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H – 1120

International Court of Justice

Filed Nov. 27, 1945

M

H-1120

H1120-0002

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

No. 1

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

- against -

HERMANN WILHELM GÖRING, et al

defendants

DOCUMENT BOOK

"M"

In re: 1933 - 1936 PREPARATION FOR AGGRESSION

ROBERT H. JACKSON
U.S. Chief of Counsel

To be argued by: SIDNEY S. ALDERMAN

Of Counsel:

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Commander, USCGR

JOSEPH DAINOW
Major, JAGD

H1120 - 0003

INDEX

DOCUMENT BOOK

1933-1936 Preparation for Aggression

Indictment paragraph IV (F) 2

Documents contained in this book in support of the brief on 1933-1936 Preparation for Aggression, are arranged in alphabetical order by series and numerical order under series.

Documents contained herein are as follows:

C List	L List	PS List
C-17	L-79	789-PS
C-23	L-172	1143-PS
C-29		1168-PS
C-32		1654-PS
C-139		2194-PS
C-140		2261-PS
C-141		2288-PS
C-153		2289-PS
C-156		2292-PS
C-159		2322-PS
C-166		2353-PS
C-189		
C-190		
C-194		

The following interrogations are also included:

Interrogation of Von Blomberg, 10 October 1945.

Extract from Interrogation of Wilhelm Keitel, 31 August 1945. Page 24.

Extract from Interrogation of Erich Raeder, 8 November 1945. Pages 1-10, inclusive.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPT OF DOCUMENT C-17
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

H1120-0004

HISTORY OF THE GERMAN NAVY 1919 - 1939

Part A (1919 - THE YEAR OF TRANSITION), Chapter VII. First efforts to circumvent the Versailles Treaty and to limit its effects. Page 70

(a) Demilitarisation of the Administration, incorporation of Naval offices in Civil Ministries, etc.

(e.g. Incorporation of greater sections of the German maritime observation station and the sea-mark system in Heligoland and Kiel, of the Ems - Jade - Canal, etc into the Reich Transport Ministry up to 1934; Noskes' proposal of 11.8.1919 to incorporate the Naval Construction Department in the Technical High School, Berlin; formation of the "Naval Arsenal Kiel".) Page 75.

(b) The saving from destruction of coastal fortifications and guns.

1. North Sea (strengthening of fortifications with new batteries and modern guns between the signing and the taking effect of the Versailles Treaty; dealings with the Control Commission - information, drawings, visits of inspection, result of efforts. Page 85.

2. Baltic. (Taking over by the Navy of fortresses Pilau and Swinemünde; salvage for the Army of 185 movable guns and mortars there.) Page 90.

3. The beginnings of coastal air defence. Page 95.

Part B (1920- 1924, - THE ORGANISATIONAL NEW ORDER) Chapter V.

The Navy
Fulfilment and avoidance of the Versailles Treaty Page 140.

Foreign Countries
(a) The inter-allied Control Commissions Page 145.
(b) Defense measures against the fulfilment of the Versailles Treaty and independent arming behind the back of the Reich Government and the legislative bodies. Page 150.

1. Dispersal of artillery gear and munitions, of hand and automatic weapons. Page 155.

2. Limitation of demolition work in HELIGOLAND. Page 160.

3. Atempt to strengthen personnel of the Navy, from 1923. Page 165.

4. The activities of Captain Lohmann (founding of numerous associations at home and abroad, participations, formation of "sports" unions and clubs, interesting the film industry in naval recruitment) Page 170.

5. Preparation for re-establishing the German U-boat arm since 1920
(Projects and deliveries for Japan, Holland, Turkey, Argentine and Finland. Torpedo testing) Page 175

6. Participation in the preparation for building of the Luftwaffe (preservation of aerodromes, aircraft construction, teaching of courses, instruction of midshipment in anti air raid defence, training of pilots). Page 180.

7. Attempt to strengthen the mining branch. Page 185.

C-17

H1120-0005

Part C (1925 - 1932. REPLACEMENT OF TONNAGE) Chapter IV.

The Navy, The Versailles Treaty, Foreign Countries.

(a) The activities of the Inter-allied Control Commissiones (up to 31.1.27; discontinuance of the activity of the Naval Peace Commission) Page 110.

Independent armament measures behind the back of the Reich Government and legislative bodies up to the LOHMANN case. Page 120.

1. The activities of Captain LOHMANN (continuation) their significance as a foundation for the rapid reconstruction work from 1935. Page 125.

2. Preparation for the re-strengthening of the German U-boat arm from 1925 (continuation), the merit of LOHMANN in connection with the preparation for rapid construction in 1925, relationship to SPAIN, ARGENTINE, TURKEY; the first post war U-boat construction of the German Navy in SPAIN since 1927; 250 ton specimen in FINLAND, preparation for rapid assembly; electric torpedo; training of U-boat personnel abroad in SPAIN and FINLAND. Formation of U-boat school in 1932 disguised as an anti U-boat school. Page 130

3. Participation in the preparation for the reconstructic of the Luftwaffe (continuation). Preparations for a Naval Air Arm, Finance Aircraft Company Severa, later Luftdienst GMBH; Naval Flying School Warnemünde; Air Station List, training of sea cadet candidates, Military tactical questions "Air Defence Journeys", technical development, experimental station planning, trials, flying boat development DoX etc., catapult aircraft, arming, engines ground organisation, aircraft torpedoes, the Deutchsland Flight 1925 and the Seaplane Race 1926 Page 135

4. Economic re-armament (The Tebeg" - Technical Advice and Supply Company as a disguised Naval Office abroad for investigating the position of raw materials for industrial capacity and other War economic questions.) Page 140

5. Various measures. (The NV Aerogeodetic Company - secret investigations.) Page 145

(c) Planned Armament Work with the tacit approval of the Reich Government, but behind the backs of the legislative bodies (1928 to the taking over of power) Page 150.

1. The effect of the Lohmann case on the secret preparations; winding up of works which could not be advocated; resumption and carrying on of other work. Page 155

2. Finance question. ("Black Funds" and the Special Budget). Page 160

3. The Labour Committee and its objectives Page 165

(d) The Question of Marine Attaches (The continuation under disguise; open re-appointment 1932-1933). Page 170.

(e) The question of Disarmament of the Fleet abroad and in Germany (The Geneva Disarmament Conference 1927; the London Naval Treaty of 1930; the Anglo-French-Italian Agreement 1931. The League of Nations Disarmament Conference 1932).

C-17

Part D (1933 - 1939. THE GERMAN NAVY DURING THE MILITARY FREEDOM PERIOD)

Chapter I.

I. National Socialism and the question of the Fleet and of prestige at sea. Page 5.

II. Incorporation of the Navy in the National Socialist State. Page 10.

(a) National Socialism in the Navy before 1933 Page 15.

(b) The taking over of powerand the Navy Page 20.

(c) The oath of the Navy to the Führer Page 25.

(d) The taking over of the National Insignia of the Party by the Navy (Autumn 1933. November 1935) Page 30.

(e) The first alteration of Flag (March 1933) and the New War Flag (7.11.35) Page 35.

(f) The Supreme Commander of the Navy placed under the Führer (February 1938) Page 40

III The Re-armament of the Navy under the Direction of the Reich Government in a disguised way. (1933 up to the achieving of military freedom in 1935) Page 45

(a) The new political bases for armament questions Reichrat Reichstag Party. Page 50

(b) The Independence of the Supreme Commander of the Navy with regard to the Re-armament and Development of the Navy. (The only limitation disguise of the re-armament work with regard to the Versailles Treaty) Page 55

(c) Public Budget and Maintaining of the previous Special Budget Page 60

(d) Preparations for the construction of a strong fleet and the first results in the constructions of the Navy (1933 - 1935) Page 65

(1. In the fleet. (Launchings, commissionings, construction of auxiliaries, etc.) Page 70

2. With coastal fortifications, etc. Page 75

IV. The Period of Military Freedom Page 80

(a) 16th March, 1935 Page 85

(b) The Fuhrer's speech dated 21.5.1935 (Point VIII concerning the future German Naval Policy). The Defence Act of 21.5.1935 and its implications for the Navy.

(The legal framework of the Navy; change of names and new formations from 1935) Page 90

H1120 - 0006

C-17

(c) German-English Fleet Relationship from 1935 Page 95

1. The attitude of the Führer to the question of competitive re-armament and a new fleet rivalry threatening peace Page 100

2. The German-Anglo Naval Agreement dated 18.6.35. Contents: example of voluntary limitation of armament; chief points: the nullification of all naval conditions of the Versailles Treaty, for example the prohibition of U-boats, aircraft, coastal fortifications. (Concerning this, 15.11.1936, the declaration of the German Government over the suspension of the limiting conditions of the Versailles Treaty.) Reich Soverneignty of waterways, for example territorial rights in the North Sea - Baltic Canal. The extensive discussions of 22.6.35 over the future qualitative limitations of construction programme. The German renunciation of the unrestricted U-boat warfare of 25.6.1935. The fulfilment of the Naval Agreement in the year 1937 and the discussions of December 1938. The abrogation of the Treaty on 28.4.1939 Page 105

(d) Naval Activity in new construction after the conclusion of the Anglo-German Agreement Page 115

1. New plans for expansion and measures for the construction programme; launchings and commissionings, coastal fortifications. (The effects of the preparations of the period 1919-1920 - with the U-baot arm.) Comparisons with foreign countries. Page 120

1a. Co-operation with the Army Page 123

2. The economic significance of re-armament of the Navy. (Scope of development of the active armament industry for the Navy) Page 125

(e) The Personnel side of re-armament. Page 130

1. The increase in numbers Page 135

2. Recruitment Page 140

3. Training question Page 145

(f) The re-incoproration of naval sections previously disbanded (e.g. sections of the German Sea-mark Service Page 150

(g) The Navy at Work Page 155

1. In representing German Interests and in warding off Bolshevistic attacks against Europe in Spain (Activities, trials, experiences) Page 160

2. The return home of Austria and the taking over of the Danube flotilla 1938. The cultivation of the "Gross-Deutschland" tradition in the Navy (Prinz Eugen) Page 165

3. The participation of the Navy in the reunion of Memel with the Reich (28.3.39) Page 170

4. Service abroad Page 175

5. Research, Surveying, Charts Page 180

6. Fishery Protection Page 185

H1120 – 0007

C-17

H1120-0008

V. The Preparation of the Merchant Navy for Future War Tasks. Page 190

VII. The encouragement of Naval and Sea mindedness in the German people. Page 215

(a) The Navy at Party Congresses. Page 220

(b) The foundation of the Reich League for German prestige at sea - its tasks and the work of the Party Page 225

(c) The Navy at the 1936 Olympic Games Page 230

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF EXCERPT OF DOCUMENT C-17

I, Gerard Schaefer, 2d Lt, Inf, O-1332102, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpt from Document No. C-17.

GERARD SCHAEFER
2d Lt, Inf.
O-1332102

C-17

H1120 – 0009

(SFC 24-3/C.23)

O.K.M.

/ - 21 - 1

(Translation of an extract from an unnamed, unnumbered file containing notes year by year from 1927 - 1940 on the reconstruction of the German Navy).

Questions of Type, Shipbuilding Plan.

C O P Y

Copy No. 2.

Berlin, 18. 2. 1938

M

to

Head of Office /

. . . . . .

The true displacement of the battleship »Scharnhorst - Gneisenau« and »F/G« exceeds by 20 % in both cases the displacement reported to the British.

. . . . . .

. . . . . .

	Length	Beam	Displacement by Type actual	notified	Draught actual/notified	
Scharnhorst	226.0	30.0	-31.300 ts	26.000 ts	8.55	7.50
»F«	241.0	36.0	-41.700 ts	35.000 ts	8.60	7.90
»HI«	254.0	41.0	-56.200 ts	46.850 ts	9.60	8.40
or »H II«	254.0	41.0	-56.200 ts	45.000 ts	9.60	8.15
or »HIII«	254.0	41.0	-56.200 ts	43.000 ts	9.60	7.85

. . . . . .

In the opinion of A IV it would under no circumstances be right to report a larger tonnage than that which for instance England, Russia or Japan will probably publish shortly, in order that we may not put upon ourselves the blame for a race in armaments.

H1120 - 0010

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-23
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(Cont.)

(Translation of an extract from an unnamed, unnumbered file containing notes year by year from 1927 - 1940 on the reconstruction of the German Navy).

SEC 24 - 3/C.23

O.K.M.

Shipbuilding Plans. BZ 221 Vol. 5 S. 5

C O P Y

Copy No. 2.

Berlin, 8. 3. 1938

General Navy Office

BB 6207/38

to M (Chief of Staff

with request to bring to the attention of the C - in - C Navy).

Subject: Address by C in C Navy to Directors of Shipbuilding Yards.

. . . . . It is proposed to make a statement/ some what along the following lines;

"In a clear cut programme for the construction of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor has set the Navy the task the carrying out of the aims of his foreign policy . . . . "

H1120 - 0011

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-23
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(Cont.)

(Translation of an extract from an unnamed, unnumbered file containing notes year by year from 1927 - 1940 on the reconstruction of the German Navy.)

(SEC 24 - 3/C. 23)

R.W.M.

A 24 - 2 Planning Committee.

C O P Y

Copy No. 2

Carls
Admiral and C - in C Fleet

Tender "Hela" September 1938

Top Secret

Opinion on the "Draft Study of Naval Warfare against England".

A. There is full agreement with the main theme of the study.

1. If according to the Fuehrer's decision Germany is to acquire a position as a world power she needs not only sufficient colonial possessions but also secure naval communications and secure access to the ocean.

2. Both requirements can only be fulfilled in opposition to anglo - french interests and would limit their position as world powers. It is unlikely that they can be achieved by peaceful means. The decision to make Germany a world power therefore forces upon us the necessity of making the corresponding preparations for war.

3. War against England means at the same time war against the Empire, against France, probably against Russia as well and a large number of countries overseas, in fact against ½ to 2/3 of the whole world.

It can only be justified and have a chance of success if it is prepared economically as well as politically and militarily and waged with the aim of conquering for Germany an outlet to the ocean.

. . . . . .

C-23

H1120 - 0012

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-23
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(Cont.)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-23

12. November 1945

I, GERARD SCHAEFFER, 2nd Lt., 01332102, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document C-23.

GERARD SCHAEFFER
2nd Lt.
01332102

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-29
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

B.Nr. MI 376/33 Top secret. Berlin W, 31 January 1933

H1120 – 0013

TOP SECRET

General directions for support given by the German Navy to the German Armament Industry.

The effects of the present economic depression have led here and there to the conclusion that there are no prospects of an active participation of the German Armament Industry abroad, even if the Versailles terms are no longer kept. There is no profit in it a nd it is therefore not worth promoting. Furthermore, the view has been taken that the increasing "self-sufficiency" would in any case make such participation superfluous.

However obvious these opinions may seem, formed because of the situation as it is today, I am nevertheless forced to make the following contradictory corrective points:

a) The economic crisis and its present effects must perforce be overcome sooner or later.

Though equality of rights in war politics is not fully recognized today, it will, by the assimilation of weapons, be achieved at some period, at least to a certain extent,

b) The consequent estimation of the duties of the German Armament Industry lies mainly in the Military-political sphere.

It is impossible for this industry to satisfy, militarily and economically, the growing demands made of it by limiting the deliveries to our own armed forces. Its capacity must therefore be increased by the delivery of supplies to foreign countries over and above our own requirements.

c) Almost every country is working to the same end today, even those which, unlike Germany, are not tied down by restrictions. Britain, France, North America, Japan, and especially Italy are making supreme efforts to ensure markets for their armament industries. The use of their diplomatic representations, of the propaganda voyages of their most modern ships and vessels, of sending missions and also of the guaranteeing of loans and insurance against deficits are not merely to gain commercially advantageous orders for their armament industries, but first and foremost to expand their output from the point of view of military policy.

d) It is just when the efforts to do away with the restrictions imposed on us have succeeded, that the German Navy has an ever increasing and really vital interest in furthering the German Armament Industry and preparing the way for it in every direction in the competetive battle against the rest of the world.

e) If, however, the German Armament Industry is to be able to compete in foreign countries, it must inspire the confidence of its purchasers. The condition for this is that secrecy for our own ends be not carried toofar. The amount of material to be kept secret under all circumstances in the interest of the defence of the country is comparatively small. I would like to issue a warning against the assumption that, at

C-29

the present stage of technical development in foreign industrial states, a problem of vital military importance which we perhaps have solved, has not been solved there. Solutions arrived at today, which may become known, if divulged to a third person by naturally always possible indiscretion, have often been already superceded by new and better solutions on our part, even at that time, or at any rate after the copy has been made. It is of greater importance that we should be technically well to the fore in any really fundamental matters, than that less important points should be kept secret unnecessarily and excessively.

f) To conclude: I attach particular importance to guaranteeing the continuous support of the Industry concerned by the navy, even after the present restrictions have been relaxed. If the purchasers are not made confident that something special is being offered them, the industry will not be able to stand up to the competetive battle and therefore will not be able to supply the requirements of the German Navy in case of need.

Sgn. Raeder.

Distribution:

A
B
VGM
Ing
K
Abw (by message)

(various illegible notations)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF EXCERPT FROM C-29

9 November 1945

I, ERNST M. COHN, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpt from Document No. C-29.

ERNST M. COHN
33925738

H1120 - 0014

H1120 - 0015

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-32
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

3 copies SURVEY LIST COMPILED AFTER THE CONFERENCE WITH THE CHIEF OF "A"
1st copy (Illegible notes) SECTION ON 9 SEPTEMBER 1933

MOST SECRET
I Material Measures

Neu A II v 4212/33 Most Secret

Ser No.	Measure	Details	Remarks
1	Exceeding the permitted number of mines	Number permitted: 1665 Actual number: 3675 x) should occasion arise, this number could possibly be increased by the addition of newly delivered mines.	Further mines are in part ordered, in part being delivered.
2	Continuous storing of guns from the North Sea area for Baltic artillery batteries.	The following guns, which according to the Versailles Treaty may be removed temporarily from their positions for maintenance reasons only, are permanently stored up in the Baltic area: 3 - 30.5 cm 3 - 28 cm 68 - 15 cm 14 - 10.5 cm 8 - 8.8 cm 96 guns	Justification: Necessity for over-hauling. Cheaper repairs.
3	Non-destruction of guns which could be used for new ships and other new guns by the preparations for new armament.	Since 1919, the following guns have been newly constructed: 6 - 28 cm (for Deutschland) 48 - 15 cm (for Deutschland, cruiser) 22 - 10.5 cm 4 - 8.8 cm 80 guns	Since then, the following guns have been handed over to the Army for scrapping: 10 - 28 cm (actually scrapped) 8 - 21 cm A receipt was sent 7 - 21 cm from the Army 25 - 15 cm to the Naval 8 - 10.5 cm Staff (B.W.) saying 30 - 8.8 cm that the 99 2 - 7.02 cm guns had been 9 - 3.7 cm scrapped. We know however that the guns were not scrapped. As this is so, the question is settled as far as the Navy is concerned.

C-32

Ser. No.	Measure	Details	Remarks
4	Deviation from the places settled by the Entente for the disposition of coastal batteries.	When the change in armament took place, the following batteries were not set up in exactly the places laid down by the Entente. Coronal, Borkum (4-28cm) Grosser Kurfurst, Pillau (3-28cm) Graf Dohna, Pillau (3-17cm) v. Hermann, Pillau (2-8.8cm)	A transfer conditioned by modernisation, to avoid firing damage and to gain a clear field of fire. Coronel has been set up within the battery area, the other 3 batteries outside it. A small point, Coastal fortifications are purely defence measures. When the equality of rights has been recognised, discussion on this question is unnecessary.
5	Laying gun-platforms for artillery batteries and storing Flak ammunition in Borkum, Sylt, Norderney, where no Flak batteries have been allowed.	Gun-platforms for the following artillery Flak batteries have been layed or are being constructed in positions not allowed by the Entente: 8 in Pillau 7 in Swinemuende 2 in Bug 2 in Nest 1 in Borkum	Flak defence is purely a defence measure.
6	Laying gun-platforms in the Kiel area.	The following gun-platforms have been laid or are being constructed in the Kiel area for artillery Flak batteries: 2 completed 4 in construction	The offence over and above that in Serial number 3 lies in the fact that all fortifications are forbidden in the Kiel area. This justification will make it less severe: pure defence measures.
7	Exceeding the calibre permitted for coastal batteries	v.d.Groeben 3-17cm in place of 6-15cm Graf Dohna 3-17cm in place of 6-15cm	Possible justification is that, though the calibre is larger, the number of guns is less.
8	Arming of Mine-Sweepers.	The arming of the mine-sweepers of the 1st and 2nd mine-sweeping half flotillas. The armament consists of: 1 - 10.5 1 - MG C/30	The reply to any remonstrance against this breach: the guns are taken from the Fleet reserve stores, have been temporarily installed only for training purposes. All nations arm their mine-sweeping forces (equality of rights).

H1120-0016

C-32

H1120 -0017

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-32
Contd.

Ser No.	Measure	Details	Remarks
9	Arming of 6 E-boats and 8 Motor mine-sweepers.	The boats have MG C/30. E-boats are also equipped with torpedoes.	Reply to the question: arming; Only temporary for training and experimental purposes.
10	Setting up practice Flak batteries.	Several practice Flak batteries have been set up for training purposes in positions where, according to the Versailles Treaty, they are not allowed.	The practice Flak batteries stand on provisional gun-platforms so that the character of the temporary measure may be retained. Training of personnel purely as a defence measure.
11	Salute battery Friedrichsort.	The battery should be equipped only with 7.7 cm field guns rendered unserviceable it has however, 4 8.8 cm A/A guns quite ready for use.	Purely a defence measure.
12	Exceeding the amount of allowed ammunition.	The permitted total amt. of ammunition has been exceeded to the following extent: Actual Amt. / Amount permitted 17 cm 16 700 / 14 600 15 cm 90 000 / 85 600 10.5cm 87 000 / 134000 88cm 166 000 / 164 000 6 cm 3 600 / 8 600 3.7cm 63 500 / 118 000 426 800 / 524 800 The numbers are given in round figures. The ammunition for heavy artillery has not been included as in this case the actual amount is less than the amount permitted.	At the present moment; large quantities of ammunition are in part being produced, in part being delivered so that the total amount of ammunition permitted will also soon be exceeded. To the question: Ammunition for heavy artillery is not so much as allowed. The contingents of material stocks were not fixed in any of the agreements and suggestions for Naval disarmament already made. Equality of rights.
13	Exceeding the number of machine guns etc. permitted.	Amount permitted / Actual Amount 1)m/g's 656 / 954 2)rifles 10233 / 18133 3)pistols 3483 / 5553 4)gas-masks 22500 / 43000 The actual amount of ammunition, side-arms, hand-grenades, search-lights, smoke-apparati, etc. likewise exceed the amount permitted but not to any considerable extent.	Can be made light of.

C-32

H1120 - 0018

Ser. No.	Measure	Details	Remarks
14	Obtaining 337 m/g C/30 without scrapping equally serviceable weapons.	112 m/g C/30 have already been delivered. They are counted as machine guns. The corresponding number of m/g's has not, however, been destroyed. The existance of 2 cm ammunition with detonators is in itself already a breach of the Hague Treaty.	It devolves into a question of detonators. Otherwise it is a small matter. Weapons for a purely defensive measure (air defence).
15 16	Intended. Arming of U-boat depot-ships.) Arming of E-boat depot-ships.)	As the term "exempt ships" has not yet been applied to Germany, this arming is a breach of the Versailles Treaty.	For the present, the armament should not be mounted.
17	Intended construction of reserve destroyers of 1850 tons.	The question of reserve ships has not yet been settled in our favour. Under the Macdonald plan, the construction and tonnage would be justifiable.	Not to be settled until further notice. If necessary, it could be declared that, according to the Macdonald plan, it would be possible and that we had agreed to this plan.
18	Construction of U-boat parts.		Difficult to detect. If necessary can be denied.
19	Intended construction of a large armoured ship.		Not to be settled until further notice. On the other hand, it must be established that the possibilities of the Versailles Treaty have not yet been fully exploited.
20	Arming of fishing vessels.		For warning shots. Make little of it.
21	Arrangement for Gebr. Thiel G.m.b.H. Ruhla to undertake the further manufacture of mechanised detonators. Holding ready separate parts, mechanism, tools for the work, so that the time required for starting work is shortened.	Together with the Army.	These firms are permissable. The list has been superseded in any case by the exclusion of firms etc. To be made light of.

C-32

H1120 - 0019

Ser. No.	Measure	Details	Remarks
22	Arranging for the Westfälisch-Anhaltische Sprengstoffabrik A.G. (Wasag). Reinsdorf to undertake the further manufacture of explosives.	Together with the Army.	These firms are permissable. The list has been superseded in any case by the exclusion of firms etc. To be made light of.
23	Arranging for Julius Pintsch A.G., Fürstenwalde (Spree) to undertake the production of mine-shells.	Together with the Army.	This firm is permitted only for torpedo tubes and air compressors. The list has been superseded in any case by the exclusion of firms etc. To be made light of.
24	Incorporation of the firm Kuhlmann, Wilhelmshaven in the work of manufacturing discharge opening cases.	According to the list of firms, K. is not permissible.	The list has been superseded in any case by the exclusion of firms etc. To be made light of.
25	Arranging for Fried. Krupp Grusonwerk A.G. Magdeburg to undertake the manufacture of Flak shells, Flak gun barrels, 2 cm to 10.5 cm. Holding ready part-materials, mechanisms, tools for the work so that the time required for starting work may be shortened.	Also not permissible.	
26	Arranging for the Mitteldeutsche Stahlwerke A.G., Lauchhammerwerk Gröditz to undertake the manufacture of Flak shells. Holding ready part-material, mechanisms, tools for the work so that the time required for starting work may be shortened.	Also not permissible.	
27	Arranging for A.G. Lignose, Sprengstoffabrik Schönebeck/ Elbe to undertake the manufacture of explosives.	Also not permissible.	
28	Arranging for Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nurnberg A.G., Augsburg Works to undertake the mass production of engine types, essential for war purposes. Holding ready part-material, mechanisms, tools for the work so that the time required for starting work may be shortened	The measure can be opposed as a whole as a preparation for mobilization.	Together with the Army.

C-32

H1120 - 0020

Ser. No.	Measure	Details	Remarks
29	Preparations in the sphere of motor experimental boats.		
30	Probably in the near future (up to and including 1934) the following serious breaches will be necessary: 1) Continuation of the work in A I, 1-3. 2) Continuation of the work in No. 21,22. 3) Continuation of the work in 24,25,26, 27, further work of 25 by Fried. Krupp Grusonwerk A.G. in the production of complete guns. 4) Expansion of the Work in 24-28 to include further armament spheres.		

H1120 - 0021

Ser. No.	Measure	Details	Remarks
29	Preparations in the sphere of motor experimental boats.		
30	Probably in the near future (up to and including 1934) the following serious breaches will be necessary: 1) Continuation of the work in A I, 1-3. 2) Continuation of the work in No. 21,22. 3) Continuation of the work in 24,25,26, 27, further work of 25 by Fried. Krupp Grusonwerk A.G. in the production of complete guns. 4) Expansion of the Work in 24-28 to include further armament spheres.		

H1120-0022

APPENDIX TO AII v 4212/33 MOST SECRET
MOST SECRET (illegible notations)

II Measures of organization

Ser. No.	Measure	Details	Remarks
1	Methodical preparatory work in preparation for mobilization.	Relevant correspondence and appropriate allotting of personnel (G.A.F. employees) The same applies to the Army	Can be regarded as a natural measure to take, with reference to the equality of rights.
2	Creating a camouflage system of economy.	The same with the Army.	
3	Negotiations with the civil authorities and the responsible part to be taken by them in the preparations for mobilization.	The same with the Army. The Army is taking the lead.	
4	Creating groups and departments of the military authorities, which are concerned solely with the preparations for reinforcement.	The same with the Army.	
5.	Exceeding the permitted number of active personnel by the measures of reconstruction.	from 1 June 33 approx. 1500 persons from 1 Jan. 34 approx. 2300 persons The army accordingly.	In the navy, however, the number of officers is at the moment far <u>below</u> the officer quota given in the Versailles Treaty.
6	Inclusion of units of the Armed Forces in planned preparations for the defense of the Reich, by the appropriate measures of organization and training.	The same with the Army.	
7	Training outside the Armed Forces for the purpose of creating a reserve of leaders and sub-leaders, also the corresponding young replacements and a specialist reserve.	Training establishments in Pillau — Wangerooge Swinemünde — Schillig Neustadt — Wilhelmshaven Kiel — Borkum in the large towns of the Reich outside the demilitarized zones.	with arms without arms

H1120 - 0023

Ser. No.	Measure.	Details	Remarks
8	Creating a replacement organization	imminent (Army) (started on 1 Oct. 33)	
9	Creating an L-officers corps	in camouflaged form the same with the Army	
10	Nominal and statistical roll of reserve personnel.		
11	Professorships of military science	In connection with the Reich Ministry of Military Science. Same with the Army.	Lectures by active officers.
12	Determining the production capacity of the war-essential industries.	In cooperation with the Army.	
13	Preparations on paper for making full use of the war-essential industries in case of war.	In cooperation with the Army.	
14	Preparations for the supply organisation of the Armed Forces in War.	In cooperation with the Army.	

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-32

12 November 1945.

I, ERNST M. COHN, PFC, 33925738, AUS, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German Languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. C-32.

ERNST M. COHN
PFC - AUS
33,925,738

C-32

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-139
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

H1120 - 0024

SEC.24-7/C-139

Top Secret.
S.C.

The Reich Minister of Defence
Nr. 1400/35 g.Kdos.L.Chef.

Berlin, 2nd May 1935

2nd copy (Note in Blue pencil "By hand only")

To: Chief of Army High Command
Chief of Navy High Command
Reich Minister for Air

For the operation, suggested in the last Staff Talks of the Armed Forces, I lay down the Code name "Schulung" ("Training").

The supreme direction of operation "Schulung" rests with the Reich Minister of Defence as this is a joint undertaking of the three Services.

Preparations for the operation will begin forthwith according to the following directives:

I. General.

1.) The operation must, on issue of the code word "Carry Out Schulung", be executed by a surprise blow at lightning speed.

Strictest secrecy is necessary in the preparations and only the very smallest number of officers should be informed and employed in the drafting of reports, drawings etc., and these officers only in person.

2.) There is no time for mobilisation of the Forces taking part. These will be employed in their peace-time strength and with their peace-time equipment.

3.) The preparation for the operation will be made without regard to the present inadequate state of our armaments. Every improvement of the state of our armaments will make possible a greater measure of preparedness and thus result in better prospects of success.

II. In particular, I request suggestions about the following points:

1.) High Command of the Army:

a) How many divisions ready for action and what other suitable troops, including all motorised troops, can be made available for the operation?

Basis of the calculations:
Restriction to pure defence - if necessary delaying resistance - in the West.
Reinforcement of the necessarily inadequate forces there by the East Prussian divisions which will be transported there immediately by rail or sea.

b) Concentration area or areas and time taken by concentration.

c) Plans for the carrying out of the operation.

2.) High Command of the Navy.

Safe transport of the East-Prussian troops by sea if transport by land is not possible.

3.) Air-Force.

a) Support for the attack carried out under "Schulung" by the army.
b) Examination of the possibilities of further assistance to the defence in the West.

(signed) v.Blomberg

C-139

SEC.24-7/C-139.

H1120-0025

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT C-139, SEC.24-7

5 November 1945

I, VIRGINIA VON SCHON, (CIV), 046318, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document C-139, SEC.24-7.

VIRGINIA VON SCHON
046318.

C-139

H1120-0026

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-140
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

(SEC-24,7/C-140)

Only by Officer, to be passed by hand.

The Reich Minister for Defense
No.7/33 top secret War Ministry

Berlin, 25th October 1933

Top secret

To: Chief of Army High Command
Chief of Navy High Command
Reich Minister for Air

(several illegible notations)

1) The enclosed directive gives the basis for preparations of the Armed Forces in the case of sanctions being applied against Germany.

2) I request the Chiefs of the Army and Navy High Commands and the Reich Minister for Air to carry out the preparations in accordance with the following points:

(a) Strictest secrecy. It is of the utmost importance that no fact become known to the outside world from which preparation for resistance against sanctions can be inferred or which is incompatible with Germany's existing obligations, in the sphere of foreign policy, regarding the demilitarised zone. If necessary, the preparations must take second place to this necessity.

Measures in the process of execution, designed to strengthen our long-range system of defense, are not affected by the attached directives.

(b) The circle of persons taking part in the preparations will be restricted, for the time being, to the War Ministry (Reichswehrministerium) and the Reich Ministry for Air. Insofar as the Chief of the Army High Command wishes to contact the Reich Minister of the Interior with regard to the Mobilised Police (Bereitschaftspolizei), this ruling should also be observed.

(c) I forbid all preparations of a practical nature until further notice.

3) I request early reports by the Chiefs of the Army and Navy High Commands and the Reich Minister for Air on the measures intended and on blockading, demolition, and evacuation. Reports [illegible] are also to be submitted to me on intentions regarding concrete measures of armament. I will subsequently decide on the participation of the National Defense Board (Landesverteidigungsrat) in further preparations.

I intend to call a meeting of individual agencies (Aussenstellen) of the Army and the Navy in the War Ministry the end of next week, for a discussion of the most important questions.

(signed) v. Blomberg.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT C-140

15 November 1945

I VIRGINIA VON SCHON, 046318 hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document C-140.

VIRGINIA VON SCHON
046318.

C-140

H1120 - 0027

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-140
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

(SEC-24.7/C-140)

To A I op 23/35. (in pencil)

Appendix to "The Reich-Minister for Defence No. 7/33 secret Reich Ministry of Defence.

Berlin, 25.10.1935.
Secret 114.

Directive
for the Armed Forces
in case of Sanctions.

Weisung
fur die Wehrmacht
im Falle von Sanktionen.

1.) The further development of the international situation created by Germany's giving notice of leaving the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference, can lead to the application of sanction measures against Germany.

It is not known which States will take steps towards sanctions. As long as the Council of the League of Nations does not decide upon joint action, France should first of all be considered. But France can induce Poland, Belgium and Czechoslovakia also to apply sanctions.

2.) The sanctions of the opponents can be of various natures.

The Armed Forces will be immediately and directly affected by such measures as entail a violation of German Territory, particularly therefore, if the enemy's forces break into, fly over or shell German land areas. The same applies at sea to the 3-miles zone (pencil margin-note - mine-laying) also in case of enemy measures against German naval force in case of the capture or sinking of German merchant ships, in case of the blockade of the German coast as well as in case of attack on German coastal fortifications or places.

First of all an occupation of German territory is to be reckoned with.

3.) The Government of the Reich is determined to reply to all enemy actions as described under figure 2, with a local armed resistance, without regard to the chances of military success. (for restrictions see figure 5. a) to c)). (Pencil margin note: Resistance).

This resistance will be made only by the Army, Navy and Air Force and the other forces, which have been expressly described as components of and which are under orders of the Armed Forces. These other forces must comply with the conditions of Article 1.) of the Appendix to the Treaty regarding the laws and usages of land warfare of 18.10.1907.

4.) In order to carry out armed resistance, the following emergency, and defensive measures of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, are visualized:

a). Systematic formation of the A-Army (A-Heeres). The whole Provincial and/or Emergency Police Force of the states (Länder) is, as a fighting body, at the disposal of the Chief of the Army High Command and under his orders. Defence-District-Command I (Wehrkr.Kdo.I) has at its disposal the East Prussian Provincial Police Force.

C-140

H1120 - 0028

b). Systematic formation of the V-Navy(V-Marine) and its further reinforcement as material and personnel possibilities permit.

c). Systematic formation of the A-Air Force (A-Luftwaffe) including the passive air defence of the Reich.

The air-forces planned for co-operation with the Army and the Navy, as soon as ready, will be placed under the orders of the Commander in Chief of the Army or Navy.

The field passive air defence troops (Feldluftschutz--truppen) planned for the Army will be available at first for the passive air defence of the Reich. I reserve for myself the time of placing them under the orders of the Chief of the Army Command.

5.) The following tasks of the armed resistance to be offered are to be envisaged first.

a). on land :

The ensuring of the positioning of the A-Army against France-Belgium, against Poland and Czechoslovakia together with the Frontier Guards (the reinforced Frontier Guard - Survey Service included) and the Provincial and/or Emergency Police Force. In the West the line Roer-Rhine and the Black Forest, in the East of the Reich the position Hotzenplotz-Oder-Nischlitz-Obra and Pomerania must be held as long as possible. In the struggle against Czechoslovakia ground may be given only yard by yard. As far as East Prussia is concerned the present regulations remain in force.

A concentration of forces of the Army in the demilitarised zone or their entry into the same requires my consent.

b). At sea:

Protection of commerce in the North and Baltic seas.
Securing of communication with East Prussia.

Defence against enemy attacks launched from the sea and from the air against the German Coast.

I reserve for myself the approval of all enterprises which have not the character of armed resistance (pencil note: see para 2) such as attacks against Gdingen, mining operations which exceed local or tactical purposes, as well as of counter-measures against an enemy blockade (marginal note in pencil; as long as the blockade has nothing to do with para.2 or 3) and the opening of warfare against merchant and naval shipping.

c). in the Air:

Defence of the air over Berlin and over the industrial part of central Germany, with Berlin as the centre of gravity.

C-140

H1120 – 0029

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-140.
(cont'd)

The employment of Bombers remains reserved.

I reserve for myself the approval of declaration of restricted areas for civil aviation.

signed. Blomberg.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-140.

I, KENNETH DUKE, Major, R.A.,109907, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. C-140.

KENNETH DUKE,
Major.,R.A.
109907.

C-140

H1120 - 0030

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-141
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

The Chief of Naval Command
B.Nr. A IIIb 2271/31 G.Kds (Stamp S.O.) BERLIN, 10 February 19[illegible]

To
S.O. Baltic Station, Kiel.
Fleet Command, Kiel.
Flag Officer Reconnaissance Forces.
Inspectorate of Torpedoes and Mining, Kiel. (3 Copies)
Naval Arsenal, Kiel.
S.O. North Sea Station, Wilhelmshaven (repeated)
Dockyard Wilhelmshaven (repeated)

Subject: Torpedo - Armament of E-Boats.*

"In view of our treaty obligations and the Disarmament Conference steps must be taken to prevent the 1st E-Boat-Half-Flotilla, which in a few months will consist of exactly similar newly built (E)-Boats, from appearing openly as a formation of torpedo-carrying boats (Torpedotraeger) as it is not intended to count these E-Boats against the number of torpedo-carrying boats allowed us."

I therefore order:

1.) "S2" - "S5", will be commissioned in the shipyard (Luerssen, Vegesack) without armament, and will be fitted with easily removable cover-sheet-metal on the spaces necessary for torpedo-tubes. The same will be arranged by T.M.I.** in agreement with the Naval-Arsenal, for the boat "S1" which will dismantle its torpedo-tubes, on completion of the practice shooting for fitting on another boat.

2.) The torpedo-tubes of all S-Boats will be stored in the Naval Arsenal ready for immediate fitting. During the trial runs the torpedo-tubes will be taken on board one after the other for a short time to be fitted and for practice shooting so that only one boat at a time carries torpedo armament. For public consumption this boat will be in service for the purpose of temporary trials by the T.V.A.*** It should not anchor together with the other, unarmed, boats of the Half-Flotilla because of the obvious similarity of type. The duration of firing, and consequently the length of time the torpedo-tubes are aboard, is to be as short as possible.

3.) Fitting the torpedo-tubes on all E-Boats is intended as soon as the situation of the political control allows it.

(Signed) Raeder.

* Translator's note: E-Boat has been used for S-Boat throughout
** - ditto - : ? = Inspectorate of Torpedoes and Mining
*** - ditto - : = Technical Research Establishment

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-141

24 November 1945.

I, D. E. SHERRIFF, Second Officer, WRNS, 36482, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. C-141.

D. E. SHERRIFF,
2/O, WRNS,
36482.

C-141

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-153
OFFICE OF U[illegible]CHIEF OF COUNSEL

The Chief of the Naval Command Staff (Marineleitung)

Reg. No. A I st 1000/34 Gkdos — Berlin, 12 May 1934.

Top Secret — Copy No: 3

Armament plan (A.P.) for the 3rd. Armament Phase

I. General Preliminary Observations.

1.) The war tasks, within the framework of the defence of the Reich, indicated to the Navy by the Reich Minister of Defence, form the basis for all military considerations and decisions.

2.) The war and operational plans resultant from the war tasks provide the direction for a clearly defined armaments target.

3.) The planned organisation of armament measures is necessary for the realisation of the target; this again requires a co-ordinated and planned expenditure in peace time. This organisation of financial measures over a number of years according to the military viewpoint is found in the Armament Programme and provides

a) for the military leaders a sound basis for their operational considerations

and

b) for the political leaders a clear picture of what may be achieved with the military means available at a given time.

4.) The A-Plan should accordingly be the directing factor in the composition of the annual budget.

5.) Owing to the speed of military political development since Germany quitted Geneva and based on the progress of the army, the new A-Plan will only be drawn up for a period of 2 years. The 3rd A phase lasts accordingly from 1.4.34 to 31.3.36.

6.) The 3rd A-Phase emphasizes reorganization. The expenditure becoming necessary owing to increases in strength of the correspondingly increased training activity lessens the amount available for purely A objects. In the meantime discomforts of all kinds (smaller barrack space and the forgoing of some amenities for instance) will have to be accepted in order to enable the existing gaps in our armaments to be filled as far as possible. By the skilled apportioning and exploitation of arms and equipment available and under issue, expenditure on costly training equipment must be kept within limits commensurate with the progress of the armament programme.

7.) All theoretical and practical A-preparations are to be drawn up with a primary view to readiness for a war without any alert period. Measures which require for their execution and completion a longer period than is envisaged in the "A" plan + are temporarily withdrawn.

II. Financial Basis.

1.) The following assumptions will form the basis for the preparations of the A.P.

Budget 34	amounting to 396.-	
Budget 35	" " 434.-	830 Mill. R.M.

For current peacetime expenditure including Personnel

C-153

1934	171.-		
1935	190.-	361	Mill. R.M.
Blance available for armament purposes of which for ship replacement construction		469	" "
1934	148.-		
1935	175.-	323	" "
Balance for other Armaments		146	" "

H1120-0032

(s. Table in Appendix D)

2.) The budget resources detailed in para II, 1 include all sources available for naval purposes (public budget, conversion budget, B budget, labour programme etc.)

III. Armaments - Target (A-Target) for the 3rd A-phase (until 1.4.36) ++

1.) General .....

2.) In Detail .....

IV. Organisation of the A.P.

1.) The material organisation in the new A.P. is arranged according to the following groups.

I	=	New construction
II	=	Air Defence (without munitions)
III	=	Improvement on ships (Ship = incl. engine construction
IV	=	" " " (Armaments)
V	=	Artillery - Munitions and Stores
VI	=	Artillery measures
VII	=	Torpedo "
VIII	=	Barrage "
IX	=	Signals "
X	=	Bases incl. Dock and Arsenal
XI	=	'J-' preparations (Supply)
XII	=	Training
XIII	=	Accomodation and Clothing

+++ .....

V. Order of Priority.....

VI. Execution of the R.P.....

RAEDER

+ T's Note: 'A' in original not R (Ruestung) Plan, as elsewhere.
++ Translator's Note: From III headings only have been given.
+++ Translator's Note: Details of Appendices follow.

C-153

H1120 - 0033

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-153
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

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- -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-153

11 November 1945.

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, 2nd Lt, 01332102, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. C-153.

GERARD SCHAEFER
2nd Lt, 01332102

d/158

H1120 – 0034

SEC-24.9/C-156

Service publication Nr. 15 Copy Nr. 274

Secret

The fight of the Navy against Versailles 1919 - 1935

Compiled by

Captain Schüssler

Published

by the High Command of the German Navy

Berlin 1937

M. Dr. Nr. 352

C-156

H1120 - 0035

SEC-24.9/C-156.

Preface.

The object and aim of this memorandum is to draw a technically reliable picture based on documentary records and the evidence of those who took part, of the fight of the Navy against the unbearable regulations of the Peace Treaty of Versailles.

It shows, that the Reich Navy after the liberating activities of the Free Corps and of Scapa Flow did not rest, but found ways and means to lay with unquenchable enthusiasm, in addition to the building up of the 15,000-man Navy, the basis for a greater development in the future and so create by the work of soldiers and technicians the preliminary condition for a later rearmament.

It must also distinguish more clearly the services of these men, who - without being known in wide circles - applied themselves with extraordinary zeal in responsibility in the service of the fight against the Peace Treaty; thereby, stimulated by the highest feeling of duty, they risked, particularly in the early days of their fight, themselves and their positions unrestrainedly in the partially self-ordained tasks.

This compilation makes it clearer however, that even such ideal and ambitious plans can be realised only to a small degree if the concentrated and united strength of the whole people is not behind the courageous activity of the soldier. Only when the Fuehrer had created the second and even more important condition for an effective rearmament, in the co-ordination of the whole nation and in the fusion of the political , financial and spiritual powers, could the work of the soldier find its fulfilment.

The framework of this Peace Treaty, the most shameful known in world history, collapsed under the driving power of this united will.

Pillau, 20 April 1937. The Compiler.

C-156

H1120 - 0036

SEC-24.9/C-156.

Summary of Contents.

I. First defensive actions against the execution of the Treaty of Versailles.
(From the end of war to the occupation of the Ruhr 1923)

1. Saving of coastal guns from destruction 7
2. Removal of Artillery equipment and ammunition, Hand and Machine Weapons 12
3. Limitation of destruction in Heligoland 18

II. Independent armament measures behind the back of Reichs government and of the legislative bodies.
(From 1923 to the Lohmann case 1927)

1. Attempt to increase the personnel strength of the Reich Navy 22
2. Contribution to the strengthening of patriotism among the people 24
3. Activities of Captain Lohmann 25
4. Preparation for the resurrection of the German U-Boat arm 38
5. Building up of the Air Force 50
6. Attempt to strengthen our Mine Arm 64
7. Economic rearmament 65
8. Miscellaneous measures:
   a. The N.V. Aerogeodetic 67
   b. Secret evidence 68

III. Planned armament works countenanced by the Reich government, but behind the back of the legislative bodies.
(From 1928 to the seizure of power 1933) 70

IV. Rearmament under the leadership of the Reich Government in camouflaged form
(From 1933 to the freedom from restrictions 1935) 75

(Translator's Note:

Appended are a list of the 119 guns approved by the conference of Ambassadors on 27. 10. 22., an index of persons mentioned and a plan of Heligoland).

C-156

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-156.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

SEC-24.9/C-156.

Copy Nr. 274.

Secret.
The fight of the Navy
against Versailles
1919 - 1935.
Compiled by
Captain Schüssler
Published
by the High Command of the German Navy
Berlin 1937.

M. Dr. Nr. 352

Dienstschrift Nr. 15.

Brief = Nr 274.

Geheim.
Der Kampf der Marine
gegen Versailles
1919 - 1935
Bearbeitet von
Kapitan zur See Schüssler
Herausgegeben
vom Oberkommando der Kriegs marine
Berlin 1937.

M. Dv. Nr. 352

- -

CHAPTER IV PAGE 75.

Concealed Rearmament under the Leadership of
the Government of the Reich.
(From 1933 until military freedom in 1935).

IV. Aufrüstung unter Führung der Reichs=
regierung in getarnter Form.

(Von 1933 bis zur Wehrfreiheit 1935).

The unification of the whole nation which was combined with the taking over of power on the 30th of January 1933 was of decisive influence on the size and the shape of further rearmament. While the second chamber (Reichsrat) approached its dissolution and withdrew as a legislative body, the Reichstag assumed a composition which could only take a one sided attitude towards the re-armament of the Armed Forces.

The Government took over the management of the re-armament programme upon this foundation.

Development of the Armed Forces.

This taking over of the management by the Reich Government developed for the Armed Forces in such a manner that the War Minister, General v. Blomberg, and through him the three branches of the Armed Forces received far reaching powers from the Reich Cabinet for the development of the Armed Forces. The whole organisation of the Reich was included in this work. In view of these powers the collaboration of the former inspecting body in the management of the secret expenditure was from then on dispensed with. There remained only the inspecting duties of the Accounting Office of the German Reich.

Independance of the Commander in Chief of
the Navy.

The Commander in Chief of the Navy, Admiral Raeder, (honorary Doctor), had received hereby a far reaching independence in the building and development of the Navy. This was only hampered insofar as the previous concealment of re-armament had to be continued in consideration of the Versailles Treaty.

C-156

Beside the public budget there remained the previous special budget, which was greatly increased in view of the considerable credits for the provision of labor which were made available by the Reich. Wide powers in the handling of these credits were given to the Director of the Budget Department of the Navy, up to 1934 Commodore Schüssler afterwards Commodore Förste. These took into consideration the increased responsibility of the Chief of the Budget.

Declaration of military freedom.

When the Führer, relying upon the strengthening of the Armed Forces executed in the meanwhile, announced the restoration of the military sovereign ty of the German Reich the last mentioned limitation in re-armament works, namely the external camouflage was eliminated. Freed from all the shackles which have hampered our ability to move freely on and under water, on land and in the air for 1½ decades, and carried by the newly awakened fighting spirit of the whole nation, the Armed Forces and as part of it the Navy can lead with full strength towards its completion the re-armament already under way with the goal of securing for the Reich its rightful position in the world.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

I, KENNETH DUKE, Major, R.A., 109907, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of an excerpt of Document No. C-156.

KENNETH DUKE,
Major, R.A.,
109907.

H1120 - 0038

C-156

H1120 - 0039

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-159
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
( )

SEC24-9/C-159

(Reader's initials in green pencil).

(Red pencil note- To be submitted to the C-in-C of the Navy)

The War Minister and C-in-C of the Armed Forces

Berlin W35, 2.3.36.
Tirpitzufer 72-76
Telephone: B1 Kurfuerst 8191

W A No. 380/36 Most Secret L I
S.O. only

Written by an officer

To:
The C-in-C of the Army
The C-in-C of the Navy
The Air Minister and C-in-C of the Air Force

Supreme Command of the Navy
Reg. No. AI Op 14/36

1. The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor has made the following decision:

By reason of the Franco-Russian alliance, the obligations accepted by Germany in the Locarno Treaty, as far as they apply to articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles wich refer to the demilitarised zone, are to be regarded as obsolete.

2. Sections of the Army and Air Force will therefore be transferred simultaneonsly in a surprise move to garrisons of the demilitarised zone. In this connection I issue the following orders:

3.

a) Re-forming his divisional staffs, the C-in-C of the Army is to move forward sections consisting mainly of the VI, IX and V Army Corps into the demilitarised zone in such a way that they will be transferred to permanent garrisons onthe Rhine and East of it. Apart from that, one Infantry Batallion shall be transferred to Aachen, one to Trier and one to Saarbruecken.

The Regional Police Inspectorates West, South West, and South will come entirely under the orders of the C-in-C of the Army for the purpose of incorporating them into the army.

b) The Reich Air Minister and C-in-C of the Air Force will transfer one fighter squadron each to the area around Cologne and Coblenz, and sections of the AAA into or near such towns on the Lower and Middle Rhine where the most important Rhine bridges are.

4. The movements are to be prepared and synchronised in such a way by the C-in-C of the Army and the C-in-C of the Air Force that the first Staffel, including the batallions assigned to Aachen, Trier and Saarbruecken, and the AAA guns arrive in the Rhine Valley at 1200 hours on Z-day and the first fighter squadrons

H1120 - 0040

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-159
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(Cont.)

land at the same time.

A second Staffal, comprising all the remaining sections of the Army assigned to the demilitarised zone will follow within 24 hours. Orders for Z-day will be given at the appropriate time.

5. Marching orders for the troops which are to be transferred, are to be given as late as possible. Every precaution must be taken to shorten the period between the commencement of practical preparations for the actual move and the entry into the demilitarised zone.

The C-in-C of the Army will see to it that the responsible departments of the general and interior administration, of the Police Force, of the municipalities, and of the Party are not informed before 0800 hours on Z-Day about the billetting of Army and Air Force men in their area.

6. To preserve the peaceful character of the operation, military security or advance measures are <u>not</u> to be taken without my express orders.

On Z-Day, from 0800 hours until further notice, however it must be ensured that the command posts of the three services can commence work day and night at short notice. Persons on leave are not to be recalled.

7. If the other powers who have signed the Locarno Treaty reply to the transfer of German troops into the demilitarised zone with military preparations, I reserve the right to decide on any military counter-measures.

In the event of enemy frontier violations with offensive intent, action must be taken in accordance with instructions for taking up position and battle orders.

8. I request:

a) timely information on instructions given in accordance with 3a and 3b.

b) to be informed continuously on the progress of the transfer of garrisons, starting on Z-Day at 1300 hours (W A Abteilung L).

Counter espionage is being given special instructions.

c) That suggestions be made to me as soon as possible, as to what advance measures should be put into operation during the the first critical stages, in case military preparations by neighbouring states become evident.

signed Blomberg.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO C-159

I, Pfc Ernst M. Cohn 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document C-159.

ERNST M. COHN
Pfc.
33925738

C-159

COMMAND OFFICE
OF THE NAVY.

BERLIN, 12 March 1934.

A II c 47134 Gkdos.

TOP SECRET.

SUBJECT: Preparation of Auxiliary Cruisers

Reference: A II c 5937/33 G.Kdos.
BB 8800/33 G.Kdos.

It is intended to include in the Establishment Organization 35 (AG = Aufstellungsgliederung) a certain number of auxiliary cruisers which are intended for use in operations on the High Seas.

In order to disguise the intention and all the preparations the ships will be referred to as "Transport ships 0". It is requested that in future this designation only be used....."

..12) The preparations are to be arranged so that they can be completed by 1.4.35.

..13) A*request to be kept in constant touch with the preparations.

A (Signed in draft) GROOS.

* A Branch of the Naval War Staff.

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CERTIFICATE OF PARTIAL TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-166

15 November 1945.

I, BETTY D. RICHARDSON, P/O, W.R.N.S., 66370, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct partial translation of Document C-166.

BETTY D. RICHARDSON
P/O, W.R.N.S.,
66370.

C-166

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-189
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel.

SEC 24-10/C-189

Conversation with the Führer in June 1934 on the occasion of the resignation of the Commanding Officer of the "KARLSRUHE".

1) Report by the C-in-C Navy concerning increased displacement of D. and E.(defensive weapons)

Führer's instructions: No mention must be made of a displacement of 25-26,000 tons, but only of improved 10,000 ton(ships). Also, the speed over 26 nautical miles may be stated.

2) C in C Navy expresses the opinion that later on the fleet must anyhow be developed to oppose England, that therefore from 1936 onwards, the large ships must be armed with 35 c.m. guns(like the King George Class).

3) The Führer demands to keep the construction of the U-Boats completely secret, Plebisite also in consideration of the Saar.

Translator's note:
This document is in Raeder's writing but is not signed.

- -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-189

14 Nov. 1945.

I, WALTER R. SELIGSON, 1st Lt. O-155 89 04, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. C-189.

Walter R. Seligson
1st Lt. O-155 89 04

C-189

H1120 - 0043

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-190
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Conversation with the Fuehrer on 2.11.34 at the time of the announcement by the Commanding Officer of the "EMDEN".

1) When I mentioned that the total funds to be made available for the Armed Forces for 1935 would presumably represent only a fraction of the required sum, and that therefore it was possible that the Navy might be hindered in its plans, he replied that he did not think the funds would be greatly decreased. He considered it necessary that the Navy be speedily increased by 1938 with the deadlines mentioned. In case of need, he will get Dr. Ley to put 120 - 150 million from the Labour Front at the disposal of the Navy, as the money would still benefit the workers. Later in a conversation with Minister Goering and myself, he went on to say that he considered it vital that the Navy be increased as planned, as no war could be carried on if the Navy was not able to safeguard the oreimports from Scandinavia.

2) Then, when I mentioned that it would be desirable to have 6 U-boats assembled at the time of the critical political situation in the first quarter of 1935, he stated that he would keep this point in mind and tell me when the situation demanded that the assembling should commence.*

* The order was not sent out. The first boats were launched in the middle of June 35 according to plan.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO C-190

15 November 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document C-190.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
O-1335567

C-190

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-194
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Reich Minister for War and
C in C of the Armed Forces.

Berlin W.35. 6 March 1936
Tirpitzufer 72-76
Telephone B1 Kurfürst 8191

WA No. 415/36 Most Secret.L.Ib.
S.O. only

Re: C in C Navy AI Op. Most Secret. dated 6 March 1936

Written by an Officer.

C in C Navy
B. Nr. AI op 16/36

To be shown to
C in C Navy
(Pencil note)

(illegible notations)

To:
C in C Navy

The Minister has decided the following after the meeting:

1) The inconspicuous air reconnaissance in the German Bay, not over the line Texel-Doggerbank, from midday on Z-day onward, has been approved. C in C Air Force will instruct Air Command VI from midday 7 March to hold in readiness single reconnaissance aircraft to be at the disposal of the C in C Fleet.

2) The Minister will reserve the decision to set up a U-boat reconnaissance line, until the evening of 7 March. The immediate transfer of U-boats from Kiel to Wilhelmshaven has been approved.

3) The proposed advance measures for the most part exceed Degree of Emergency A and therefore are out of the question as the first counter-measures to be taken against military preparations of neighbouring states. It is far more essential to examine the advance measures included in Degree of Emergency A, to see whether one or other of the especially conspicuous measures could not be omitted.

By order
Sgd. KEITEL

- - - - - - - - -

Most Secret

Top Military Secret

Berlin 6.3.36

C in C Navy
A.1. op. 100 Most Secret.
S.O. only

Written by an Officer.

(illegible notations)

Special Order.

1) This order will be forwarded by an authorized officer who has been instructed at the same time to pass on verbally procedures pertaining to this order.

2) Until special orders are issued, no measures showing military preparations are to be taken except those instituted by me personally.

3) MEASURE "LUDOLF"

Inconspicuous air reconnaissance in German Bay,

C-194

carried out under S.O. Naval Air Forces in accordance with the instructions given by Fleet Command. Not over the line from Texel to Doggerbank and out of sight of land.

C.in C Air Force will issue instructions to Air Command VI and to S.O. Naval Air Forces, who will carry out the duties allotted by the Fleet.

H1120-0045

MEASURE "URIAN"

Setting up a U-boat reconnaissance line F.O. U-boats in accordance with the instructions given by Fleet Command. Out of sight of land and not further west than Hook of Holland - Lowestoft. The measure is to be carried out unseen.

4) After the entry has been made, (7 March - Z day 1200) the following measures are to be taken:

a) There must be a staff-officer continually on watch at all higher staffs. The C.O.'s must be available at all times.

b) Military leaders as far as and including Flotilla-leaders are to be informed verbally and in detail, and the importance is to be stressed of keeping to the regulations issued by me in this order.

c) As far as this is possible by inconspicuous measures such taking over fuel, remaining in port instead of putting out to sea etc, the state of readiness may be increased.

d) Until further orders are issued, no measures except possible safety measures considered to required, must be taken which could show outwardly any military preparations in case a conflict should arise, i.e. recall from leave, strengthening the watches, cessation of dockyard work, conspicuous movement of troops.

5) After the entry has been made the attention of the troops is to be drawn to the significance of the day by means of the Führer's speech and the official publications. Troops are to be informed that I expect the Navy responsibly conscious of the leader's decision, not to give a false picture to foreign nations of the Führer's intentions and thereby render peaceful action more difficult, by celebrating and making a show of their war enthusiasm.

The rtroops are to be instructed by their immediately superior officer. No special concentrations under higher ranking Commanding Officers are to take place.

6) As soon as specific advance measures are necessitated by the fact that neighbouring countries have become aware that military measures are being taken, special instructions will be issued. They will presumably be limited at first to the following measures, which can be prepared in great secrecy by the staffs:

a) Increasing the state of readiness of the Fleet (fuel, provisions, materials, personnel).

b) Concentraion in assembly ports,(focal point the North Sea as nothing can be expected at first from Russia owing to the ice).

Equipping with "DE" for warfare in the Atlantic.

c) Equipping of U-boats for duties in distant sea-areas (focal point Channel, possibly single boats in the Eastern Baltic).

C-194

d) Strengthening the air defense by manning the most important batteries with active personnel, drawing on the local reserve personnel.

e) Preparation of important auxiliary ships (mine-layers, etc).

f) Increased measures for guarding (Reinforced Frontier Guard Control Service (costal) etc).

g) Preparation of protective barrages (keeping ready materials, preparing orders). Cessation of dockyard work and/or speeded- up completion of ships lying in the dockyard.

h) Assignment of reconnaissance staffels of the operational Air Force. Confidential instruction to shipping companies to delay German ships putting out to presumably enemy countries, until the situation permits a clear ruling being made.

7) Queries from shipping concerns, regarding the attitude to be assumed, can be answered as follows until new orders of 7 March. 1200 are issued:

At present, there is no cause to take special precautionary measures or to alter sailing plans.

C-in-C Navy

(illegible notations)

Distributions

Flotilla leader — Copy No. 1
Admiral Commanding in the Baltic — Copy No. 2
" " " " North Sea — " " 3.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-194

12 November 1945

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No C-194.

ERNST M. COHN
Pfc. 33925738

H1120 - 0046

C-194

H1120 – 0047

TRANSLTION OF DOCUMENT L79
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Top Secret
To be translmitted by officer only

Minutes
of a Conference on 23 May 39

Place: The Fuehrer's Study, New Reich Chancellery.

Adjutant on duty: Lt-Col. (G.S.) Schmundt.

Present: The Fuehrer, Field-Marshal Goering, Grand-Admiral Raeder.

Col.-Gen. von Brauchitsch, Col-Gen. Keitel, Col-Gen. Milch, Gen. (of Artillery) Halder, Gen. Bodenschatz, Rear-Adml. Schniewindt, Col. (G.S.) Jeschonnek, Col. (G.S.) Warlimont, Lt.- Col. (G.S.) Schmundt, Capt. Engel (Army), lieut-Comd. Albrecht, Capt. v. Below (Army).

Subject: Indoctrination on the political situation and future aims.

The Fuehrer defined as the purpose of the conference:

I) Analysis of the situation.
2) Definition of the tasks for the Armed Forces arising from the situation.
3) Exposition of the consequences of those tasks.
4) Ensuring the secrecy of all decisions and work resulting from these consequences.

Secrecy is the first essential for success.

The Fuehrer's observations are given in systematised form below.

Our present situation must be considered from two points of view:

I) The actual development of events between I933 and I939;
2) The permanent and unchanging situation in which Germany lies.

In the period I933-I939, progress was made in all fields. Our military situation improved enormously.

Our situation with regard to the rest of the world has remained the same.

Germany had dropped from the circle of Great Powers. The balance of power had been effected without the participation of Germany.

This equilibrium is disturbed when Germany's demands for the necessities of life make themselves felt, and Germany re-emerges as a Great Power. All demands are regarded as "Encroachments". The English are more afraid of dangers in the economic sphere than of the simple threat of force.

H1120-0048

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L 79
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(cont.)

A mass of 80 million people has solved the ideological problems. So, too, must the economic problems be solved. No German can evade the creation of the necessary economic conditions for this. The solution of the problems demands courage. The principle, by which one evades solving the problem by adapting oneself to circumstances, is inadmissible. Circumstances must rather be adapted to aims. This is impossible whithout invasion of foreign states or attacks upon foreign property.

Living space, in proportion to the magnitude of the state, is the basis of all power. One may refuse for a time to face the problem, but finally it is solved one way or the other. The choice is between advancement or decline. In 15 of 20 years' time we shall be compelled to find a solution. No German statesman can evade the question longer than that.

We are at present in a state of patriotic fervour, which is shared by two other nations: Italy and Japan.

The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to good use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in harmony with our aims.

After 6 years, the situation is today as follows:

The national-political unity of the Germans has been achieved, apart from minor exceptions. Further successes cannot be attained without the shedding of blood.

The demarkation of frontiers is of military importance.

The Pole is no "supplementary enemy". Poland will always be on the side of our adversaries. In spite of treaties of friendship, Poland has always had the secret intention of exploiting every opportunity to do us harm.

Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all, It is a question of expanding our living space in the East and of securing our food supplies, of the settlement of the Baltic problem. Food supplies can be expected only from thinly populated areas. Over and above the natural fertility, thoroughgoing German exploitation will enormously increase the surplus.

There is no other possibility for Europe.

Colonies: Beware of gifts of colonial territory. This does not solve the food problem. Remember - blockade.

If fate brings us into conflict with the West, the possession of extensive areas in the East will be advantageous. Upon record harvests we shall be able to rely even less in time of war than in peace.

The population of non-German areas will perform no military service, and will be available as a source of labour.

The Polish problem is inseparable from conflict with the West.

Poland's internal power of resistance to Bolshewism is doubtful. Thus Poland is of doubtful value as a barrier against Russia.

It is questionalbe whether miltary success in the West can be achieved by a quick decision, questionable too is the attitude of Poland.

L-79

The Polish government will not resist pressure from Russia. Poland sees danger in a German victory in the West, and will attempt to rob us of the victory.

There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with the decision:

To attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity.

We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There will be war. Our task is to isolate Poland. The success of the isolation will be decisive.

Therefore, the Fuehrer must reserve the right to give the final order to attack. There must be no simultaneous conflict with the Western Poweres (France and England).

If it is not certain that a German-Polish conflict will not lead to war in the West, then the fight must be primarily against England and France,

Fundamentally therefore: Conflict with Poland - beginning with an attack on Poland - will only be successful if the Western Powers keep out of it. If this is impossible, then it will be better to attack in the West and to settle Poland at the same time.

The isolation of Poland is a matter of skilful politics.

Japan is a weighty problem. Even if at first for various reasons her collaboration with us appears to be somewhat cool and restricted, it is nevertheless in Japan's own interest to take the initiative in attacking Russia in good time.

Economic relations with Russia are possible only if political relations have improved. A cautious trend is apparent in Press comment. It is not impossible that Russia will show herself to be disinterested in the destruction of Poland. Should Russia take steps to oppose,us, our relations with Japan may becaome closer.

If there were an alliance of France, England and Russia against Germany, Italy and Japan, I would be constrained to attack England and France with a few annihilating blows. The Fuehrer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with England, We must prepare ouselves for the conflict. England sees in our development the foundation of a hegemony which would weaken England. England is therefore our enemy, and the conflict with England will be a life-and death struggle.

H1120 - 0049

What will this struggle be like?

England cannot deal with Germany and subjugate us with a few powerful blows. It is imperative for England that the war should be brought as near to the Ruhr basin as possible. French blood will be spared (West Wall). The possession of the Ruhr basin will determine the duration of our resi stance.

The Dutch and Belgium air bases must be occupied by armed force. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored. If England and France intend the war between Germany and Poland to lead to a conflict, they will support Holland and Belgium in their neutrality and make them build fortifications, in order finally to force them into cooperation.

H1120-0050

TRNASLATION OF DOCUMENT L 79
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL.
(cont.)

Albeit under protest, Belgium and Holland will yield to pressure.

Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the Polish war, we must occupy Holland with lightning speed. We must aim at securing a new defense line on Dutch soil up to the Zuider Zee.

The war with England and France will be a life-and death struggle.

The idea that we can get off cheaply is dangerous; there is no such possibility. We must burn our boats, and it is no longer a question of justice or injustice, but of life or death for 80 million human beings.

Question: Short or long war?

Every country's armed forces of government must aim at a short war. The government, however, must also be prepared for a war of 10-15 years, duration.

History has always shown that the people have believed that wars would be short. In 1914, the opinion still prevailed that it was impossible to finance a long war. Even today this idea still persists in many minds. But on the contrary, every state will hold out as long as possible, unless it immediately suffers some grave weakening (e.g. Ruhr basin). England has similar weaknesses.

England knows that to lose a war will mean the end of her world power.

England is the driving force against Germany. (Literally: England: is the motor driving against Germany). Her strength lies in the following:

1. The British themselves are proud, courageous, tenacious, firm in resistance and gifted as organisers. They know how to exploit every new development. They have the love of adventure and bravery of the Nordic race. Quality is lowered by dispersal. The German average is higher.

2. World power in itself. It has been constant for 300 years. Extended by the acquisition of allies, This power is not merely something concrete, but must also be considered as a psychological force embracing the entire world. Add to this immeasurable wealth, with consequental financial credit.

3. Geopolitical safety and protection by strong sea power and a courageous air force.

England's weakness:

If in the World War I we had had two battleships and two cruisers more, and if the battle of Jutland had begun in the morning, the British fleet would have been defeated and England brought to her knees. It would have meant the end of World War. It was formerly not sufficient to defeat the fleet, landings had to be mad in order to defeat England. England could provide her own food supplies. Today that is no longer possible.

The moment England's food supply routes are cut, she is forced to capitulate. The import of food and fuel depends on the fleet's protection.

L 79

H1120 - 0051

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L79
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(cont.)

If the German Air Force attacks English territory, England will not be forced to capitulate in one day. But if the fleet is destroyed, immediate capitulation will be the result.

There is no doubt that a surprise attack can lead to a quick decision. It would be criminal, however, for the government to rely entirely on the element of surprise,

Experience has show that surprise may be nullified by:-

I) Betrayal from the wider circle of military experts.

2) Mere chance, which may cause the collapse of the whole enterprise.

3) Human incompetence

4) Weather conditions.

The final date for striking must be fixed well in advance. Beyond that time the tension cannot be endured for long. It must be borne in mind that weather conditions can render any surprise intervention by Navy and Air Force impossible.

This must be regarded as a most unfavourable basis of action.

I) An effort must be made to deal the enemy a significant or the final decisive blow right at the start. Considerations of right and wrong, or treaties, do not enter into the matter. This will only be possible if we are not involved in a war with England on account of Poland.

2) In addition to the surprise attack, preparations for a long war must be made, while opportunities on the Continent for England are eliminated.

The army will have to hold positions essential to the Navy and Air Force. If Holland and Belgium are successfully occupied and held, and if France is also defeated, the fundamental conditions for a successful war against England will have been secured.

England can then be blockaded from Western France at close quarters by the Air Force, while the Navy with its submarines can extend the range of the blockade.

Consequences:

England will not be able to fight on the Continent;
Daily attacks by the Air Force and Navy will cut all her life-lines;
Time will not be on England's side;
Germany will not bleed to death on land.

Such strategy has been shown to be necessary by World War I and subsequent military operations. World War I is responsible for the following strategic considerations which are imperative:-

I. With a more powerful Navy at the outbreak of the War, or a wheeling movement by the Army towards the Channel ports, the end would have been different.

2. A country connot be brought to defeat by an Air Force, It is impossible to attack all objectives simultaneously and the lapse of time of a few minutes would evoke defensive counter-measures.

3. The unrestricted use of all resources is essential.

4. Once the army, in cooperation with the Air Force and Navy, has taken the most important positions, industrial production will cease to flow into the bottomless pit of the Army's battles and can be diverted to benefit the Air Force and Navy.

The Army must therefore be capable of taking these positions. Systematic preparation must be made for the attack.

Study to this end is of the utmost importance.

The aim will always be to force England to her knees.

A weapon will only be of decisive importance in winning battles, so long as the enemy does not possess it.

This applies to gas, submarines and the Air Force. It would be true of the latter for instance, as long as the English Fleet had no available counter-measures; it will no longer be the case in 1940 and 1941. Against Poland, for example, tanks will be effective, as the Polish Army possesses no counter-measures.

Where straight forward pressure is no longer considered to be decisive, its place must be taken by the elements of surprise and by masterly handling.

<u>This is the plan of attack.</u>

The plan demands:-

I. A correct estimate of weapons and their effectiveness:- e.g. (a) Battleship or aircraft carrier; which is the more effective? Individually or considered as a whole? The aircraft carrier is the better protection for a convoy.

(b) Is air attack more important on a factory than on a battleship? Where are bottle-necks in production located?

2. Immediate preparedness on the part of the Army. The Army must move straight from its peace stations to overrun neighbouring states. (Literally: Neighbouring states must be overrun direct from barracks).

3. A study of the enemy's weak points.

These studies must not be left to the General Staffs. Secrecy would no longer be guaranteed.

The Fuehrer has therefore decided to order the formation of a small planning staff at OKW. It will keep the Fuehrer informed and report to him.

The planning staff is responsible for the planning of operations on the highest level, and of the technical preparations and organization necessarily required by the decision taken.

The purpose of certain regulations concerns no-one outside the staff.

However great are the increases in the armaments of our adversaries, they must ,at some time, come to the end of their recources, and ours will be greater. French recruiting - I20,000 men in each age class.

We shall not be forced into a war, but we shall not be able to avoid one.

Secrecy is the decisive requirement for success. Our object must be kept secret even from Italy or Japan. The break-through through the Maginot line is still a possibility for Italy, and must be studied. The Fuehrer considers that such a break-through is possible.

The close combination of the services, for the study of the problem in its entity, is important.

The object:

1. Study of the problem in its entity.
2. Study of the procedure.
3. Study of the necessary requirements.
4. Study of the necessary training.

The staff must include men with great imaginative power and the best technical knowledge, as well as officers of sober and sceptical judgement.

Working principles:

1. No-one must be admitted who is not concerned.
2. No-one may know more than it is necessary for him to know.
3. When must the person concerned know, at latest? No-one may know of a matter earlier than is necessary for him to know of it.

At the request of Field Marshal Goering, the Fuehrer decrees that:

a) The various services shall decide what construction is to be undertaken.
b) There shall be no alterations in the shipbuilding programm.
c) The armaments programs are to be considered with regards to I943 or I944.

Certified correct record
(Sgd) Schmundt, Lt Col.

I8 Nov. I945

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLAION
OF DOCUMENT L 79

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5 338I2I69, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document L 79.

GOETZ MAYER
T/5 338I2I69

H1120 - 0053

L-79

H1120 - 0054

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. L-172
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Introduction

I. Review of the most important questions of development up to the present.

II. The Italian betrayal, how it was parried, and its consequences.

General Outcome:

III. The present situation

Consideration of the individual theatres of war and their characteristic features.

Finland

Norway

Denmark — Keystone of communications with Norway.

France with the Netherlands and Belgium — the battlefield of the year '44.

Italy — a narrow front with deep flanks.

The Balkans — Guerilla warfare - Supply

TheEAST — Comparison with the Western front 1917/18

IV. The enemy - his resources and their grouping.

His further strategic intentions.

V. The morale of the confederates and Neutrals.

VI. The problems of the German Command in this situation of the struggle along the inner line.

(a) The distribution of forces throughout the theatre of war as a whole.

(b) The formation of operative reserves.

(c) Comparison between requirements in soldiers and munitions-workers.

(d) Exhaustion of man-power reserves in the territories under our domination.

The problem of the Confederates and of alien soldiers.

(e) Mastering the enemy terror raids from the air.

H1120 - 0055

(f) The renewal of effective U-boat warfare.

VII. The foundations of our morale and our confidence in victory.

(a) The German people and its leadership.

(b) The German armed forces.

(c) The ethical and moral foundation of our struggle.

(d) The unified political and military aim of the Confederates ("VERBUNDETEN"), protection from Bolshevism.

(e) Unified political and military Command.

(f) The diverging political, military, social and economic tendencies of our opponents, the moral inferiority of our opponents in the WEST and the purely materialistic foundations of their struggle.

(g) The genius at the head of the Command.

H1120 - 0056

page 1
of original

The Strategic Position in the beginning of the 5th Year of War.

Lecture
by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (West) to the Reichs- and Gau- leaders, delivered in MUNICH on 7 Nov. 1943.

Introduction

ReichsLeiter BORMANN has requested me to give you a review to-day of the strategic position in the beginning of the 5th Year of War.

I must admit that it was not without hesitation that I undertook this none too easy task. It is not possible to do it justice with a few generalities. It is not necessary to say openly what is. No-one - the FUEHRER has ordered - may know more or be told more than he needs for his own immediate task, but I have no doubt at all
page 2 in my mind, Gentlemen, but that you need a great deal in order to be able to cope with your tasks. It is in your GAUS, after all, and among their inhabitants that all the enemy propaganda, the defeatism, and the malicious rumours concentrate that try to find themselves a plan among our people. Up and down the country the devil of subversion strides. All the cowards are seeking a way out, or - as they call it - a political solution. They say, we must negotiate while there is still something in hand, and all these slogans are made use of to attack the natural sense of the people, that in this war there can only be a fight to the end. Capitulation is the end of the Nation, the end of Germany. Against this wave of enemy propaganda and cowardice you need more than force. You need to know the true situation and for this reason I believe that I am justified in giving you a perfectly open and uncoloured account of the state of affairs. This is no forbidden disclosure of secrets, but a weapon which may perhaps help you to fortify the morale of the people. For this war will not only be decided by force of arms but by the will to resist of the whole people. Germany was broken in 1918 not at the front
page 3 but at home. Italy suffered not military defeat but morale defeat. She broke down internally. The result has been not the peace she expected but - through the cowardice of these criminal traitors - a fate a thousand times harder than continuation of the war at our side would have brought to the Italian people. I can rely on you, Gentlemen, that since I give concrete figures and data concerning our own strength, you will treat these details as your secret; all the rest is at your disposal without restriction for application in your activities as leaders of the people.

H1120 - 0057

I

page 4 The necessity and objectives of this war were clear to all and everyone at the moment when we entered upon the War of Liberation of Greater Germany and by attacking parried the danger which menaced us both from Poland and from the Western powers. Our further incursions into Scandinavia, in the direction of the Mediterranean and in that of Russia - these also aroused no doubts concerning the general conduct of the war so long as we were successful. It was not until more serious set-backs were encountered and our general situation began to become increasingly acute, that the German people began to ask itself whether perhaps we had not undertaken more than we could do and set our aims too high. To provide an answer to this questioning and to furnish you with certain points of view for use in your own explanatory activities is one
page 5 of the main points of my present lecture. I shall divide it into three parts:

I. A review of the most important questions of development up to the present.

II. Consideration of the present situation.

III. The foundations of our morale and our confidence in victory.

In view of my position as military adviser to the Führer, I shall confine myself in my remarks to the problems of my own personal sphere ofaction, fully appreciating at the same time that in view of the protean nature of this war, I shall in this way begiving expression only to one side of events.

H1120-0058

page 6

I. Review

1. The fact that the National-Socialist movement and its struggle for internal power were the preparatory stage of the outer liberation from the bonds of the Dictate of Versailles is not one on which I need enlarge in this circle. I should like however to mention at this point how clearly all thoughtful regular soldiers realize what an important part has been played by the National-Socialist movement in re-awakening the will to fight ("WEHRWILLEN"); in nurturing fighting strength ("WEHRKRAFT") and in rearming the German people. In spite of all the virtue inherent in it, the numerically small REICHSWEHR would never have been able to cope with this task, if only because of its own restricted radius of action. Indeed, what the Führer aimed at - and has so happily been successful in bringing about - was the fusion of these two forces.

page 7

2. The seizure of power in its turn had meant in the first place the restoration of fighting sovereignty ("WEHRHOHEIT") (conscription, occupation of the Rhineland) and re-armament with special emphasis being laid on the creation of a modern armoured and air arm.

3. The Austrian "Anschluss", in its turn, brought with it not only the fulfilment of an old national aim but also had the effect both of reinforcing our fighting strength and of materially improving our strategic position. Whereas up till then the territory of Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way right into Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of France and an air base for the Allies, in particular Russia), Czechoslovakia herself was now enclosed by pincers. Its own strategic position had now become so unfavourable that she was bound to fall a victim to any attack pressed home with rigour before effective aid from the WEST could be expected to arrive.

page 8.

This possibility of aid was furthermore made more difficult by the construction of the WEST WALL, which, in contra-distinction to the MAGINOT Line, was not a measure based on debility and resignation but one intended to afford rear cover for an active policy in the EAST.

4. The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn of 1938 and spring of 1939 and the annexation of Slovakia rounded off the territory of Greater Germany in such a way that it now became possible to consider the Polish problem on the basis of more or less favourable strategic premises.

page 9

5. This brings me to the actual outbreak of the present war, and the question which next arises is whether the moment for the struggle with Poland - in itself unavoidable - was favourably selected or not. The answer to this question is all the less in doubt since the opponent - after all not inconsiderable in himself - collapsed unexpectedly quickly, and the Western Powers who were his friends, while they did declare war on us and form a second front, yet for the rest made no use of the possib lities open to them of snatching the initiative from our hands. Concerning the course taken by

H1120 - 0059

the Polish campaign, nothing further need be said beyond that it proved in a measure which made the whole world sit up and take notice a point which up till then had not been certain by any means, i.e., the high state of efficiency of the young Armed Forces of Greater Germany.

page 10 6. The main effect of this success was however that we now had no opponent in the EAST and that in view of the agreements with Russia the two-front problem might be regarded as for the time being solved.

7. As a result of all this the point of gravity in the conduct of the war naturally shifted to the WEST where the most urgent task was clearly defined as the protection of the RUHR area from the invasion of Holland by the British and French. Even before the Polish campaign had been concluded the FUHRER had already decided upon an attack against this enemy the aim ofwhich could only be complete subjection of the opponent. The circumstance that this decision was not carried out - as originally planned - i.e., in the late autumn of 1939 - was mainly due to weather conditions but in part also influenced by our situation with regard to armaments.

page 11 8. In the meantime, however, we were confronted by yet another problem which must be settled promptly: the occupation of Norway and Denmark. The point here lay in opening up a theatre of war which while it lay outside the zone of immediate danger yet possessed two-fold importance from the point of view of our general conduct of the war. In the first place there was danger that England would seize Scandinavia and thereby besides effecting a strategic encirclement from the NORTH would stop the import of iron and nickel which was of such importance to us for war purposes. Secondly, it was realization of our own maritime necessities which made it imperative for us to secure for ourselves freeaccess to the ATLANTIC by a number of air and naval support points on the Norwegian coast. Here too, therefore, defensive and offensive requirements combined to form an indissoluble whole.

The course and conclusion of this campaign are known. In the main in was completed in such good time that it was possible to start upon the campaign in the WEST with the setting in of the most favourable season of the year, in May, 1940.

page 12 9. The decisive success of this campaign improved our position in the best possible way. We gained possession not only of the French potential of armaments - destined to do us importantservice in the further course of the war - but above all the entire ATLANTIC Coast fell into our hands with its naval ports and air support points. Direct threat to the British Motherland had by this means become possible.

The question now arose whether or not we should carry the war into England by a landing on the grand scale. Furthermore - in view of the possible eventuality of the USA entering the war - it was necessary to take into consideration the occupation of a number of advanced support points in the ATLANTIC (for instance, Iceland and the AZORES on which in the meantime the enemy had laid

H1120 - 0060

page 13 his hand). From these islands we should be able both to carry on particularly effectively the fight against British supplies and to defend the territory of Europe in exactly the same way as Japan now holds Greater East Asia secure by means of its island advanced bases in the Pacific. However, very wisely the FUHRER refrained from adopting these objectives. Not alone their initial execution but the subsequent maintenance of communications by sea would have involved a measure of strength which our naval and air equipment could not have provided permanently.

10. Instead of these considerations the winter of 1940/41 provided another opportunity of combating England. Although outwardly our action only took the form of aid to our Italian ally, yet ultimately the point at issue was British command of the seas in the Mediterranean which in its turn represented a heavy menace to the Southern flank of the European continent.

In the measure as the weakness and failure of Italy became more and more manifest, North Africa became more
page 14 and more a German theatre of war. Employing our forces in this way - incidentally, no great force was involved - appeared to be all the more justified since by this means strong British land, sea, and air forces, and a very considerable tonnage in the way of sea-transport would be kept tied down, away from German "living space" (LEBENSRAUM).

11. What was however less acceptable was the necessity of affording our assistance as an Ally in the Balkans in consequence of the unnecessary expedition of the Italians against Greece. The attack which they launched in the autumn of 1940 from Albania with totally inadequate means was contrary to all agreement but in the end led to a decision on our partwhich - taking a long view of the matter - would have become necessary in any case sooner or later. The planned attack on Greece from the NORTH was not executed merely as an operation in aid of an ally. Its real purpose was to prevent the British from gaining a foothold in Greece and from menacing our Roumanian oil area from that country.

page 15 12. Parallel with all these developments realization was steadily growing of the danger drawing constantly nearer from the Bolshevik East - that danger which has been only too little perceived in Germany and latterly, for diplomatic reasons, had deliberately to be ignored. However, the FUHRER himself has always kept this danger steadily in view and even as far back as during the Western Campaign had informed me of his fundamental decision to take steps against this danger the moment our military position madeit at all possible.

13. Following on the interlude of the overthrow in Yugoslavia, the Balkan campaign which followed this, and our occupation of CRETE; this decision was translated into action. If put into effect at all, it had of necessity to take us deep into Russian territory - a circumstance entailing dangers to an extent not yet encountered in our previous campaigns.

H1120 - 0061

page 16 14. In spite of the fact that we were not able either in 1941 nor in 1942 completely to annihilate the enemy's fighting forces and thereby to force Russia to her knees, yet we can definitely claim it as a positive result that the Bolshevist danger has been driven back far from our own frontiers.

If today, in view of the repeated and prolonged setbacks of the year 1943, the question comes up again and again, whether we had not thoroughly under-estimated the strength of the Bolshevik opponent, the answer to this question in regard to the execution of individual part-operations, may certainly be said to be 'Yes'. But as regards the decision to attack as a whole and that of holding on to this decision for as long as possible, there can be no doubts. As in politics so in the conduct of war - the issue is not merely one of arithmetical sums, and one of the most important lessons taught by war is that correct estimation of the opponent is one of the hardest of all tasks, and that even when everything has been correctly summed up, there still remains much
page 17 that is imponderable and only becomes clear in the course of the battle itself.

One clarification of the situation is however to be perceived in that, as a result of our advance into the dark unknown which is Russia, we have taken the measure not only of the strength in personnel involved but also of a standard of equipment which has forced us in our turn to institute a state of totalitarian warfare and a technical counter-blast such as left to ourselves we were hardly likely to have produced. One can only think with a shudder of what would have happened if we had adopted a waiting attitude in the face of this danger and, sooner or later, have been overrun by it.

15. Within the framework of this short sketch of the sweep of our strategy all that remains to mention is the occupation of TUNIS effected as a counter-measure to the landing of Anglo-American forces on the NORTH and WEST coasts of French North Africa, the rapid loss again of which position is probably specially likely to evoke doubt in the correctness of our wider strategy.

Taking it all in all, however, fighting along the periphery has built up for us a capital sum of space which we are now living upon.

page 19 In recapitulation, a brief summary of the course of the great tactical events up to the autum of 1943:

The first two years of war saw Germany and its later Allies running a victorious course almost unparalleled in history. The campaigns in Poland, Norway, France, in North Africa, in the Balkans, and the attack on Russia as far as the DONETZ, up to the gates of MOSCOW and up to the VOLKHOV created a wide forefield for the defense of Europe and as a result of the occupation and making safe of rich areas of raw materials and food, providedthe premises for a long war. Superior leadership, better employment of the modern means of war, a superior air arm and the exceptionally high fighting

H1120-0062

value and morale of our troops faced by opponents inferior on each of these counts have produced these successes. Nevertheless, during this period of the war, in which our superiority on land was undisputed, and our superiority in the air was able to make good, at all events in the coastal districts, our hopeless inferiority at sea, in our last grasp at the palm of victory success has eluded us. The landing in England,
page 20 prepared for down to the smallest detail but with improvised transport resources only, could not be dared while the British Air arm had not been completely beaten. And this we were not able to do, just as we have not been able completely to shatter the Soviet Armed Forces. Later generations will not be able to reproach us with not having dared the utmost and spared no effort to achieve these aims which would have decided the war.

But no one could take it upon himself to allow the German air arm to bleed to death in the Battle of Britain in view of the struggle which still lay before us against Soviet Russia.

In the EAST however, the natural catastrophe of the winter of 1941 imposed an imperative halt on even the sternest resolution.

(Following paragraph struck out)

Our third objective, that of drawing Spain into the war on our side, and thereby creating the possibility of seizing GIBRALTAR, was wrecked by the resistance of the Spanish or, better say, Jesuit Foreign Minister, SORANO SUNJER.

page 21 It therefore became clear that we could no longer count upon an early end to the war, but that it would be hard and difficult and confront the whole nation with great hardships*.

After the first set-backs on the Eastern front and in the North African theatre of war in the winter of 1943, the Reich and its Allies once again gathered together all their strength in order to defeat this Eastern opponent finally by a new assault and to deprive the British of their Egyptian base of operations. The great operation against the CAUCASUS and the DELTA of the NILE failed, however, owing to insufficient strength and inadequate supplies. For the first time our Western opponents showed themselves to be superior both on the technical side and numerically in the air over the Mediterranean. The Soviet Russian Command also continued to stabilize

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* For - says CLAUSEWITZ - every attack which does not lead either to an armistice or to peace must of necessity end in defense.

H1120-0063

the front at STALINGRAD and before the CAUCASUS, and after that in wintertime using newly-formed strong reserves continued to break-through the petrified over-extended fronts on the VOLGA and along the DON - largely occupied moreover by the troops of our Allies. The 6th Army,
page 22 consisting of the best German formations, inadequately supplied and exposed to the storms of winter, succumbed to enemy superiority.

Similarly, the Western Powers were able to bring together in Egypt a concentration of land, sea and air forces which held us up at the very gates of Egypt and after the battle of EL ALAMEIN forced us to retreat, and finally, following on the landing of strong Anglo-American armies in French North Africa, to surrender the entire African position. Again some of the best German divisions fell a victim to the stranglehold of a superior enemy air force on our supplies by sea, although not before they had won for us a certain gain in time which was worth every sacrifice.

At the end of the winter fighting of 1942/43 and after the loss of the African Army the armed forces of Germany and her allies were strained to the utmost. It proved possible to re-form the 5th Armoured Army and the 6th Army - but four armies of our allies were lost for good.

The tactical reserves in the East would, it is true be exceptionally well equipped, but their numbers would no longer be increased to such a pitch as to make it possible to envisage any extensive operations. Gone
ge 23 was the great mobility of the Army and, excepting on the Russian theatre of war, gone also our superiority in the air. The superior economic strength of our opponents and their greater reservoir of man-power, concentrated to form a point of gravity against Europe, was beginning to tell. The complete failure of Italy in all demains and the absence of any munitions production worthy of the name among our other Allies could not be adequately compensated by the tremendous efforts made by Germany.

Of necessity therefore the initiative was bound to passover to the opposing side and the Reich, and the European nations fighting at Germany's side, to go over to the defensive.

So when the positions pushed out beyond the European front to the SOUTH had been taken by the enemy, in July 1943, the enemy attack started: In the EAST to regain the territories lost there and in the SOUTH against the Fortress Europe proper at its weakest point. In the meantime the air arms of the Anglo-Americans had already begun the grand assault on the production hearths and morale of our people at home.

In the Far East Japan's struggle has developed on much the same lines, with the difference, however, that the Japanese had pushed their advanced positions very much further away from the Motherland proper and the Anglo-Saxons did not here undertake any attacks on a large-scale for the reason that they had directed their point of gravity against Europe.

H1120-0064

Page 25 It was at this stage of the war that the Italian betrayal took place. Its main features will be known to you from what appeared in the press. Actually it was even more dramatic than the newspapers showed. For the Supreme Command it was perhaps one of the hardest problems which it had as yet had to master. That the removal and arrest of the DUCE could not end otherwise than by the defection of Italy was completely clear to the FUHRER from the first, although many politically less well-trained eyes thought to see in it rather an improvement in our position in the Mediterranean and our cooperation with the Italians. There were many personages at this time who failed to understand the Fuhrer's GHQ in its political and military actions. For these were directed towards overthrowing the new Government and liberating the DUCE. Only the smallest possible circle might know of this. On the military side in the meantime everything was to be done to stop enemy penetration of the Southern front as far SOUTH as possible, i. e. on SICILY.

Page 26 That the enemy would bring this point of gravity to bear on some point further EST in the Mediterranean - of that there was not the slightest doubt; the distribution of his shipping and landing space made this clear. Where however would this point be? On SARDINIA, on CORSICA, in APULIA, in CALABRIA, or - if the thesis of betrayal were true - why not in ROME itself, or near LEGHORN or GENOA? If he did not do this, then our job was to hold as much of Italy as possible in order not to let the base of the enemy air forces come near to the Alps. If the enemy is successful in a landing in Northern Italy then all the German formations in Central and Southern Italy would be lost. Moreover no grounds must be given which might serve the Italians as a moral pretext for their betrayal, or
Page 27 by premature hostile action to commit the betrayal ourselves. In the meantime the traitors simply oozed with amiability and assurances of faith, and even got as far as to make some of our officers who came into contact with them daily doubtful of the truth of the betrayal-hypothesis. This was nothing to be wondered at, for to the German officers such depths of infamy were simply incomprehensible.

The situation became more and more difficult. It was perhaps the only time in this war when at times I myself hardly knew what I should suggest to the FUHRER. The measures to be taken in the event of <u>open</u> betrayal had been decided in every detail. The watchword 'Axis' would set them in motion. In the meantime however all the divisions, which the FUHRER at once caused to be moved from the WEST to Upper Italy, were operatively idle there - and that at a time when the EAST front, subjected to severe assault, was begging for reserves more urgently than ever.

How much meanwhile we had been able to find out through our troops and through the bordering GAU's - keen as sleuth-hounds on the track of Italian machinations - in the matter of manifestly hostile actions and preparations
Page 28 is known to you all. However, somehow or other the Italians explained it all way, either as a misunderstanding or with excuses.

H1120 - 0065

In this insupportable position the FUHRER agreed to slash through the Gordian knot by a political and military ultimatum. Then on the morning of the 7 September the enemy landing fleet appeared at SALERNO and on the afternoon of September 8th news of the Italian capitulation flew through the ether. Even now however, at the last moment, the freedom of action of the Command was still held up: the Italians refused to admit the authenticity of the wireless message. The password itself therefore would not be given but only the 'stand-by' for the troops, until at last at 19.15 this most monstrous of all betrayals in history was confirmed by the Italian political authorities themselves. What followed was both a drama and a tragedy. Only at a later date will it be possible to gather together and set forth all the grotesque details. The more disillusioned the troops and the German Command, the harder the reaction.

General Outcome: Appendix

H1120 - 0066

(Unnumbered)

WFST/ORG/1st STAFFEL
Armed Forces Operation Staff/Organization/1st Section

List of Italian Booty

1. Arms:

Rifles	1255606
Pistols	17703
M.P.	13627
A.T. rifles	167
MG	38383
Mortars	8606
A.T. guns	961
A.A. guns	3679
Army guns	5346
Ammunition (tons)	287502
Motor cycles	2295
Armoured cars	1938
Lorries	12708
Motor busses (KOM)	90
Trailers	471
Tractors	293
Tanks and assault guns	970
M.T. fuel	123114
Horses, mules	67600

2. Aircraft

Fighters	1379)	
Bombers	886)	Front line
Reconnaissance	512)	aircraft
Transports	363)	
Seaplanes	90)	2nd line
Passenger planes	125)	aircraft
Training craft	1198)	
Aircraft engines	499)	

3. Ships

Torpedo boats	8)	10	
Destroyers	2)		
Corvettes	2)		
S-boats	14)		
Anti-submarine boats	6)		
Mine-layers	4)		51
Mine-detectors	7)		
Escort vessels	7)		
R-boats	13)		
Other small war vessels	11		
Merchant ships	34		

4. Clothing

Overcoats	551000
Capes	408000
Tunics	524000
Pullovers	552000
Trousers, prs	494000
Shirts	1139000
Pants, prs	4243000
Shoes, prs	3286000
Caps	486000
Tent squares	509000
Cloth, metres	352000
Linen (in m^2)	3036000
Blankets	2522000

H1120 - 0067

5. Raw materials. (Note in ink: "In far larger quantities than might have been expected)

Iron and steel	196,200	tons
" " " scrap	16,900	"
Non-ferrous metals	78,780	"
Minerals	500	"
Coal	41,000	"
Timber	90,000	cbm.
Mercury	3,400	tons
Asbestos	100	"
Buna	462	"
Chem. Products (Chloric acid, hydrochloric acid)	1,900	"
Industrial oils and fats	240	"
Tanning materials	515	"
Alcohol	400	"
Hides and tallow	21,925	pieces
Leather	200	tons
Tyres (cars and cycles)	21,000	pieces
Raw material for textiles	493	tons
Quinine	13	tons
Raw Tobacco	8,800	tons

6. Prisoners of war or military internees:

Italians	547,531	of whom	24,744 officers
British	34,160	of whom	2,615 officers
Americans	1,427	of whom	201 officers

L-172

H1120-0068

(Unnumbered)

Italian Booty

Arms	
Rifles	1,255,660
Machine guns	38,383
Guns	9,986
M. T. vehicles	15,500
Tanks and assault guns	970
MT Fuel (cubic metres)	123,114
Horses, mules	67,600
Aircraft	
Front line aircraft	2,867
Other aircraft	1,686
Ships	
Torpedo-boats and destroyers	10
Other small vessels of war	51
Clothing for	500,000 men
Rawmaterials in far larger quantities than might have been expected in view of the constant economic demands.	

PWs or military internees:

Italians	547,531 of whom	24,744 officers
British	34,160 of whom	2,615 officers
Americans	1,427 of whom	201 officers

L-172

H1120 – 0069

Unnumbered

Disarmed Italian Divisions

Definitely disarmed	51 divisions
Probably disarmed	29 divisions
Not disarmed	3 divisions

H1120 - 0070

(Unnumbered)

Disarmed Italian Divisions

South-East

Disarmed:

Rhodes	:	REGINA Division	1
Crete	:	SIENA Division	1
Greece	:	CAGLIARI, PIEMONTE, FORLI, PINEROLO, CASALE, MODENA, AQUI Divisions	7
ALBANIA	:	BRENNERO, AREZZO, PARMA, FIRENZE, PUGLIE, EMILIE Divisions	6
MONTENEGRO	:	PERUGIA, VENEZIA, FERRARA, TAURINENSE divisions	4
CROATIA	:	MURGE, MARCHE, MESSINA, BERGAMO, ZARO, LOMBARDIA Divisions	6
			25

NOT yet disarmed up to the present;

Main part of CUNEO Division

(SAMOS) and RE Division and

MACERATA division (North-West Croatia)

L-172

H1120 - 0071

(Unnumbered)

Disarmed Italian Divisions

South

Disarmed:

Area of Army Group C:

a) Main portion of divisions probably disarmed:

JULIA, TRIDENTINA, CUNEENSE, ROVIGO, ALPI GRAIE, 201st Coastal Division, ERSATZ BRENNERO Division, ERSATZ FIRENZE Division, ERSATZ PISTOIA Division, ERSATZ RAVENNA Division — 10

b) Main portion of divisions probably disarmed:

206th Coastal Division, PRINCIPE AMEDEO DUCA d'AOSTA division, COSSERIA, TRENTO, ASSIETA, LIVORNO, and TORINO divisions — 7

c) Some parts of the divisions probably disarmed:

VENETO, VICENZA, NAPOLI and ACSTA divisions — 4

21

In addition a considerable number of special units not forming part of a divisional formation were disarmed.

L-172

H1120 - 0072

Area of Supreme Command South ("OB. SUD")

a. Main portion of divisions definitely disarmed:

221st Coastal divisions, PIAVE, GRENATIERI DI SARDEGNA, SASSARI, PIACENZA, CENTAURO, ARIETE divisions, 220th Coastal divisions, 215th Coastal Division, RAVENNA — 10

b. Parts of the divisions definitely disarmed:

211th Coastal, MANTUA, 212th Coastal, 227th Coastal, 214th Coastal, PICINO, 210th Coastal, 200th Coastal, 222nd Coastal, PASUBIO, LEGNANO — 11

c. Parts of divisions probably disarmed:

PRIULI, CREMONA, CALABRIA, 204th Coastal, BARI, 200th Coastal, SABAUDA, (on Corsica and SARDINIA) — 7

28

L-172

H1120 - 0073

(Unnumbered)

Disarmed Italian Divisions

West:

Disarmed:

Main portion of divisions definitely disarmed:

EM. FILIBERTO, PUSTERIA, TARO,
LUPI DI TOSCANA, 223rd Coastal division,
224th Coastal division

In all 6 divisions

H1120 - 0074

III

I should like briefly to set out the characteristic features of the individual theatres of war.

See Appendices:

(Note in pencil: "Delivered extempore with the help of maps")

H1120 - 0075

To III

Finland

The Finnish front, the Northern abutment of the European defence system. The outermost wing of the East Front, and at the same time the rear cover of the Norwegian front.

Total length of front approx 1400 km (= 2/3 of the total length of the East front), occupied along wide stretches only by means of support points.

Terrain: South-East: forest and swamp; North-East: treeless partly rocky TUNDRA.

Weather: Very various over the terrain as a whole. (Temperatures on 1. 11. from + 8 to - 18 degrees). In the North long polar night, mud period not materially important.

War Supply: Important nickel mines at KOLOSJOKI near PETJAMO (32% of the total European output).

Total population: 3.8 millions.

Operational possibilities:

No operations on a grand scale possible owing to absence of roads. High capacity lines of communication for supplying own offensive do not exist (only one railway in North - South direction as far as ROVANIEMI, branch line Eastwards (KANDALAKSHA) still under construction. Only one high capacity trunk road running North - South HELSINKI - PETJAMO). As against this, on the Russian side, high-capacity MURMANSK line.

Conduct of war: Consequently, in the main, confined to assault unit activities and enterprises by JAGER detachments, action along the flanks and for roads of special importance. Nevertheless because of the great length of front a strong own (German) force of 176,800 is tied to this front, consisting of the best troops capable of withstanding the nature of the country. Own divisions in good fighting trim, fully equipped, trained as in peacetime, good body of officers.

For air activity on the whole very unfavourable Terrain affords few possibilities for laying out airfields.

H1120 - 0076

Norway

Protection of the North-Western flank of Europe. Total front length 2,800 km (about equal to East front). Part of the front occupied only by support points, islands not all occupied.

Terrain: Medium-mountain and alpine in nature deeply indented by fjords and valleys.

War Supply: Transportation of Swedish ore via NARVIK (22% of total European output). Emphasis in supply lies on communications by sea. Several good big and small ports suitable for distribution traffic.

Coastal district suitable for enemy landings with limited objective.

Operations - on land only possible with limited forces. Railway and road systems very widely meshed, of low capacity, easily blocked (bridges, tunnels). For these reasons the British operations 1940 (plus absence of bigger harbours) were greatly hampered.

Own forces in Norway are 380,000 men.

The greater portion of the 13 divisions are employed in coastal defence, partly permanently posted.

(In Norway about 1,000 guns of over 10 cm. cal. are employed in coastal defence).

Counter-attack reserves: 1 Inf. Div. in Central Norway, 1st Infantry and 1 Armoured Divisions in South Norway.

Opportunities of action of own air arms dependent to a very high degree on weather, particularly in North Norway.

Navy: Important U-boat support points, berths for heavy naval combat forces. Supply for the AOK (Army Command) depends on the security of sea communications. Mean supply efficiency per month by sea = 190,140 BRT.

H1120-0077

Denmark

Key position at entrance to the Baltic the possession of which would make possible far-reaching enemy operations both in the direction of Scandinavia and in that of Germany and extend their influence into the Baltic.

Total length of front: approx. 700 km.

Terrain: For landings from the sea on a large scale the Western coast is little suited (storms, surf); East Jutland and the islands are better suited (but owing to long approach routes and good defensive possibilities unlikely).

Especially open to the danger of a landing: ESBJERG (West Jutland) and AALBORG (North-West Jutland).

For tanks - possible almost everywhere. Landings from the air possible in the open as well as on the well-developed airfields.

Coastal defence - by support points. Coastal defence forces - 3 divisions, of limited fighting value. In addition, counter-attack reserves. Reinforcements have been ordered.

Total formations of the WEHRMACHT employed - 106,500 men.

H1120 - 0078

West

1. Terrain:

In all 2,100 Km. of coastal front on the Channel and Atlantic and 500 Km on the Mediterranean all of which - in contra-distinction to the coast in Norway - with a few inconsiderable exceptions admit of landings with modern resources.

The interior of the country offers no obstacles to the employment of all formations including tactical armoured formations (Western campaign).

A good well-developed communications system both by rail and road enables our resources to be moved rapidly but will also benefit the enemy once he has gained a footing.

Weather conditions do not completely exclude landing operations with modern equipment at any time of the year. In the autumn and winter however storms may make a landing on the grand scale a difficult matter.

2. Own possibilities:

The position as described makes it necessary to repel and destroy the enemy before he can reach the coast. For this reason - construction of the ATLANTIC Wall. This construction has been in hand for a long time; it is however impossible along a front of 2,600 Km to reinforce the coastal front with a system of fortifications in depth at all points. Nevertheless the number of positions and built-in weapons is greater than in any other construction as yet known, including the West Wall and the MAGINOT Line.

2,692 guns of cal. 7.5 cm. up the the heaviest long-range batteries, not including the AA guns and the artillery of the divisions employes. 2,354 medium and heavy A.P. weapons alone, without counting the equipment of the employed divisions. 8,500 (8,449) positions of the permanent construction type have been handed over to the troops. In all over 5.3 million cubic metres of concrete have been used on the constructions.

A belt of fortifications of this kind has the effect however of tieing down considerable forces of one's own. For this purpose we have put in fortress divisions of whom however, needless to say, only a small section in every case can be effective against the enemy. For this reason it is essential to have strong, mobile and especially well equipped reserves in the West for the purpose of forming points of gravity. Any weakening of these tactical reserves required in the West is a risk and acutely endangering the general situation.

Strength in the West: In all 1,370,000 men.

H1120 - 0079

Italy

1. Ground conditions

Along the front:- mountains some of which are Alpine in nature. Less steep country only along the West and above all the East coast. As a result it is possible in part to cut out some sectors of the Alpine regions; on the other hand infantry must be employed in strength to prevent infiltration. Transverse movements behind the front are very difficult. Good possibilities of blocking roads for a long time.

In addition to these conditions along the front (Length app. 150 km.), the factor determining the employment of own troops is the double coast-line (on both sides), total length approx. 1,600 km. In addition to landings directly behind our front, the sectors especially threatened are GENOA, LA SPEZIA, Rome, and the whole of the East coast south of RAVENNA.

2. The point of next importance to the terrain in determining tactical conditions in Italy is the superiority of the enemy on land, in the air, and on the sea. This enables him to advance methodically, taking no undue risks, supported by a number of smaller and greater landings directly behind our front. Strong enemy artillery action.

Absolute supremacy in the air. In addition to direct and heavy effect on the troops this air superiority also means constant interference with traffic (especially on the railroads) in the rear areas. Troop movements and supply are affected right far back into the Hinterland.

The enemy's rearward communications across the sea are practically unhampered as our own sea and air forces are nothing like strong enough.

3. In view of these conditions our own troops are confronted with an immense task.

In spite of the fact that our forces are hampered at the coast and in the back areas (total ration strength of all branches of the Armed Forces and auxiliaries rather over 400,000), we have so far contrived to delay the enemy advance very considerably and to keep down our own losses in men and equipment to a minimum since the islands were evacuated. This may be regarded as a success, since, apart from his having gained a foothold in Europe proper, the enemy has not up to the present gained any decisive tactical success. However, it will not be possible in the near future to wrest the initiative from the enemy as he is in a position to supply and reinforce his formations in practically unlimited measure.

Own air arm - in a difficult position owing to the multivariousness of its duties and the vast extent of the tactical theatres of war - must confine itself to forming points of gravity.

Navy: Apart from the employment of a few U-boats and speed-boats, possesses few possibilities of becoming effective against the enemy.

4. Along the coasts - preparations for defence.

H1120-0080

(Unnumbered) III

Finland: Total length of front about 1,400 km. (= 2/3 of total length of Eastern front. Important: Nickel mines KOLOSJOKI near PETSAMO (32% of total European output) Total number of inhabitants 3.8 millions.

Own strength: 176,800 men

NORWAY: Total length of front 2,000 km (equal to length of Eastern Front).

NARVIK: Clearing port for Swedish ore (22% of total European output).

Own strength: 315,000 men

Approx 1,000 guns over 10 cm.

DENMARK: Total length of front: approx 700 km. Own strength 106,500 men.

WEST: In all 2,100 km of coastal front along the channel and the Atlantic and 500 km. along Mediterranean.

Atlantic Wall: 2,692 guns of cal. 7.5 up to the heaviest long range batteries
2,354 medium and heavy A.P. weapons
8,500 positions, constantly being extended.

Over 5.3 million cbm of concrete laid.

Own strength: 1,370,000 men.

ITALY: Length of front: spprox. 150 km.
Both coasts : in all approx, 1,600 Km.
Own strength : 329,000 men.

South-East: Balkans 50% of European output in mineral oil.

100% of European output in chromium ore.

60% of European output in bauxite.

29% of European output in antimony.

21% of European output in copper.

Length of coast-line (incl. CRETE and RHODES):

approx. 4,200 km., or twice the distance from LENINGRAD to the Black Sea.

Own strength: 612,000 men.

EAST: Length of front: 2,100 km.

In view of the length of front our own strength is inadequate for a continuous line of positions as in the last world war.

L-172

H1120 - 0081

Artillery: Monthly production 1,200 guns.

Tanks : At the outbreak of the war 21,000 tanks, mainly light and out of date.

Russian losses in tanks from June 1941 to October 1943:

52,000.

Railway sabotage: July 1560, August 2,121, September 2,000 line demolitions with great effect on operations and on evacuation transport.

Reinforcement of the Red Army (lowest point) 1.12.1941:

2.3 millions

Today highest point up to date

5.5 millions

Own strength: 3,900,000

H1120 - 0082

South-East

1. Importance of the South-East

Domination of the Balkans as an integral part of the Fortress of Europe is decisive from the point of view of winning the war for tactical, military-political and economic reasons.

The Balkans provide:

50%	of	the	total	European	output	in mineral oil
100%	"	"	"	"	"	in chromium ore
60%	"	"	"	"	"	in bauxite
29%	"	"	"	"	"	in antimony
21%	"	"	"	"	"	in copper

2. Tactical possibilities

In view of the coast length (including Crete and Rhodes) of approx 4,200 Km, i.e. twice the distance from LENINGRAD to the Black Sea, in the event of an attack by the enemy our own troops would have the following advantages and disadvantages:-

Advantages

For coastal defence in general all that is necessary is to occupy the harbours and river-mouths on the point of gravity principle.

Should the operations move inland, the hill offer good opportunities for blocking and defence.

Disadvantages

A sparse rail and road system involves difficulties in the matter of supply and the movement of reserves.

Grave danger from the air on all the few roads and mountain railway lines all of which possess many artificial constructions. (To Greece only one single-track railway line with an efficiency of 12 trains per day).

Difficulties in supplying the many islands of the AEGEAN (Low own tonnage, shortage of naval tactical forces - only a few Italian torpedo-boats - very few security vessels. Ration strength on Crete 47,000, on Rhodes 8,000 and 30,000 Italian military internees).

3. Present position

Army:

In the parts of the Balkans occupied by us guerilla warfare is now being waged against guerilla bands - some of them well-armed - supported by the Anglo-Saxons to a total strength of approx 140 - 150,000 men. The bands are allanti-German, but disunited amongst themselves. A distinction should be made:

L-172

H1120-0083

a. In Croatia and Serbia between:

aa. Communist bands under the command of TITO to a strength of approx 90,000 men.

bb. CHETNIKS under the command of DRAZA MIHAILOVIC, to a strength of 30,000 men.

b. In Greece:

Nationalist bands under the command of ZERVAS to a strength of 10,000 and approx 15,000 Communists.

For the defence against ANGLO-SAXON attack and for putting down the guerilla bands we have at our disposal at the present time own forces to the strength of 612,000 men.

Landings of any size in the winter time are unlikely so that the main task of these forces is to put down the guerillas in order to be able in the spring of 1944, after defeating and destroying the larger bands, to employ the largest possible forces in coastal defence.

From the forces of the confederates stationed in the South-East - with the exception of the Bulgarian formations who however are requested to defend Bulgaria - no material assistance may be expected.

Air arm:

At present, in view of the great distance to their jumping-off bases, the nemerical superiority of the ANGLO-SAXON air arm has not made itself felt excepting in the Western Balkans where the fact that Southern Italy is occupied by the enemy has become noticeable.

H1120 - 0084

East

Length of front: 2,100 Km. (distance from frontier to Reich to Moscow 900 km., to Urals 2,300 Km.)

Terrain: Flat plateau, swamp and forest in the North, deeply indented (steppe ravines) in the South. In view of the great length of the front the ratio of our own strength is not sufficiently high to admit of a continuous line of positions as in the World War and makes it necessary to occupy by a system of support points and mobile warfare in which threats to the flanks and rear must be accepted. Our line of fefence is therefore rather thin and there is difficulty in forming larger gravity points. Where we are opposed by enemy concentrations our forces are always locally inferior.

Russian infantry's fighting value has sunk to a still lower level although their training is noticeably better; on the other hand their equipment is rapidly improving (automatic and heavy infantry weapons). The Russian artillery is being built up on a grand scale. Monthly output 1,200 guns.

Armoured troops: On the outbreak of war 21,000 tanks, mainly light and out-of-date.

Strength on 1.10.43: 9,000 heavy tanks of the most modern types. Monthly production 1,700.

Russian tank losses from June 1941 to October 1943: 52,000. Creation of tactical tank formations for extensive tasks (thrust into the depth of the enemy's terrain and destruction by envelopment) employment in the form of points of gravity.

Formations of special units on a large scale (A.T. regiments, mortar regiments).

Railway sabotage:

July 1560, August 2121, September 2000 line demolitions with far-reaching effect on operations and evacuation transport.

Guerilla warfare: The purpose of this is to impede German supply, to make it impossible to use the land, to subvert the territorial formations, organise an armed popular rising, reconstruct the Party organisation in occupied territory. Although losses in personnel have been high, remorseless exploitation of all the provisions re. fitness for service and extreme restrictions have brought about a gradual reinforcemtnt of the Red Army (Lowest level on 1.12.1941: 2.3 millions to-day highest level as yet known 5.5 millions), in addition to this, continuous calling-up of replacements (ERSATZGESTELLUNGEN) and the creation of tactical winter reserves (approx. 50 divisions).

Total strength of Russian formations:

327 rifle divisions
51 armoured divisions

Own strength in the EAST: 200 German,
10 Roumanian
6 Hungarian divisions -
4,183,000 men

L-172

H1120 - 0085

EAST

Armed Forces Operations Staff/Op (H)/North

No 006650/43 TOP SECRET

FUHRER's GHQ
31.10.1943

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Subject: Lecture by Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff - copy

EAST

Length of Front: 2,100 km (Distance of frontier of Reich to Moscow 900 Km., to Urals 2,300 Km.)

Terrain: Flat table land, swamp and forest in the North, deeply indented (steppe ravines) in the South. Owing to the length of the front ratio of own strength does not admit of continuous line of positions as in the World War and makes it necessary to occupy by means of support points and mobile warfare, in which threats of defense therefore rather thin. Great difficulty in forming larger points of gravity. Where opposed by enemy concentrations own forces always locally inferior.

Russian infantry's fighting value sunk to still lower level although their training noticeably improved; on the other hand their equipment with weapons is rapidly rising (automatic and heavy infantry weapons). Large-scale building up of Russian artillery. Monthly production 1,200 guns.

Principles of employment: Fire concentration on narrow sector on the German pattern. For this, fresh formation of artillery brigades and artillery corps. Maximum employment of ammunition.

Armoured troops: At the outbreak of war 21,000, mostly light and out-of-date tanks. Strength on 1.10.43 9,000 heavy tanks of the latest types. Monthly production 1,700. Russian tank losses from June 1941 to October 1943: 52,000. Creation of tactical armoured formations for extensive tasks. (Thrust in depth and destruction by envelopment). Employment by points of gravity.

Formation of special units on grand scale (A.T. regiments, mortar regiments).

Own Air Arm: Length of front in comparison with available forces makes it necessary to concentrate own air arm at the focal points. As a result it is unavoidable that on many sectors of our own land front own troops see little of the activities of their own air arm. However the air arm is there, in spite of this, and cintributes very materially to the successes of the defence.

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The Russian air arm: remains as before far inferior to or own, but it must be admitted that its command, organization and equipment have greatly improved. The command is manoeuvreable and strict, organization admits of rapid displacement or follow-on of the formations. Specially unpleasant for our own troops on land is the new Russian battle aeroplane now appearing in large numbers. The Russian air arm is being employed almost exclusively in support of the army; so far operational employment has been quite secondary. Since 1941 the Soviet Russian Command has adapted itself to the principles of the German command. As against the principle "Not a step back!" of the year 1941, since the summer of 1942 tactical withdrawal movements have been the rule. The command has become more mobile, quickly seizes any moment of weakness and makes good use of initial successes. The situation with respect to communications is very bad (wide-meshed low efficiency rail and road system, during the mud season the roads cannot be used at all) so that it is difficult for us to move our reserves. Add to this steadily increasing sabotage on the railways: July 1560, August 2121, September 2000 line demolitions with great repercussions on operations and evacuation transport.

Guerilla warfare: Purpose is to impede German supply, prevent use of the land, the organization of armed popular risings, reconstruction of the Party organizations in occupied territory.

In spite of high losses in personnel, remorseless exploitation of all provisions re fitness for service and extreme restriction have made it possible gradually to reinforce the Red Army (lowest level 1.12.1941: 2.3 millions, present day highest level so far 5.5 millions); in addition continuous calling up of recruits and the formation of tactical winter reserves (approx. 50 divisions). Own strength in East *) 4,183,000.

Munitions industry: Evacuation (methodically prepared for beforehand) made it possible by the summer of 1942 to return again to the production level of the previous period.

At the present time the Russian food situation cannot be regarded as likely to decide the fate of the war.

Economic losses due to the withdrawal of the front:

Pig iron products	338,000 tons
Loss in coal production	460,000 tons
Loss in grain and oil crops	1,854,000 tons
Production of raw timber	6.2 fm (million fathoms?)
Loss of steel products	10,000 tons
Potatoes approx.	1,000,000 tons
Meats and fats	50,000 tons
Men fit for service	677,000

*) Div: 200 German
10 Roumanian
6 Hungarian

L-172

H1120 - 0087

Finland

The Finnish front is the Northern abutment of the European system of defence. Outer wing of the East front and at the same time rear corner of the Norwegian front. Total length of front approx 1,400 Km (2/3 of the total length of the Easy front), wide stretches of the front occupied by means of support points only.

Terrain: South-East: forest and swamp; North East: treeless and partly rocky TUNDRA.

Weather: Varies greatly over the area as a whole (Temperatures 1.11 from + 8 to - 18 degrees!), in the North long polar night, mud period is in considerable.

War Supply: Important nickel mines at KOLOSJOKI near PETSAMO (32% of the European production).

Total number of inhabitants: 3.8 millions.

Tactical possibilities: Operations on a large scale impossible owing to absence of roads. High capacity lines of communication for feeding an offensive are lacking (only one in North-South direction as far as ROVANIEMI branch line Eastward (KANDALAKSHA) still under construction. Only one high capacity trunk North-South road HELSINKI - PETSAMO). As against this on the Russian side the high capacity MURMANSK railway.

Conduct of war therefore limited in the main to activities of assault troops and enterprises by JAGER detachments. Fighting on the flanks and for roads of special importance. In spite of this owing to the length of the front strong own forces (Mountain Army Command 20 : 212,000 men) formed of the best human material capable of standing up the the nature of the terrain are tied down to it. Own division in excellent fighting trim, fully equipped, trained as in peace time, good body of officers.

With respect to air activity, on the whole very unfavourable conditions. Terrain affords few possibilities for laying out airfields. In winter time, owing to the short hours of daylight flying activities are very restricted. Supply in the purview of the air arm very difficult.

Our own air arm is highly superior in value to the Russian, as is regularly proved in all air battles fought in the course of Russian attacks on German convoys by the specially high numbers of aircraft brought down.

Coastal defence is equal to the Russian forces. Combined Anglo-American-Russian landing operations in the area of the VARANGER fjord - PORSANGERFJORD unlikely for political reasons. Collaboration with Finns (trained in forest and winter fighting) good, as before.

H1120 - 0088

Norway

Protection of the North-West flank of Europe. Total length of front 2,500 km (about the same length as the East front). In part occupied only by support points. Some of the island unoccupied.

Terrain: Medium mountains and Alpine in nature, deeply indented by Fjords and valleys.

War Supply: Transport of Swedish ore via NARVIK (22% of the total European output).

The points of gravity of supply rests on communications by sea. Several good big ports and many small ones suitable for distribution traffic. Coastal areas suitable for enemy landings with limited objectives.

Operations: On land possible only with limited forces. Rails and road system very widely meshed, of low capacity and easily blocked (bridges, tunnels). These factors (plus the lack of larger harbours) greatly impeded British operations in 1940. Own forces in Norway number 380,000. The main body of the 13 divisions occupied in coastal defence, partly permanently employed. (In Norway approx. 1,000 guns over 10 cm. caliber employed in coastal defence).

Counter-attack reserves: 1 Inf Div in Central Norway, 1 Inf and 1 Armoured divisions in South Norway.

Possibilities of action of our own air arm greatly dependent on the weather, especially in North Norway. Tactical activities directed in the first place above the sea against enemy ships. Possibilities with regard to laying out airfields limited owing to the nature of the terrain, supply difficult. Possibilities of action on the part of the enemy equally restricted owing to the great distance to their flying bases. In central and North Norway fighters can be employed only from aircraft carriers.

Navy: Important U-boat support points, births for heavy naval fighting forces. Supplies for the Army Command depend on sea communications (illegible note in German script).

H1120 - 0089

DENMARK

Key-position at entrance to Baltic, the possession of which would make possible extensive operations in the direction of Scandinavia as also in the direction of Germany and make it possible to influence the area of the Baltic.

Total length of front: approx 700 km.

Terrain: West coast little suited to landing operations on a grand scale (storms, surf), East Jutland and the Islands vetter adapted (but improbable, owing to long approach routes and possibilities of defence.) Specially threatened by landings EBSJERG (West Jutland) and Aalborg (North-West Jutland). Passable by armour almost everywhere. Air landings also possible off the air-fields which are very well laid out: Coast protected by support points. Coastal defence forces 3 divisions of very limited fighting value. In addition counter-attack reserves. Reinforcements ordered. Conditions for the employment of own air forces are good. Communications good. Supply secured. Total strength of all formations of all branches of arms: 110,000.

The defence of Denmark is largely determed by the attitude of Sweden.

Distribution:

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L-172

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Armed Forces Operations Staff/ Op. H/South
No 006652/43 Very Secret

FUHRER's G.H.Q.
2nd November, 1943

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Material for the Lecture by the Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff on 7.11.43

Position in Italy

1. Ground conditions

Along the front mountains, partly Alpine in character, only on the West and above all on the East coast rather less steep terrain. This makes it possible in places to cut out sectors in the Alpine area but also makes it necessary to employ strong Infantry forces in order to avoid infiltration. Troops movement along the front line very difficult. Good possibilities of blocking roads durably. - Opponents, mainly Canadians, clever at making use of terrain.

In addition to the above conditions at the front (length approx. 150 Km.) the employment of own forces is also determined by the long coast lines on both sides (Total length approx. 1600 Km.). Besides landings directly behind our front the sectors mainly threatened are GENOA, LA SPEZIA, Rome and the whole of the East coast South of RAVENNA.

2. Next to ground configuration the factor determining tactical conditions in Italy is the tremendous* superiority of the opponent on land, in the air and on the sea. This enables him to advance methodically, taking no undue risks, supported by repeated landings small and great directly behind our front. Strong enemy artillery active.

Absolute superiority in the air. In addition to heavy direct action on the troops, continued interference with communications, especially by rail, in the back areas. Troop movements and supply affected to a great depth in the HINTERLAND. River communications of enemy overseas practically undisturbed, as our own naval and air tactical forces are far too small.

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* "GEWALTIG" - struck out in pencil

H1120-0091

3. In view of these conditions our own troops are confronted with immense task. In spite of the fact of our troops being hampered at the coast and in the back areas (Total ration strength of all branches of arms with auxiliaries rather over 400,000), we have so far contrived to delay the enemy advance very considerably and to keep down to a minimum our own losses in men and material since the islands were evacuated. This may be regarded as a success, as -apart from his having gained a foothold in Europe proper up to the present the enemy has not gained any decisive tactical success. However it will not be possible in the near future to wrest the initiative from the enemy, he being in a position to supply and reinforce his formations in practically unlimited measure.

Own air arm - in a difficult position owing to the multivariousness of its duties and the vast extent of the tactical theatres of war -- must confine itself to forming points of gravity.

Navy: Apart from employing a few U-boats and speed-boats, no great opportunities of becoming effective against the enemy.

4. Along the coasts - preparations for defence.

5.* In the Hinterland mopping up operations on considerable scale have been in progress for some time past in the guerilla-infested areas of Slovenia and Istria influenced from the Balkans. When these operations have been concluded it will still be necessary to keep forces here to maintain pacification. The guerilla activities which break out again from time to time in several other areas are of no great importance. The Italians are not in a position to maintain law and order with their own forces.

6. Disarmament of the Italians after some short and in some cases sharp fighting in spite of our being outnumbered (51 Italian divisions disarmed by 17 German divisions and 2 German brigades) also represents a thwarting of enemy plans which aimed at cutting off the German forces.

7. The enrollment of Italian forces for service at present in progress in collaboration with the Italian Government is made more difficult by indifference and war-weariness.

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* This point and the two following struck out in pencil.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. L-172 (Cont'd)
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Armed Forces Operations Staff/Op(H) South-East

No. 006651/43 Very Secret.

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1.11.1943

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Material South-East for Lecture by Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff on 7.11.1943

1. Importance of the South-East:

Domination of the Balkans as an integral part of the Fortress of Europe is decisive from the point of view of winning the war for tactical, military-political and economic reasons.

The Balkans furnish:

50%	of	the	total	European	production	of	mineral oil
100%	"	"	"	"	"	"	chromium ore
60%	"	"	"	"	"	"	bauxite
29%	"	"	"	"	"	"	antimony
21%	"	"	"	"	"	"	copper

2. Tactical possibilities

In view of a length of coast (with CRETE and RHODES) of approximately 4,200 km, equal to two times the distance from LENINGRAD to the BLACK SEA, the enemy, in the event of an attack on their own troops is confronted by two main directions of attack:

(a) Making use of South Italy as jumping-off place for a landing on the Dalmatian coast.

(b) After breaking through the island belt position in the AEGEAN, to advance on SALONIKI and the Thracian coast.

This would afford the following advantages and disadvantage:

(a) For the enemy:

Advantages: Support by the guerilla bands.

Disadvantages: The coast with the exception of the ports and river mouths is generally unsuitable for a landing (steep coast, lagoons). After landing the terrain is generally speaking mountainous and short

/ or ...

L-172

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of water, with a sparse system of roads and railways.

Troops who presumably will be unused to fighting in the hills.

(b) For own troops:

Advantages: The coast can be defended, generally speaking, merely by occupying the ports and river mouths.

In the event of operations advancing, good opportunities for blocking and defence in the hills.

Disadvantages: Only a sparse road and rail system. Supply difficulties and poor conditions for moving reserves.

Grave danger from the air on all the few roads and mountain railway lines all of which possess many artificial constructions. (To Greece only one single-track line with capacity of 12 trains per day).

Difficulties in supplying the many islands in the AEGEAN (Own tonnage is low - shortage of naval tactical forces - only a few Italian torpedo-boats - very few security vessels. Ration strength on CRETE 47,000, on RHODES 8,000 and 30,000 Italian military internees).

Further possible enemy operations from the European bridge-head of Turkey and operations against the Bulgarian-Roumanian BLACK SEA litteral would have to be taken into account should Turkey change the attitude of neutrality she has maintained up till now, or if the unfavourable position in the EAST should develop still further.

3. Present position

Army: In the part of the Balkans occupied by ourselves, guerilla warfare is rife against bands of whom some are well-armed - supported by the Anglo-Saxons - to a total strength of 140 - 150,000 men. The bands are all anti-German, but not in agreement among themselves. A distinction should be made between:

(a) Croatia and Serbia:

(aa) Communist bands under the command of TITO to a strength of about 90,000.

(bb) CHETNIK's under the command of DRAZA MIHAILOVICH to a strength of 30,000.

(b) Greece:

Nationalist bands under the command of ZERVAS

/ to ...

L-172

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to a strength of 10,000 men and approximately 15,000 Communists.

For the defence against Anglo-Saxon attack and for putting down the Guerilla bands we have at our disposal at the present time own forces to the strength of in all of 24 divisions *with a total strength of 408,000 men.

Landings in any strength during the winter are unlikely, so that the main task of these forces is to put down the guerillas in order to be able in the spring of 1944, after having defeated and destroyed the larger bands, to employ the largest possible forces in coastal defence.

From the confederate forces stationed in the South-East area, with the exception of the Bulgarian formations who however are required for the defence of Bulgaria, no material assistance may be expected.

Air Arm:

At the present time, in view of the great distance to their starting bases, the numerical superiority of the Anglo-Saxon Air Arm has not yet become effective excepting in the Western Balkans where the fact that South Italy is occupied by the enemy is beginning to make itself felt.

4. In September units of twelve German divisions, in spite of some sharp resistance on the part of the Italian formations and great difficulties connected with the terrain, continued to disarm 25 Italian divisions, including Corps and Army units.

Up to the present in all 304,098 Italians (including 12,575 officers and 291,519 men) have been evacuated from the area High Command South-East.

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* The words "24 divisions" struck out; pencil note in margin '612,000 men'.

L-172

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. L-172 (Cont'd)
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Very Secret

Armed Forces Operations Staff/Op Army/WEST

FUHRER's GHQ
2nd November, 1943

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Western Theatre of War including the

Netherlands and Belgium

Subject: Lecture by Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff.

1. Terrain:

In all 2100 km of coastal front on the Channel and the Atlantic and 500 km on the Mediterranean, which - in contradistinction to the coast in Norway - admit of landings with modern resources.

The interior of the country presents no difficulties to the employment of all formations including tactical armoured formations (Western Campaign).

Good system of communications, road and rail, highly-developed, enables own reserves to be moved quickly but will also aid the enemy should he continue to gain a footing.

Weather: does not exclude landing with modern resources at any time of the year. However in the autumn and winter storms may make a landing on the grand scale difficult since this requires continuous good weather at sea for some days. The possibilities of employing the air arm are sometimes restricted in the autumn and winter owing to presence of extensive fields of fog, particularly over England.

2. The enemy:

The enemy possesses possible starting bases along an almost continuous circle from Eastern England via the USA, North Africa to CORSICA and SARDINIA with at some points shortest possible approach routes to the Continent. In all areas the opponent has at his disposal locally superior forces. The enemy formations are fresh and have gained experience in the campaigns in North Africa, Sicily and Italy. He has developed his landing technique and tactics to a high level, so that we must now reckon at all times - with the afore-mentioned reservations - with a landing on the grand scale.

Enemy Air Arm: Numerically greatly superior. Will enable the enemy both to defend his own forces and their supply and to effect the employment of air landing forces on a big scale.

/ Possibilities ...

L-172

H1120-0096

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. L-172 (Cont'd)
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Possibilities for the enemy:

A demand on the part of Russians for the establishment of a Second Front in the West and the endeavour on the part of the Anglo-Americans to acquire more weight in opposition to the Russian political demands by gaining a thorough military success are the leading features of the position in the West. Successful penetration of the Western defences would very soon break through to the Belgian, North-French and West-German industrial areas and so prove fatal. At the same time this operation would also cut off the U-boat support points in the Atlantic.

Even a minor enemy success involving the creation of a bridgehead would spell danger, since in view of the enemy's superiority in equipment and personnel he would have no difficulty in extending this bridgehead into a breach of our defences.

3. Our possibilities: The position as described makes it essential to repel and destroy the enemy before he can reach the coast. For this reason - construction of the Atlantic Wall. The work has been in hand for a long time; it is however impossible to provide a coastal front of 2,600 km. at all points with a system of fortifications in depth. Nevertheless the number of positions and built-in weapons is greater than any other construction as yet known, including the West Wall and the MAGINOT Line, for instance 2,692 guns of 7.5-cm.cal. up to the heaviest long range batteries, not counting the AA guns and the artillery of the employed divisions. * 2,354 medium and heavy A.P. weapons alone, not reckoning the equipment of the employed divisions. 8,449 installations of the permanent construction type have been handed over to the troops. (In pencil: In all ..... cbm concrete have been used in the construction).

A belt of fortifications of this type however has the effect of tying down considerable forces of one's own. We have put in for this purpose fortress divisions, of which however, naturally, only a small proportion in each case can be effective against the enemy. Because of this it will be essential to have strong, mobile and particularly well-equipped reserves in the West. Any weakening of these tactical reserves required in the West is a risk and will acutely endanger the situation as a whole.

X However in the event of an attack in force in the West, even if the said tactical reserves are there, the forces at our disposal will not be adequate. It will be necessary in this event which will decide the war to employ every German man able to bear arms, laying the home country largely bare.

---

* Illegible scribbled question in margin and note - '5.3 millions'.

X Pencilled note "370,000 men".

L-172

H1120 - 0097

4. Internal security

The British are continually trying to form organizations intended to engage in sabotaging the French industries working for the German munition industry and the lines of communication. They are supplied by air. The Army units employed in security duties, the SD (Security Service), and the French police as well have been able to keep these organizations under control. In the period from the 20th to the 30th October alone these terrorists lost 12 dead and 380 prisoners.

Strong forces of the ERSATZ Army have been transferred to France for the pacification of the country.

5.* Disarmament of the 6 Italian divisions numbering approximately 50,000 men employed along the coast of the Mediterranean is proceeding smoothly. The employment of units of 2 divisions proved sufficient to nip all will-to-resistance in the bud.

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* Illegible marginal note.

L-172

H1120 – 0098

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. L-172 (Cont'd)
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Very secret

Armed Forces Operations Staff/Op (Army) West

FUHRER's G.H.Q.
3rd November 1943

4 copies
1 copy

Strength of Army Command West

(to date 1.11.43)

1. Employed in coastal defence: 27 divisions & 2 Rgt.

2. Employed in 2nd line : 1 Inf Div
2 Inf div being formed
3 Tactical groups (I.D.)
1 Armoured div
3 SS armoured divisions)being formed
4 Armoured grenadier divisions)
3 Reserve armoured divisions

3. In addition : 5 Reserve divisions

46 Divisions / 2 Regts.

4. New formations ordered (no formations HQs and cadres available as yet) : 5 Inf divisions
3 Parachute Jäger divisions
1 SS armoured grenadier division

7 divisions

5. Ration strength (without armed forces auxiliaries and PWs)
1,370,708

Ration strength including armed forces auxiliaries and PW's
1,708,990

Distribution:

Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff	1st copy
Deputy Chief	2nd copy
Op (Army)/West	3rd copy
KTb (?)	4th copy

L-172

H1120 - 0099

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. L-172 (Cont'd)
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

IV

How are the resources of our opponents distributed at the present time, and what are his strategic and tactical intentions likely to be?

England)
America) separate appendices
Mediterranean)
Far East)

It was doubtful for a time whether the enemy would not transfer his point of gravity to the Far East. This assumption proved wrong. The main mass of the British-American formations capable of employment is undoubtedly in the Mediterranean. Consequently we must reckon in every event with the continuation of the operations there. The only questions remaining open are: in what direction and on what scale? The supplies observed passing through the straits of Gibraltar per month amount to approx.1.8 million tons, of which approx. 300,000 tons go through the SUEZ Canal to the Far East. This leaves approx. 1.5 million tons for the Mediterranean to be divided between the Western and Eastern Mediterranean. That is not much more than is required for normal supply. Presumably therefore it is not proposed to send any new and stronger forces to the Mediterranean.

L-172

H1120 – 0100

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. L-172 (Cont'd)
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Distribution of the American Army

Europe:	16 Inf divisions
	3 armoured divisions
	3 armoured brigades
	3 air-borne divisions
	7 mixed brigades
U.S.A.:	29 Inf divisions
	10 armoured divisions
	1 air-borne division
Pacific:	14 Inf divisions
	2 Marine infantry divisions
	1 armoured brigade
	2 mixed birgades

L-172

H1120-0101

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. L-172 (Cont'd)
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Strength of the forces in Great Britain suitable for employment in attacking operations

40 - 41 Infantry divisions (of whom 4 - 5 American)
4 independent Inf brigades
9 armoured divisions
11 armoured brigades (of whom 1 American)
2 air-borne divisions
7 paratroop battalions (of whom 3 American)

Of these employed in South-East and South England only, in direct proximity to the starting ports:-

18 Infantry divisions
2 Infantry brigades
1 airborne division
8 armoured divisions
4 Army armoured brigades

In addition about 1,000 2-4 engined transport aircraft are able to put in approx. 20,000 air-borne troops.

It is also possible to reckon with the employment of approx. 20,000 paratroops.

Troop transport and landing boat tonnage is available for at least 11-12 Infantry divisions and 1-2 armoured divisions.

The forces and resources at the disposal of the enemy are already sufficient for a large scale operation intended to force the issue on the Continent. These forces and resources will presumably be reinforced still further in the course of the next few months.

H1120-0102

Distribution of British Forces

Italy:

10 Infantry divisions
2 armoured divisions
3 armoured brigades
1 air-borne division
5 commandos.

Western Mediterranean:

(Gibraltar: garrison approx.20,000)

3 Infantry divisions
2 armoured divisions
2 armoured brigades
1 air-borne division

Middle East and
Near East:

15 Infantry divisions
and 4 Polish Infantry divisions
in all : 19

4 Inf brigades &

2 Greek
1 Czech
1 Yugoslav brigades
in all : 8

5 armoured divisions
5 armoured brigades
1 paratroop division

L-172

H1120-0103

(unnumbered)

V

According to my experience, there is yet another anxiety stalking the land. It concerns the morale of our own Allies and the fear that yet other, as yet neutral states, might join the ranks of our enemies. At this point, of course, I enter upon the ticklish question of foreign policy which is not my business and which I will traverse as speedily as possible.

Of the neutral countries, we are not loved by Sweden and Switzerland. The latter is surrounded, of no danger to us from the military point of view, and will not harm us. She lives on our bounty and benefit from her.

The same does not apply to Sweden. In the last few years she has been arming hard, and possesses 12-14 Infantry divisions, 3-4 armoured brigades, and in addition a few cyclist brigades, in all 400,000 men under arms. Sweden sways between fear of Bolshevism and hope of British-American aid. This latter is far away for as long as we in the SKAGERRAK cut off Sweden's contact with England.

Should an enemy landing in Norway or Denmark prove successful, Sweden may become dangerous - but not before.

Spain and Portugal have decided to remain neutral. They have not the necessary strength to defend themselves against England and America. Everything depends therefore on the good will of our Western opponents as to the measure in which they recognize this neutrality. Latest events in Portugal have shown this. I do not believe however that it is in the interest of the ANGLO-SAXONS either for political or military reasons to unleash war on the Iberian Peninsula and that is what would undoubtedly happen were Spain to be attacked. Whether the simpler methods of political disintegration which are at present being employed will be successful is doubtful, at all events in the case of Spain.

TURKEY so far has maintained a clear policy of neutrality. Its ideal would have been agreement between England and Germany and consequently reliable security against her traditional enemy: Russia. However, the closer the Soviet Power approaches the Balkans, and the more England - in order to win the war - enters into the tow of the Bolshevists, the more difficult the position of Turkey becomes, for against Soviet Russia and England she cannot possibly maintain her neutrality - Attack by surprise on the part of Turkey against the Axis powers is not to be expected. No more likely however is it that England should allow the Dardanelles to pass into the hands of Soviet Russia and so lose her own safety in the Mediterranean which is her aim. Nevertheless even if England were merely to occupy the Dardanelles, this would at once be regarded by the Soviets as a hostile act. Turkey's future attitude is dominated by this problem of 'Haute Politique'. She

L-172

H1120-0104

is able to maintain her neutrality thanks to the diverging interests of Soviet Russia and the Western Powers. Expansionist plans she has none, not even against BULGARIA.

Page 32 Our own Allies on the other hand are united and kept at our side by the fear of Bolshevism. That is understandable, for no people fights for another but only for its own existence.

Concerning the internal morale of Finland and Bulgaria there can be no doubt.

Roumania contains two worlds, the rigorous policy faithful to the alliance with us looks two ways.*) We must be clear with ourselves as to that.

In Hungary, as a feudal state on the old pattern, social contrasts are still present in their acute form. The country is therefore particularly liable to infection with the Communist idea. In no city in Europe however does this fact appear to be less recognized than in BUDAPEST . In that city a dissolute and strongly JUDAIFIED society strata is living and dancing on a volcano. However in contradistinction to Italy, here the main mass of the officer caste at least has recognized the danger. For the present at all events for Hungary there is no political way out.

Japan: There a heroic people is fighting decisively for its existence just as we are. From the political-strategic point of view a great gap yawns in the Far East in the clear line of the fronts. ROOSEVELT and CHURCHILL want Russia to join in the fight against Japan. We ourselves, from the purely military point of view, would be glad to see the Manchurian Armies cross the AMUR or advance against VLADIVOSTOK. But on this point both the Asiatic powers stop their ears to the siren songs of the West. The reasons for this do not lie solely in the supplementary military burdens which both States would have to take upon themselves by such a decision, but more probably in their own long-term political considerations. For why should Japan start a war against Russia for as long as it can be certain that there will be no American-British air base at VLADIVOSTOK and while on the distant horizon there still looms large a conflict of the Western powers against Soviet Russia?

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*) Translator's note: JODL says literally: "stands on 2 eyes".

L-172

VI

page 34 Leaving the slippery ground of politics, I now turn to the problem which confronts the High Command today and will confront it in the near future. We are fighting along the inner line, that is, we are in a position to transfer strong forces from one theatre of war to another in a much shorter time. Our great successes in the East in 1917/18 and in Italy in 1917 we owe to able exploitation of the inner line. Today this tactical advantage of the inner line is not so marked; at the moment the enemy is so strong on all fronts that in spite of our shorter lines of communication we are scarcely in a position to produce more than local superiority. This state of affairs may change if the Anglo-Saxons steps to form a second or third front in addition to the Italian. At the present time, however, the hardest task of all of the Command is to

page 35 distribute its forces throughout the theatre of war as a whole in such a way that we may be sufficiently strong at those points at which the enemy delivers the blow. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that we are not in a position rapidly to reinforce the South-East, or Finland, or Norway, because the necessary technical facilities are not present there. We have won advanced positions in Finland, Norway, Denmark, in the West, in Italy and in the South-East in order to keep the core of the Reich itself alive. The same reasons which compelled us to take these positions also compel us now, at this particular time, when the superior range of the enemy air arm is inflicting grave injury to the centre of the Reich, to maintain them. To do so a certain measure of strength is necessary. That things are getting warm on the East front, must be admitted; however no success gained by the enemy is directly fatal there, with the exception of the loss of the Roumanian oil region. None the less the Command cannot close its eyes to the fact that the brand is now held in readiness at some time or other to start a conflagration in the West which if not extinguished then and there will pass beyond control.

page 36. It is at this point the various fronts ceaselessly drag on the nerves and decisions of the FUHRER. STEGEMANN once put this into words as follows: "In war there is always the same conflict: the swing between spending and saving the forces accumulated. This has been and still is a problem not easy to solve. War with its unpredictabilities, its intangible dynamics and its fluctuations of luck and chance cannot be determined beforehand. He who expends everything on one throw may later on, as the result of circumstance, be left with empty hands, and he who expends his accumulated forces sparingly may, as the result of circumstances, never come to win the upper hand. Only he who is able to solve this problem is able to master war. One thing however has always been so, namely, that whatever may be done must be done with all one's might if it is to pay. That is the only rule which in war has never failed."

Where the enemy will strike to obtain that decision, we do not know. He has a jumping-off base in the
page 37 Mediterranean and a jumping-off base in England.

No theatre of war can be weakened below a certain level. our uttermost efforts can therefore only take the form of creating, in spite of all our manpower problems, new tactical central reserves over and above the necessary

H1120-0105

L-172

H1120-0106

minimum of occupying forces. That is now being done (Appendix).

This however brings us to the next difficult problem which always arises in every long war: the interplay and conflict between the need for soldiers at the front and the need for workers at home. Never before has this problem presented itself in so acute a form as in this highly mechanized war. Herewith a few figures (Appendix).

How therefore is the Command to decide? The front needs soldiers and the front needs weapons. Many weapons, and the better weapons the higher the value attached to the life of the fighting man himself.

If we had not the FUHRER at the head with sovereign rights of decision there would be black murder done on this question. One thing however is sure: it is a crime to keep a man able to bear arms working at home if he can be replaced by some other worker or if his work is not vital. Fortunately Italy's betrayal has its good
age 38 side in this question. The flow of military internees and workers from Italy will afford considerable relief in this domain.

This dilemma of man-power shortage has led to the idea of making more thorough use of the man-power reserves in the territories occupied by us. Here right thinking and wrong thinking are mixed up together. I believe that in so far as concerns labour, everything has been done that could be done. But where this has not yet been achieved, it appeared to be more favourable politically not to have recourse to measures of compulsion, exchanging for these order and economic aid. In my opinion however the time has now come to take steps with
ge 39 remorseless vigour and resolution in Denmark, Holland, France and Belgium also to compel thousands of idle ones (Nichtstuer) to carry out the fortification work which is more important than any other work. The necessary orders for this have already been given.

The question of recruiting alien peoples as fighting men should however be examined with the greatest caution and scepticism. There was a time when something in the nature of a neurosis emanated from the East Front with the slogan "Russia can be conquered *) only by Russians". Many heads were haunted by the notion of an immense VLASJOV army. At that time we recruited over 160 battalions. Our experiences were good while we were ourselves attacking successfully. They became bad when the position changed for the worse and we were compelled to retreat. Today only about 100 Eastern battalions are available and hardly one of these is in the East. One Cossack and one TURKMEN division are at the moment
e 40 undergoing their test by fire in the South-East. At the moment the Reichsführer of the SS is engaged in draining the defensive resources of Estonia and Latvia as well as the Croatian, Moslem and Macedonian manpower supplies.

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*) In the typescript the word was typed as 'liberated'. This has been scratched out in favor of 'conquered'.

L-172

H1120-0107

However, what weighs most heavily today on the home front, and consequently by reaction on the front line also, are the enemy terror raids from the air on our homes and so on our wives and children. In this respect the war - and this cannot be repeated often enough - has assumed forms solely through the fault of England such as are believed to be no longer possible since the days of the racial and religious wars.

The effect of these terror raids, psychological, moral, and material, is such that they must be relieved if they cannot be made to cease completely. It is true that they - like any other great trouble - have had some good effects. In face of the ruins of one's own possessions all social problems, all enviousness and all the petty impulses of the human soul die down. But this is no
ge 41 consolation for us. Asking too much of our air arm and inability on the technical side to keep pace with the aircraft development and radio location of our enemies have brought us to this pass. The efforts of the JUHRER and the Reichs Marshal will overcome this crisis also. The first beginnings and first fruits are there. We shall counter the heavy and powerful armament of the 4-engined bombers by speed and the annihilating effect of fire at long range. Our enemies have realized this danger and are endeavouring to meet it by destroying the hearths of production. It is enough if the enemy bombers can be made with absolute cert inty in all day and night raids to lose 10 - 12% of the aircraft put in. They might perhaps replace this loss on the equipment side, but not in personnel; and above all the morale of the crews, most of whom have no idea for what they are fighting and who among the Americans are mainly materialists, will not hold out against it. I am fully convinced that thanks to our new weapons and technical progress the raids in close squadron formation which alone by means of their bomb carpets have been able to produce so annihilating an effect will not escape their fate.

Nevertheless the greatest hopes of all have been stamped by the military command and the German people in U-boat warfare, and that with every right, since within the framework of the general large-scale strategic defensive which we have been forced by the development of the war and the gradual coming into effect of the superior war potential of our enemies, submarine warfare may be regarded
ge 42 as the only offensive sector of the German command. Here too, in the activities of this weapon, heavy set backs have had to be recorded in the course of the last few months, set backs which have resulted in the successes of the tonnage war no longer being able to keep up with the rate at which the enemy is able to build his merchantmen. The reason for the decline in U-boat successes lies in the anti U-boat defence measures which the opponent has been driving forward with the uttermost energy, making use for
ge 43 this purpose of wide-scale support by the air arm and

H1120-0108

ge 43 new highly efficient detector equipment together with high efficiency bombs and submarine weapons. The present crisis in the German U-boat war is therefore directly traceable to the enemy's air superiority over the Atlantic. This crisis must and will be overcome. The extraordinary importance of the tonnage war remains unassailable, as before. In the past it has afforded the greatest hindrance to all enemy plans of operation
ge 44 and it will continue in the future to present the greatest threat to any future developments since all the continuous heavy transportation of men and equipment for the Anglo-Saxon Command and all supply for the armies employed in Europe and for England itself must come by sea. Elimination of the threat presented by the Tonnage-war would inevitably set free a vast enemy war potential for employment at other points.

On our side measures have been instituted, or are already being developed and driven forward with the utmost resolution, with a view to breaking the enemy defence and bringing about a radical improvement in the fighting value of the U-boat.

There is every reason to believe that they will lead to success in the near future and in this way put an end to the present slackening in the U-boat war.

For the rest the C in C of the navy has himself given you an account in greater detail of the general situation in the U-boat war.

H1120-0109

To page 37 - top

In process of formation at the present time as a tactical reserve.

20 Infantry divisions

4 Italian divisions
1 Croatian mountain div, 1 Croatian Legionary div.
1 Galician infantry division
1 Macedonian infantry division.

2 Armoured divisions

5 Armoured Grenadier divisions

2 Northern Armoured Grenadier divisions
2 Assault brigades

2-3 Parachutist Jäger divisions

H1120-0110

To V

BULGARIA

To date 1.11.43

A. Land Forces:

1. Home area — 10 Inf Div (of which 1 in process of formation)
1 Cav div.
1 Cav brigade
1 Armoured brigade

2. Coastal defence — 2 Inf divisions
1 Cav brigade

3. Serbian Occupied territory:
7 Inf divs

In all: 19 Inf divs
1 armoured brigade
1 Cav division
2 Cav brigades

B. Air force: (only home area)

9 fighter squadrons (JAGDSTAFFELN)
3 combat squadrons (KAMPFSTAFFELN)
11 reconnaissance and transport squadrons

C. Air-borne and parachutist squadrons: None

H1120-0111

Roumania
To date 1.11.43

A. Land Forces

1. Home area (including Transaistria)

a) fully fit for service — 3 Inf Div

b) conditionally fit for service — 5 Inf Div
1 Mountain Div

c) replenished or re-constituted — 8 Inf Div
1 Cav div
2 Cav div (mot)
1 Armoured Div

2. Russia: — 3 Inf divisions
4 Mountain divisions
2 Cav divisions

In all: 19 Inf Div (of which 5 conditionally fit for service)

5 Mountain divisions (of which 1 conditionally fit for service)

5 Cav div of which 2 (mot)
1 Armoured division

3. Air forces

1. Home area — 7 fighter squadrons (modern equipment)
1 night fighter squadron
8 combat squadrons ("KAMPFSTAFFELN")
19 reconnaissance and transport squadrons

2. Russia (employed with 4th Air Fleet) — 5 fighter squadrons
4 combat squadrons ("KAMPFSTAFFELN")
6 Battle squadrons ("SCHLACHTSTAFFELN")
4 reconnaissance squadrons

In all — 12 fighter squadrons
1 night fighter squadron
12 combat ("KAMPF") squadrons
6 battle ("SCHLACHT") squadron
23 reconnaissance squadrons

C. Air-borne and Parachutist formations: None

H1120-0112

Hungary

To date 1.11.43

A. Land Forces:

1. Home area (all formations conditionally fit for employment, equipment incomplete).

8 Inf div
1 light division
1 cavalry division
2 mountain brigades
1 armoured division

2. Russia (Occupation troops)

9 light divisions (security divisions)

In all
8 inf divisions
1 cavalry division
10 light divisions
2 mountain divisions
1 armoured division

B. Air Force:

1. Home area
4 fighter squadrons
2 combat ("KAMPF") squadrons
1 transport squadron

2. Russia (employed with Air Fleet 4)

2 fighter squadrons
2 combat ("KAMPF") squadrons
1 battle ("SCHLACHT") squadrons
2 reconnaissance squadrons

In all:
6 fighter squadrons
4 combat squadrons
1 battle squadron
2 reconnaissance squadrons
1 transport squadron

C. Air-borne and parachutist formations: NONE

H1120-0113

SWEDEN

To date 1.11.43

A. Land Forces:

12 - 14 Inf divisions
6 - 8 cyclist brigades
3 - 4 armoured brigades
1 mot brigade

Corps and army units and frontier and coast guard formations.

At the moment it may be assumed that the number of men under arms is 400,000.

B. Air Force

In all:

700 front line aircraft
76 reconnaissance aircraft

225 fighters
12 torpedo aircraft

of which approx 482 modern types

H1120-0114

Finland

To date 1.11.43

A. Land Forces:

(all formations in the area of operations)

14 Inf div (of which 3 inf divisions as reserve behind the front)
2 Inf brigades
1 armoured division
1 cavalry brigade
3 coastal defence brigades

Corps and army units, in addition, navy, air arm, ERSATZ (replacements) army, Home Air Defence, and building units to a total strength of approx 450,000.

According to report, it is proposed to form 1 new infantry divisions and 2 infantry brigades.

B. Air forces:

7 fighter squadrons
4 combat ("KAMPF") squadrons
4 other (reconnaissance and transport) squadrons

H1120-0115

To page 37 - 11c V B

Position with respect to Personnel

on 1.10.1943

1. In the Armed Forces (WEHRMACHT) 9,860,000
on 1.8.

of whom:	Waffen SS	402,000
	Navy	711,000
	Air Arm	2,007,000
	Replacements Army	2,185,000
	Field Army 1)	4,555,000

1) Field Army as per strength on 1.8.43; no newer reports available.

2. UK (subject to occupational deferment) and temporarily rejected: 5,726,000

Year-classes 1894 - 1926.
(note in pencil: including 18 - 50 year olds

of whom 348,000 year class 1914 - 45

3. Unfit for service: 2,931,000

Year classes 1894 - 1926

4. Available replacements 2):

year-class		
	1894 - 1899	18000
	1900 - 1922	6000
	1923	1000
	1924	3000
	1925	45000
	1926 3)	468000
		541,000

---

2) Year class 1884 - 1893 ("LANDSTURM") at present still being called up

3) Year class 1926 at the moment in the RAD (Reichs Labour Service)

5. Aliens working in Reich territory (to date 15,8.43)

men	3,586,000
women	1,678,000
	5,264,000

6.....

L-172

H1120-0116

6. Persons fit for work 1877 - 1927

57,500,000

This figure represents the sum total of these year-classes (population acc. to the Census figures for 1939). According to the Balance-Sheet of forces of the Reichs Statistical Office the number of occupied German nationals (i.e. without the Armed Forces, P.O.W. and aliens) on the 31.5.43:

men	15,462,000
women	14,274,000
	29,736,000

(no page 3)

To II

Armed Forces Operations Staff/ORG (II

FUHRER'S G.H.Q.
Nov. 3rd 1943

3 copies
-- copy

Men fit for service in the war supply industries (munitions industry).

Men liable for military service suitable and fit for service are to be found now in any number (excepting on the Reich railways and to some extent in agriculture) only in the war supply industries (including mining and building) and in particular in the munitions industry. The view continually being put forward by the munitions industry that any deduction of these young men liable for service would be bound to prejudice production is not shared by G.H.Q. Armed Forces in view of German labour which has flowed into the munitions industry since the beginning of the year of the basis of the Duty to Report and close down order throughout industry, of the Russian POW allocated by G.H.Q. Armed Forces (especially for mining), and the appreciable allocation being made at the present moment of Italian internees and free Italian labour, as well as other measures by the GBA (?) and the Minister for munitions aimed at supplying supplementary labour.

The war supply industries (including mining and building) according to the figures for 1.10.43 included in all 2,950,000 men liable for service temporarily deferred. Of these

year classes	06 - 13	783,000
" "	14 & later	203,000

According to the report of the GBA the total number of workers which it was found possible to allocate for the production of munitions from the 1.1. - 30.9.43 was 2,200,000 workers
including 770,000 metal workers.

These allocations replaced 300,000 men called up from munitions for service with the colours and wastage and in addition reinforced the personnel of the most important munitions concerns by

650,000 workers

The FÜHRER has now ordered that

210,000 men liable for military service of the year-classes 01 - 22. be transferred from industrial war supply (including mining and building) in three monthly contingents of 70,000 men as from November '43.

However whereas the transfers to the Armed Forces effected up to the present could be more than compensated,

H1120-0118

the transfers now ordered will be covered, in addition to the current allocations of the G.B.A. by

approx. 500,000 Italian military internees who have now become available and in addition by free Italian labour to be recruited by the G.B.A. and estimated by this body as numbering

Approx. 3,000,000 workers.

So that no decline in production need to anticipated.

The early and complete call-up of all young men liable for military service in the front line still employed in industrial war supply should be demanded for psychological reasons as well. A large number of letters from official bodies, and in particular from the mass of the people, show clearly that the forthcoming call-up of the LANDSTURM (young-classes 84-93) is not understood while there are still so many young men liable for military service, working at home under temporary deferment.

H1120-0119

To VI

FÜHRER'S GHQ
4.11.1943

4 copies

- copy

Contribution by Op M (Operations NAVY) to lecture

by Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff.

Position of the Navy in the beginning of November 1943.

Submarine War:

The U-boat weapon is being employed in force in all the seas. Conditions much more difficult than before owing to comprehensive air reconnaissance (extension of range of reconnaissance as a result of theoccupation of the AZORES), excellent enemy detector apparatus, and exceptionally strong escort of convoys. The aircraft is to-day the chief enemy of the U-boat.

In spite of this by sticking stubbornly to the task and making fullest use of the U-boat weapon further successes have been gained. Increasing successes also recently in the fight against enemy aircraft and destroyers. Sinkages figures correspond to the difficulty of the position. Since 1.1.1943 sunk by U-boats only after careful counting far above 3,000,000 BRT plus a large number of destroyers, cruisers and escort vessels. To this figure may be added in the merchant fleet and tonnage war as a whole the successes gained by the surface tactical forces, the air arm and mines. This gives us since 1.1.1943 a total figure of almost 5,000,000 BRT British-American merchant tonnage sunk (without Russia).

In the war at sea the main task of the Navy in all the seas under our control: protection of own communications by sea, injury to enemy fleets, supply shipping, military transport and supply formations, defence against landing operations. All these tasks set extraordinarily high demands on the tactical and security formations of the Navy.

H1120-0120

Position in the individual theatres of war.

BALTIC

Naval supremacy completely in our hands. - Importance of BALTIC for ore-traffic from Sweden. - Lively own supply traffic to Finland, Finnish Gulf via BALTIC entrances. Interference by British air mine warfare especially in the KATTEGAT, the Sound and the Belts and in the Western BALTIC. Own loss up to the present very low thanks to active mine-clearing. Russians confined to inner part of Finnish Gulf by dense minefields. Attempts to break out so far always thwarted. In the inner Finnish Gulf recently several affrays with Russian trawler formations, all in our favour.

Importance of BALTIC as training arm for the naval tactical forces and the submarine weapon.

NORTH SEA

DEUTSCHE BUCHT (German Bight) and SKAGERRAK blocked by strong mine-wall. Own task: protection of lively coastal traffic, continuous patrol of shipping lanes, intensive mine detection, trawling and outpost activities. By means of continuous energetic air activity combined with mine-laying and raids by enemy speed-boats the enemy is endeavouring to stop our communications by sea. Up to the present we have always succeeded in maintaining communications without undue loss on our side. Good results in particular against enemy speedboats.

Norway:

Very busy own rations and supply traffic along the long stretch of coast under the protection of screening forces and numerous strong coastal batteries. Routes in the skerries protected by their natural position and mine-blocks. Our own escort movements interfered with by enemy air arms and speed-boats which hide in the skerries. Successes obtained by the enemy in attack so far very slight. In the Polar region attacks by Russian aircraft and submarines. Our own losses slight but enemy losses high.

Arctic

The presence of our own combat group of battleships and destroyers in Northern Waters is of considerable strategic influence. Since January of this year large-scale enemy supplies going to Russia via the Arctic have not been observed (Supply diverted to the far longer and more difficult route to the Persian Gulf and via IRAN). U-boats employed against individual enemy movements in the ARCTIC. We have now to see whether the despatch of supplies to Russia by the Arctic route begin again in the period of darkness now setting in.

Channel

In spiteof strong enemy superiority in the air and the lively activity of his light naval tactical forces combined with intensified mine-laying, German supplying and rationing traffic continues to be carried on practically to schedule. At the same time full employment of our own screening tactical units (mine detector, outpost, trawling and escort boats). Lively and successful offensive employment of our own speed-boats against British convoyed traffic and for mine-laying.

H1120-0121

Conditions difficult owing to British superiority on sea and in the air. Warfare in the Channel area shows increasing signs of enemy threat of landing operation. Strong coastal defence on one side.

BISCAY/ATLANTIC coast

Air raids on our own ports have left U-boat defence unaffected. Main task for Navy:

> Keeping the seaways open and maintenance of escort for U-boats coming in and going out. In addition, counter-measures against British mine laying, against strong British air observation and the appearance of light enemy naval tactical forces.

MEDITERRANEAN

A very strong enemy naval fighting force (3 British, 1 French, 5 Italian battleships, 13 cruisers, 55 destroyers) is unopposed on our side by any fighting forces with the exception of U-boats and S-boats. A few Italian destroyers and torpedo boats are being commissioned. Our own U-boats are being employed against very busy British supply traffic. Numerous successes. For the rest, the task of the Navy is to carry out and protect our own supply traffic for the combatant troops in the LIGURIAN and TYRRHENIA Seas and in the ADRIATIC. Increasing activity on the part of the enemy tactical air and light naval forces. Transfer of our own supply to small ships and coastal traffic. The necessary freight tonnage and screening forces are being made ready.

AEGEAN

Support of the island garrisons by protective formations of the German Navy. Carrying out supply and rationing overseas. Strong enemy activity with submarines, cruisers, destroyers and tactical air forces.

BLACK SEA

All suitable fighting forces (U-boats, S- and R-boats, "MFP") employed to defend the CRIMEA. Own slight forces fully employed. Good success. So far activity of the Russian BLACK SEA Fleet slight. Up to the present rationing and supply traffic maintained in accordance with plan in spite of enemy air and submarine activity.

DISTRIBUTION:

Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff	1st copy
Op.H. (Army)	2nd copy
Op.L. (Air)	3rd copy
Op.M. (Navy)	4th copy

H1120-0122

Page 45.

III. The grounds for our confidence in Final Victory.

When at the end of my considerations I come to sum up the general situation in a few words I am bound to describe it quite candidly as difficult, moreover I cannot gloss over the fact that I expect further severe crises. My own attitude towards these prospects I should like to characterise directly by the aphorism from FONTAINE:

> "Great times are always just those when everything seems to be going wrong, when every moment brings the fear: now its all done for. That's when it shows. Courage is good but sticking it out is better. Sticking it out, that's the main thing."

Page 46

In particular however our confidence is built up on a series of points of view to be set forth objectively. At the head comes the ethical and moral foundation of our struggle which givesits impress to the general attitude of the German people and makes our Armed Forces a definitely reliable instrument in the hands of its Command. The force of the revolutionary idea has not only made possible a series of unprecedented successes, it also enables our brave troops to achieve feats in defence and in retreat according tp plan such perhaps the Russians but certainly no other people could achieve and which drive off into the realm of Utopie any hope on the part of our opponents for a military breakdown.

As against this themoral, political and military tendencies of our opponents by no means from a closed uniformly directed whole. This shows most clearly in the fighting morale of the English and Americans whose successes in Africa, Sicily and Italy are solely ascribable to the weakness and treachery

page 47

of our Italian ally. Where they have met German forces in battle, they have shown themselves inferior throughout and gained the advantage only as a result of multiple numerical advantage. This shows particularly clearly from the point of view of their conduct of the war, for according to our ideas it is totally incomprehensible that the Anglo-Americans should have avoided forming the Second Front in the WEST which their Russian allies have been demanding for over two years, and they have by no means extracted from their opportunities in Mediterranean that which according to the true state of affairs and by German standards of activity they might have extracted.

Well, whatever comes, any further attack by our opponents - whether in the NORTH or WEST, in Italy or in the Balkans - will place their readiness for action to a hard test. We ourselves could tell a tale from the struggle in North Africa what supply difficulties can mean and the sacrifices they may entail. And reports of the most various kinds from the camps of our opponents all point in the same direction, showing how difficult the reversion of these conditions is already being found by the enemy.

page 48

My most profound confidence is however based upon the fact that at the head of Germany there stands a man who by his entire development, his desires and striving can only have been destined by fate to lead our people into a brighter future. In defiance of all views to the contrary I must here

H1120-0123

testify that he is the soul not only of the political but also of the military conduct of the war and that the force of his willpower and the creative riches of his thought animate and hold together the whole of the German Armed Forces, with respect to strategy, organization and munitions of war. Similarly the unity of political and military command which is so important is personified by him in a way such as has never been known since the days of Frederick the Great.

That no command is free of errors has often been said by the FUHRER himself, moreover the history of war - to use an aphorism of SCHLIEFFEN's - consists in general only of a series of errors and every war situation, naturally, can only be the product of errors.

page 49 What matters ultimately is constant readiness to act, the determination never to let oneself be beaten and always to stick to the enemy. That it is so now, I am able to assure you from the bottom of my heart.

Further, as regards the part played by his collaborators, once again, as before, a quotation from CLAUSEWITZ which is not very generally known has been found true: "The most perfect General Staff with the most correct views and principles does not in itself represent perfect leadership of an Army, if the soul of a great General is missing."

It behoves us all therefore to crush down within ourselves all faintheartedness and by so doing to create within ourselves the foundations of that confidence out of which alone victory can grow. After all, the other fellow is just a bit more frightened still, and a war is only lost when it is given up.

page 50 How this war will end, that no man can foretell. What imponderables it may yet bring with it, how many hopes may be disappointed, and how many troubles may turn to the contrary, lies hidden in the darkness of the future. All that is sure is that we shall never cease to fight for through the history of the world there run, like an bronze law, progress and advance upward. In these Europe has led and at the head of Europe - Germany. A Europe under the whip of American Jews or Bolshevik commissars is unthinkable.

At this hour I would wish to testify not with the lips but from my deepest heart,

- that our trust and faith in the FUHRER is boundless.

- that for us there is no higher law and no more holy duty than to fight to the last breath for the freedom of our people.

page 51 - that we will throw off all who are soft and forget their duties.

- that all the threats of our opponents only make us harder and more resolute,

- that we do not cherish any false hopes that anyone else might save us from that Bolshevism which will sweep away all should Germany fall,

- that we ourselves will defend the ruins of our country to the last cartridge since it is a thousand times better to live among them than in servitude.

- that we shall win because we must win since otherwise world history would have lost all meaning.

H1120-0125

The Operations and Tactical Plans ranged in the order of their happening.

1. Campaign against Poland; defence in the WEST.
2. Plan of attack against the WEST; attempt to realise this during the winter.
3. Spring campaign against Norway.
4. Summer campaign against the WEST.
5. Intention to land in England.
6. Attempt to win the Spanish position and take GIBRALTAR.
7. Decision to intervene in North Africa. ROMMEL's counter-attack up to the Egyptian frontier.
8. Realisation of the necessity of a campaign against Soviet Russia. (Discussion with MOLOTOV in BERLIN).
9. Italy's surprise campaign against Greece.
10. The German campaign planned against Greece.
11. The overthrow in Yugoslavia and the campaign in the Balkans and its consequences; delay of the campaign in the EAST.
12. ROMMEL's retreat to CYRENAICA.
13. The Eastern campaign 1941 and the winter position 1941/42. Finland's entry into the war. The culminating point of the attack.
14. Japan's entry into the war.
15. The idea of occupying Iceland and the AZORES.
16. The Russian Spring offensive; the German counter-attack.
17. The German summer offensive: The CRIMEA - the DON - the VOLGA - the CAUCASUS.
    The intention of taking LENINGRAD is not realised.
18. ROMMEL's offensive up to EL ALAMEIN.
19. Counter-stroke by Western Powers. Landing in North Africa.
20. The German counter-stroke in France. Occupation of the whole country. Occupation of the Mediterranean littoral, occupation of TUNISIA.
21. The winter battle in Russia. The collapse of the confederates.
22. The loss of Tripolitania, attempt to hold TUNISIA.
23. The loss of the entire African position.
24. The beginning of the landing in Europe (Sicily).

25. The summer offensive of the Soviet Army.

26. The treachery of Italy.

27. The landing of the Continent.

	Available	Short
c. Tanks	4,252	2,995
d. Assault guns	2,409	338

12) Front line aircraft with the formations:

Fighters	1646
Night fighters	574
Combat ("KAMPF") aircraft	1676
Reconnaissance	613
STUKAS	441
Other aircraft	1127
in all	6077

18 Nov. 1945

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. L-172

I, Willard E. Skidmore, Lt. (jg), USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpt from Document No. L-172.

Willard E. Skidmore,
Lt (jg) USNR
391590

L-172

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 789-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Pencilled note: Duplicate

Nov. 23, 1939, 1200 hours. Conference with the Fuehrer, to which all Supreme Commanders are ordered. The Fuehrer gives the following speech:

The purpose of this conference it to give you an idea of the world of my thoughts, which takes charge of me, in the face of future events, and to tell you my decisions. The building up of our armed forces was only possible in connection with the ideological (weltanschaulich) education of the German people by the Party. When I started my political task in 1919, my strong belief in final success was based on a thorough observation of the events of the day and the study of the reasons for their occurrence. Therefore, I never lost my belief in the midst of set-backs which were not spared me during my period of struggle. Providence has had the last word and brought me success. On top of that, I had a clear recognition of the probably course of historical events, and the firm will to make brutal decisions. The first decision was in 1919 when I after long internal conflict became a politician and took up the struggle against my enemies. That was the hardest of all decisions. I had, however, the firm belief that I would arrive at my goal. First of all, I desired a new system of selection. I wanted to educate a minority which would take over the leadership. After 15 years, I arrived at my goal, after strenuous struggles and many set-backs. When I came to power in 1933, a period of the most difficult struggle lay behind me. Everything existing before that had collapsed. I had to reorganize everything beginning with the mass of the people and extending it to the armed forces. First reorganization of the interior, abolishment of appearances of decay and defeatist ideas, education to heroism. While re-organizing the interior, I undertook the second task: to release Germany from its international ties. Two particular characteristics are to be pointed out: secession from the League of Nations and denunciation of the disarmament conferen It was a hard decision. The number of prophets who predicted that it would lead to the occupation of the Rhineland was large, the number of believers was very small. I was supported by the nation, which stood firmly behind me, when I carried out my intentions. After that the order for rearmament. Here again there were numerous prophets who predicted misfortunes, and only a few be-lievers. In 1935 the introduction of compulsory armed service. After that militarization of the Rhineland, again a process believed to be impossible at that time. The number of people who put trust in me, was very small. Then the beginning of the fortification of the whole country especially in the west.

One year later, Austria came, this step also was considered doubtful. It brought about a considerable reinforcement of the Reich. The next step was Bohemia, Moravia and Poland. This step also was not possible to accomplish in one campaign. First of all, the western fortification had to be finished. It was not possible to reach the goal in one effort. It was clear to me from the first moment that I could not be satisfied with the Sudeten-German territory. Tha was only a partial solution. The decision to march into Bohemia was made. Then followed the erection of the Protectorate and with that the basis for the action against Poland was laid, but I wasn't quite clear at that time whether I should start first against the east and then in the west or vice-versa. Moltke often made the same calculations in his time. Under pressure the decision came to fight with Poland first. One might accuse me of wanting to fight and fight again. In struggle I see the fate of all beings. Nobody can avoid a struggle if he does not want to lose out. The increasing number of people requires a larger living space (Lebensraum). My goal was to create a logical relation between the number of people and the space for them to live in. The struggle must start here. No people can get away from the solution of this task or else it must yield and gradually die out. That is taught by history. First migration of peoples to the southwest, then adaptation of the number of people to the small space by emigration. In the last years, adaptation of the people to insufficient space, by reducing the number of births. This would lead to the death and weakening of the blood of the people. If a people chooses that course all their weaknesses are mobilized. One yields to the force of the outside and uses this force against one's self by killing of the child. This means the greatest cowardice, decimation of the number, and loss of value. I decided a different way: adaptation of the living space to the number of people. One acknowledgement is important. The state has a meaning only if it supports the maintenance of its population potential. In our case 82 millions of people were concerned. That means the

H1120-0129

greatest responsibility. He who does not want to assume this responsibility is not worthy of belonging to the mass of the people. That gave me the strength to fight. It is one eternal problem to bring the number of Germans to a proper relationship to the available space. Security of the needed space. No calculated cleverness is of any help, solution only with the sword. A people unable to produce the strength for fight, must withdraw. Struggles are different than those of 100 years ago. Today we can speak of a racial fight. Today we fight for oilfields, rubber, treasures of the earth, etc. After the peace of Westphalia Germany disintegrated. Disintegration, impotence of the German Reich was determined by decree. This German impotence was removed by the creation of the Reich when Prussia realized her task. Then the opposition between France and England began. Since 1870 England has been against us. Bismarck and Moltke were certain that there would have to be one more action. The danger at that time was of a two-front war. Moltke was at times in favor of a preventive war. To take advantage of the slow progress of the Russian mobilization. German armed might was not fully employed. Insufficient sternness of the leading personalities. The basic thought of Moltke was the offensive. He never thought of the defense. Many opportunities were missed after Moltke's death. The solution was only possible by attacking a country at a favorable moment. Political and military leadership always declared that it was not yet ready. In 1914 there came the war on several fronts. It did not bring the solution of these problems. Today the second act of this drama is being written. For the first time in 67 years it must be made clear that we do not have a two-front war to wage. That which has been desired since 1870 and considered as impossible of achievement has come to pass. For the first time in history we have to fight on only one front, the other front is at present free. But no one can know how long that will remain so. I have doubted for a long time whether I should strike in the east and then in the west. Basically I did not organize the armed forces in order not to strike. The decision to strike was always in me. Earlier or later I wanted to solve the problem. Under pressure it was decided that the east was to be attacked first. If the Polish war was won so quickly, it was due to the superiority of our armed forces. The most glorious appearance in history. Unexpectedly small expenditures of men and materiel. Now the eastern front is held by only a few divisions. It is a situation which we viewed previously as unachievable. Now the situation is as follows: The opponent in the west lies behind his fortifications. There is no possibility of coming to grips with him. The decisive question is: how long can we endure this situation? Russia is at present not dangerous. It is weakened by many incidents today. Moreover, we have a pact with Russia. Pacts, however, are only held as long as they serve the purpose. Russia will hold herself to it only so long as Russia considers it to be to her benefit. Even Bismarck thought so. Let one think of the pact to assure our back. Now Russia has far reaching goals, above all the strengthening of her position in the Baltic. We can oppose Russia only when we are free in the West. Further Russia is striving to increase her influence on the Balkans and is striving toward the Persian Gulf. That is also the goal of our foreign policy. Russia will do that which she considers to benefit her. At the present moment it has retired from internationalism. In case she renounces this, she will proceed to Pan-Slavism. It is difficult to see into the future. It is a fact that at the present time the Russian army is of little worth. For the next one or two years the present situation will remain.

Much depends on Italy, above all on Mussolini, whose death could alter everything. Italy has a great goal for the consolidation of her empire. Those who carry this idea are fascism and the Duce, personally. The court is opposed to that. As long as the Duce lives, then it can be calculated that Italy will seize every opportunity to reach her imperialistic goal. However, it is too much to ask of Italy, that it should join in the battle before Germany has seized the offensive in the west: Just so Russia did not attack until we had marched into Poland. Otherwise Italy will think that France has only to deal with Italy, since Germany is sitting behind its West Wall. Italy will not attack until Germany has taken the offensive against France. Just as the death of Stalin, so the death of the Duce can bring danger to us. Just how easily the death of a statesman can come I myself have experienced recently. The time must be used to the full, otherwise one will suddenly find himself faced with a new situation. As long as Italy maintains this position then no danger from Jugoslavia is to be feared. Just so is the neutrality of Rumania achieved by the position of Russia. Scandinavia is hostile to us because of Marxistic influences, but is neutral now. America is still not dangerous to us because of its neutrality laws. The strengthening of our opponents by America

is still not important. The position of Japan is still uncertain, it is not yet certain whether she will join against England.

Everything is determined by the fact that the moment is favorable now, in 6 months it might not be so anymore.

As the last factor I must name my own person in all modesty: irreplaceable. Neither a military nor a civil person could replace me. Assassination attempts may be repeated. I am convinced of the powers of my intellect and of decision. Wars are always ended only by the destruction of the opponent. Everyone who believes differently is irresponsible. Time is working for our adversary. Now there is a relationship of forces which can never be more propitious, but can only deteriorate for us. The enemy will not make peace when the relationship of forces is unfavorable for us. No compromise. Sternness against ourselves. I shall strike and not capitulate. The fate of the Reich depends only on me. I shall deal accordingly. Today we have a superiority such as we have never had before. After 1914 our opponents disarmed themselves of their own accord. England disregarded the construction of her fleet. The fleet is no longer sufficiently large to safeguard the shipping lanes. Only two modern new constructions: Rodney and Nelson. New construction activity only in the cruisers of the Washington class, which were, however, an unsatisfactory type. The new measures can become effective only in 1941. In the Abyssinian war England did not have enough strength to occupy the Tana Sea. At Malta, Gibraltar and London little anti-aircraft protection. Since 1937 a renewal of rearmament. At present however, only a small number of divisions, which must form the nucleus of new divisions. Material for the army being gathered together from all over the world. Not before next summer is a positive action to be expected. The British army has only a symbolic meaning. Rearmament in the air is proceeding. The first phase will end in the spring of 1940. Anti-aircraft has only guns from the last war. A German flyer is safe from English anti-aircraft fire at 6000 meters altitude. The navy will not be fully rearmed before one to two years (1 - 2 Jahren). I have the greatest experience in rearmament and I know the difficulties which must be overcome therein.

After 1914 France reduced the length of service. After 1914 decrease of military might. Only in some special branches are we inferior. Only the French Navy was modernized. In the time after the war the French army deteriorated. There were no changes until Germany rearmed and announced her demands.

H1120-0130

In summary:

1) The number of active organizations in Germany is greatest.
2) Superiority of the Luftwaffe.
3) Anti-aircraft beyond all competition.
4) Tank corps
5) Large number of anti-tank guns, five times as many as 1914 machine guns.
6) German artillery has great superiority because of the 10.5 gun.
7) French superiority in howitzers and mortars does not exist.

Numerical superiority, but also the value of the individual soldier is greater than for the others. I am most deeply pained when I hear the opinion that the German army is not individually as valuable as it should be. The infantry in Poland did not accomplish what one should have expected from it. Lax discipline. I believe that the soldiers must be judged in their relative value in comparison with the opponent. There is no doubt that our armed forces are the best. Every German infantryman is better than the French. Not the exhiliration of patriotism but tough determination. I am told that the troops will only advance if the officers lead the way. In 1914 that was also the case. I am told that we were better trained then. In reality we were only better trained on the drill field, but not for the war. I must pay the present leadership the compliment that it is better than it was in 1914. Mention of the collapse while storming Liege. There was nothing like this in the campaign in Poland.

Five million Germans have been called to the colors. Of what importance if a few of them collapse. Daring in the army, navy and Luftwaffe. I can not bear it when one says the army is not in good shape. Everything lies

in the hands of the military leader. I can do anything with the German soldier if he is well led. We have succeeded with our small navy in clearing the North Sea of the British. Recognition of the small navy, especially the High Command of the Navy.

We have a Luftwaffe which has succeeded in safeguarding the entire living space of the Germans.

The land army achieved outstanding things in Poland. Even in the West it was not shown that the German soldier is inferior to the French.

Revolution from within is impossible. We are superior to the enemy numerically in the West. Behind the Army stands the strongest armaments industry of the world.

I am disturbed by the stronger and stronger appearance of the English. The English are a tough enemy. Above all on defence. There is no doubt that England will be very much represented in France at the latest in six to eight months.

We have an Achilles heel: The Ruhr. The progress of the war depends on the possession of the Ruhr. If England and France push through Belgium and Holland into the Ruhr, we shall be in the greatest danger. That could lead to the paralizing of the German power of resistance. Every hope of compromise is childish: Victory or defeat! The question is not the fate of a national-socialistic Germany, but who is to dominate Europe in the future. The question is worthy of the greatest efforts. Certainly England and France will assume the offensive against Germany when they are armed. England and France have means of pressure to bring Belgium and Holland to request English and French help. In Belgium and Holland the sympathies are all for France and England. Mention of the incident at Venlo: The man who was shot was not an Englishman, but a Dutch General Staff officer. This was kept silent in the press. The Dutch government asked that the body of the Dutch officer be given up. This is one of their greatest stupidities. The Dutch press does not even mention the incident anymore. At a given time I shall use that to motivate my action. If the French army marches into Belgium in order to attack us, it will be too late for us. We must anticipate them. One more thing. U-boat. Mines, and Luftwaffe (also for Mines) can strike England effectively, if we have a better starting point. Now a flight to England demands so much fuel that sufficient bomb loads cannot be carried. The invention of a new type mine is of greatest importance for the Navy. Aircraft will be the chief mine layers now. We shall sow the English coast with mines which cannot be cleared. This mine warfare with the Luftwaffe demands a different starting point. England cannot live without its imports. We can feed ourselves. The permanent sowing of mines on the English coasts will bring England to her knees. However, this can only occur if we have occupied Belgium and Holland. It is a difficult decision for me. None has ever achieved what I have achieved. My life is of no importance in all this. I have led the German people to a great height, even if the world does hate us now. I am setting this work on a gamble. I have to choose between victory or destruction. I choose victory. Greatest historical choice, to be compared with the decision of Friedrich the Great before the first Silesian war. Prussia owes its rise to the heroism of one man. Even there the closest advisers were disposed to capitulation. Everything depended on Friedrich the Great. Even the decisions of Bismarck in 1866 and 1870 were no less great. My decision is unchangeable. I shall attack France and England at the most favorable and quickest moment. Breach of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is meaningless. No one will question that when we have won. We shall not bring about the breach of neutrality as idiotically as it was in 1914. If we do not break the neutrality, then England and France will. Without attack the war is not to be ended victoriously. I consider it as possible to end the war only by means of an attack. The question as to whether the attack will be successful no one can answer. Everything depends upon the favorable instant. The military conditions are favorable. A prerequisite however, is that the leadership must give an example of fanatical unity from above. There would not be any failures if the leaders always had the courage a rifleman must have.

Individual acknowledgements: The enemy must be beaten only by attack. Chances are different today than during the offensive of 1918. Numerically we can use more than 100 divisions. With respect to men, reserves can be supplied. The material situation is good. Moreover that which is not

H1120-0131

ready today must be ready tomorrow. The whole thing means the end of the World War, not just of a single action. It concerns not just a single question but the existence or non-existence of the nation.

I ask you to pass on the spirit of determination to the lower echelons.

1) The decision is irrevocable.
2) The only prospect for success, if the whole armed forces are determined

The spirit of the great men of our history must hearten us all. Fate demands from us no more than from the great men of German history. As long as I live I shall think only of the victory of my people. I shall shrink from nothing and shall destroy everyone who is opposed to me. I have decided to live my life so that I can stand unashamed if I have to die. I want to destroy the enemy. Behind me stands the German people, whose morale can only grow worse. Only he who struggles with destiny can have a good intuition. In the last years I have experienced many examples of intuition. Even in the present development I see the prophecy.

If we come through this struggle victoriously - and we shall come through victoriously - our time will enter into the history of our people. I shall stand or fall in this struggle. I shall never survive the defeat of my people. No capitulation to the outside forces, no revolution from the interior forces.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 789-PS

3 October 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 789-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
O-1335567

789-PS

H1120-0133

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO 1143 -PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

Translation in full

Volkischer Beobachter
Editor: Adolf Hitler
Central Organ of the National-Socialistic
German Labor-Party

Berlin Editor
Berlin W.9, Linkstrasse.

20 Oct 32
Dr. Alfred Rosenberg, M.d.R,

Munich 13.

Dear Alfred:

I am sending you enclosed a communication from the R.W.M. forwarded to me by our confidential man ("Vertrauensmann") which indeed is very interesting. I believe we will have to take some steps so that the matterswill not be procured secretly for the Stahlhelm.

This report is not know to anybody else.I intentionally did not inform even our own long friend. I am enclosing an additional copy for Hess, and ask you to transmit the letter to Hess, by messenger, as I do not want to write a letter to Hess for fear that it might be read somewhere,

With best regards.

Yours Ame.

Airforce-organization.

Purpose: Preparation of material and training of personnel to provide for the case of the armament of the airforce,

Entire management as a civilian organization will be transferred to Colonel von Willberg (at present Commander of Breslau) who, retaining his position in the Reichwehr, is going on leave of absence,

(A) Organizing the pilots of civilianairlines in such a way as to inable their transfer to the airforce organization.

(B) Prospects to train crews for military flying. Training to be done within the organzation for military flying of the Stahlhelm which is being turned over to Colonel Haenel, retired. all existing organizations for sport flying are to be used for military flying.

Directions on kinds and tasks of military flying will be issued by the Stahl' helm directorate.

The Stahlhelm organization will pay the military pilots Mk 50 per hour flight. These are due to the owner of the plane in case he himself carries out the flight.

They are to be divided in case of non-owners of the plane between flight organization proprietor and crew in the proportion of 10 to 20 to 20.

My own note: Hereby the entire organization of military flying is being turned over to the Stahlhelm.

1143-PS

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO 1143-PS

Military flying is now paid better than flying for advertisement (40). We therefore have to expect that most proprietors of planes or flying associations will go over to the Stahlhelm organization. It must be achieved that equal conditions will be granted by thr R.W.M, also the N.S.D.A.P organizations.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 1143-PS

19.11.45

I, WILLARD EVANS.SKIDMORE, Lt (jg) USNR 391590,hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is correct and true translation of Document No 1143-PS

WILLARD EVANS, SKIDMORE
Lt,(jg) USNR.
391590

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H1120-0135

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1168-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Memorandum from SCHACHT to HITLER,
Identified by SCHACHT as Exhibit "A"
Interrogation 16 October 1945, Page 40.

May 3, 1935

Financing of Armament

The following explanations are based upon the thought, that the accomplishment of the armament program with speed and in quantity is the problem of German politics, that everything else therefore should be subordinated to this purpose, as long as the main purpose is not imperilled by neglecting all other questions. Even after March 16, 1935 the difficulty remains, that one cannot undertake the open propagandistic treatment of the German people for support of armament without endangering our position internationally (without loss to our foreign trade). The already nearly impossible financing of the armament program is rendered hereby exceptionally difficult.

Another supposition must be also emphasized. The printing press can be used only for the financing of armament to such a degree, as permitted by maintaining of the money value. Every inflation increases the prices of foreign raw materials and increases the domestic prices, is therefore like a snail biting its own tail. The circumstance that our armament had to be camouflaged completely till March 16, 1935 and even since this date the camouflage had to be continued to a larger extent, making it necessary to use the printing press (bank note press) already at the beginning of the whole armament program, while it would have been natural, to start it (the printing press) at the final point of financing. In the portefeuille of the Reichsbank are segregated notes (for this purpose: armament) of 3,775 millions and 866 millions, altogether 4,641 millions, out of which the armament notes amount to RM 2,374 millions (Status of April 30, 1935). The Reichsbank has invested the amount of marks under its jurisdiction, but belonging to foreigners in.....notes of armament. Our armaments are also financed partly with the credits of our political opponents. Furthermore 500 million Reichsmarks were used for financing of armament, which originated out of Reichsanleihe (Federal loans) placed with savings banks. In the regular budget the following amounts were provided. For the budget period 1933/34 RM 750 millions, for the budget period 1934/35 RM 1,100 millions, and for the budget period 1935/36 RM 2,500 millions.

The amount of deficits of the budget since 1928 increases after the budget 1935/36 to 5 - 6 millions RM. This total deficit is already financed at the present time by short term credits of the money market. It therefore reduces in advance the possibilities of utilization of the public market for the armament. The Reichsfinanzminister (Minister of Finance) correctly points out at the defense of the budget: "As a permanent yearly deficit.....is an impossibility, as we cannot figure with security with increased tax revenues in amount balancing the deficit and any other previous debits, as on the other hand a balanced budget is the only secure basis for the impending great task of military policy, for all these reasons we have to put in motion a fundamental and conscious

1168-PS

budget policy which solves the problem of armament financing by organic and planned reduction of other expenditures not only from the point of receipt, but also from the point of expenditure, e.g., by saving.

How urgent this question is, can be deducted from the following, that a large amount of task has been started by the state and party and which is now in process, all of which are not covered by the budget, but from contributions and credits, which have to be raised by industry in addition to the regular taxes. The existing of various budgets side by side, which serve more or less public tasks, is the greatest impediment for gaining a clear view over the possibilities of financing the armaments. A whole number of ministries and various branches of the party have their own budgets, and for this reason have possibilities of incomes and expenses, though based on the sovereignty of finance of the state, but not subject to the control of the Finanzminister (Minister of Finance) and therefore also not subject to the control of the cabinet. Just as on the sphere of politics the much too far reaching delegation of legislative powers to individuals brought about various states within the states, exactly in the same way the condition of various branches of state and party, working side by side and against each other, has a devastating effect on the possibility of financing. If on this territory concentration and unified control is not introduced very soon, the solution of the already impossible task of armament financing is endangered.

We have the following tasks:

(1) A deputy is entrusted finding all sources and revenues, which have its origin in contributions to the Federal government, to the state and party and in profits of public and party enterprises.

(2) Furthermore experts, entrusted by the Fuehrer, have to examine, how these amounts were used and which of these amounts can in the future be withdrawn from their previous purpose.

(3) The same experts have to examine the investments of all public and party organizations, to which extent this property can be used for the purpose of armament financing.

(4) The federal ministry of finances is to be entrusted to examine the possibilities of increased revenues by way of new taxes or increasing of existing taxes.

The up-to-date financing of armaments by the Reichsbank under existing political conditions was a necessity and the political success proved the correctness of this action. The other possibilities of armament financing have to be started now under any circumstances. For this purpose all absolutely non-essential expenditures for other purposes have not to take place and the total financial strenght of Germany, limited as it is, has to be concentrated for the one purpose of armament financing. Whether the problem of financing, as outlined in program, succeeds, remains to be seen, but without such concentration it will fail with absolute certainty.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1168-PS

21 November 1945

I, CARL RICHFIELD, civilian, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 1168-PS.

CARL RICHFIELD

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1168-PS

H1120-0137

1935 REICHSGESETZBLATT, Page 369-Nr. 28
dated 16 March, 1935.

TO THE GERMAN PEOPLE!

AN DAS DEUTSCHE VOLK!

When in November 1918, the German people trusting the assurances given in Wilson's 14 points, laid down their arms, after four and a half years of glorious resistance in a war which they never wanted, they believed, not only to have rendered a service to tortured mankind but also toward a great idea. Suffering the most, under the consequences of this insane battle, millions of our people faithfully grasped at the thought of a reorganization of the relation-ship between people. This would be improved by the elimination of secret diplomatic cabinet politics on one hand, and the horrible means of war on the other. The harshest results of defeat which are history appeared, to many German people as the necessary sacrifices in order to free the world once and for all of similar horrors.

The idea of the League of Nations has probably not aroused a more hearty approval in other nations than in the German which lost all earthly happiness. And so it was easy to understand, why the German people occupied and fulfilled the inane requests for destruction of armnaments. The German people, and especially the administration, were convinced that through their fulfillment of orders for disarmament, laid down at Versailles, an international disarmement program was going to be started and guaranteed. For only in a fulfillment of these orders, by both sides, lies a moral sensible justification for a demand, which if unilaterally imposed and executed, will lead to eternal discrimmination and with that, to a declaration of inferiority, of a great nation. But such a peace treaty could never be the pre-requisite for a real inner reconciliation of the people and with that lead to a pacification of the world; but it would only create an eternal buring hatred. Germany has fulfilled the imposed disarmament obligations laid down by the Inter-Allied Control Commission.

The following were the works of the destruction of the German military power and its means which were certified to, by this commission.

A. Army

59 897	guns and barrels
130 558	machine guns
31 470	trench mortars and barrels
6007 000	rifles and carbines
243 957	machine gun barrels
28 001	gun carriages
4 390	trench mortar carriages
38750 000	projectiles
16550 000	hand and rifle grenades
60400 000	fuzes
491000 000	small arms amunition
335 000	shells
23 515	cartridges and bullets
37 600	powder
79 500	empty shells
212 000	telephones
1 072	flamethrowers
31	armored trains
59	tanks
1 762	observation cars
8 982	wireless stations
1 240	Field bakeries
2 199	pontoons
981	pieces of equipment for soldiers and

1654-PS

H1120-0138

8230 350 sets of equipment for soldiers
7 300 pistols and revolvers
180 machine gun sleighs
21 mobile workshops
12 AA gun carriers
11 caissons
64 000 steel helmets
174 000 gas masks
2 500 machines of former war industry.
8 000 rifle barrels

B. Air
15 714 fighter planes and bombers
27 757 Airplane engines

C. Navy
26 battleships
4 coast guard vessels
4 destroyers
19 small destroyers
21 schooland special ships
83 torpedo boats
315 U-Boats

Remarks to A and B.

Further under the destruction duties; vehicles of all kinds, means of gas attack and partly gas defense, gas and explosives, searchlights, sighting mechanisms, range-finding and sound-ranging devices, optical apparatus of all kinds, harnesses for horses, narrow gauge equipment, field printing shops, field kitchens, workshops, slash and stabbing weapons, steel helmets, ammunition transport material, normal and special machines of the War industry as, buildings, blueprints thereof, airplane and zeppelin hangars, etc.

Following this unprecedented historical fulfillment of a treaty, the German people had the right to expect the redemption of the introduced duties also from the other side.

Because:

1. Germany has disarmed.
2. In the peace treaty it was plainly required that Germany must be disarmed in order to set precedent for general disarmament; this means, it was said that only in Germany's armament alone lies the basis for the armament of other nations.
3. The German people were filled with such principles in its governments and in its Parties which completely agreed with the pacifistic-democratic ideals of the League of Nations and its founders.

While Germany however had fulfilled its obligations on one side of the treaty, there remained the redeeming of the obligations on the other side. That means: the high treaty-makers of the former victorious states have unilaterally released themselves from the obligations of the Versailles treaty!

Not enough that every disarmament, was in some way or another comparable to the German destruction of arms, discontinued, nor Not even a stanstill in the armament was seen, on the contrary, the armament of a whole number of states became visible. What was discovered during the War in the way of new distructive machinery now was completed in a methodical-scientific way. In the field of creating mighty tanks, fighters and bombers, uninterrupted and terrible improvements took place. New large guns were constructed new high explosive, incendiary and gas bombs were developed.

In the meantime however, the world resounded again with war cries as if there never had been a World War and never a Versailles Treaty.

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Germany was an empty powerless space, among these highly armed War states, which continually made available the most modern motorized equipment; (Draefte) and had no defense against any menace or threat. The German people recall the disaster and suffering from fifteen years of economical distress, political and moral humiliation. It is therefore easily understood when Germany began to ask loudly for the redeeming of the promise of the disarmament of the other nations.

Because this is clear;

The world would not tolerate a hundred year long peace but it must be an unmeasureable blessing to her. But it would not endure a hundred year long break between conqueror and conquered.

The feeling regarding the moral rectification and necessity of an international disarmament was not only active in Germany but also within many other nations. Out of the pursuance of these strengths resulted attempts to try and direct an ammament reduction by means of conferences and thereby bring about a general international assismilation on a lower level.

And so resulted the first proposition for an international armament abrogation, of which we have the memory of the Mac-Donald Plan as being significant.

Germany was prepared to accept this plan and to take it as foundation of a final agreement.

It failed due to the rejection by other nations and was finally abandoned. Since the German people and Reich under such circumstances found no realization in the equality of rights solemnly guaranteed in the December declaration of 1932, the new German government saw in themselves, the guardians of the honor and the living rights of the German people; they were not in the position to continue to take part in such conferences or to belong to the League of Nations.

Even after the leaving of Geneva, the German Government was still prepared not only to consider proposals by other nations but also to make several practical proposals themselves. They undertook thereby the conception, which was coined by other nations themselves, that the creation of short service Armies are inappropriate for purposes of aggression and therefore are to be recommended for a peaceful defense.

They were therefore prepared to convert the long-service Reichswehr into a short service Army according to the wishes of other nations. Their proposals of the winter 1933/34 were practical and easy to accomplish. Their rejection as welllas the final rejection of the similar proposed Italian and English plan however led us to believe that the inclination toward a further sensible fulfillment of the Versailles disarmament provission no longer exists.

Under these circumstances, the German government was forced to t take every necessary measure which would guarantee the termination of conditions, which are just as unworthy as menacing; of the helpless defenselessness of a great people and Reich.

They started out from the same motivations as the very true expression given by Minister Baldwin in his last speech:

" A country, which is not willing to seize the necessary precautionary measures for its own protection will never have might in this world, neither moral nor material might."

The Government of the present day German Reich however, only wishes one single moral and material might; it is the power to be able to protect the peace for the Reich and with that, peace for all of Europe!

Therefore she did everything that was in her power and what could serve toward the furtherance of the peace;

1. For a long period of time she was proposed to all her neighbor nations, the signing of non-agression pacts.

2. She has sought and found an agreeable arrangement with the eastern neighbor nation, which, thanks to the great arbitrary understanding, has for ever decontaminated the menacing atmosphere which existed when they took over the power, and it will lead to a lasting understanding and friendship between the two peoples.

1654-PS

3. She has finally given France the solemn security that Germany, after the effectuated arrangement of the Saar question will not place or raise anymore territorial claims against France. She believes thereby to have created, in a historically rare form the prerequisite for the termination of a hundred year long conflict between two large nations through a great political and essential sacrifice.

However, the German government must witness to its regret, that for months a continually rising rearmament is taking place in the world. She sees in the creation of a Soviet-Russian Army of 101 Divisions, which means 960,000 men in present peacetime strength, an element which could not be forseen at the time of the composition of the Versailles Treaty.

She sees further signs of rejecting the disarmament idea, proclamated in its time, in the overdoing of similar measures. It is far from the German Government to reproach any nation. However, she sees today that through the present resolved introduction of the two-year military service in France, the basic ideas of the creation of a short service defense Army has been abandoned in favor of a long-service organization.

This, however, was one of the arguments used in the demands on Germany, to surrender its Reichswehr.

.....Under these circumstances, the German government feels that it is impossible longer to postpone taking the necessary measures for the security of the Reich, or even to hide them from the knowledge of the world.

Therefore, if it now complies with the desire, expressed in the speech of the English Minister Baldwin on November 28, 1934 for a clarification of the German intentions, then this is done:

1. IN ORDER TO GIVE THE GERMAN PEOPLE THE CONVICTION AND THE OTHER STATES THE KNOWLEDGE THAT THE MAINTAINING OF THE HONOR AND SECURITY OF THE GERMAN REICH WILL, FROM NOW ON, AGAIN BE ENTRUSTED TO THE GERMAN NATION'S OWN POWER.

2. but in order, by fixing the extent of the German measures, to invalidate those assertions which wish to imply that the German people are striving for a position of military hegemony in Europe.

What the German government desires, as the guardian of the honor and interests of the German nation, is to guarantee the extent of those means of power which are required not only for maintaining the integrity of the German Reich, but also for the international respect and esteem of Germany as a co-guarantor of the general peace.

For in this hour the German government renews, before the German people and before the whole world, the assurance of its determination never to trespass the limit of guarding German honor and the freedom of the Reich, and especially of its determination to (wish to) form, in the national German armament, not an instrument of military attack, but rather exclusively one for defense, and thus for maintaining the peace.

In so doing, the German Reich Cabinet expresses the confident hope that the German people, which thus regains its honor, may be permitted, with independent equal right, to make its contribution to the pacification of the world in a free and open cooperation with the other nations and their governments.

In this spirit the German Reich Cabinet has today passed the following law:

Law for the Organization of the Armed Forces of March 16, 1935.

The Reich Cabinet has passed the following law which is herewith promulgated:

Section 1

Service in the Armed Forces is based upon compulsory military duty.

Section 2

In peace time, the German Army, including the police troops, transferred to it is organized into:

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1654-PS
Contd.

H1120-0141

12 Corps and
36 ~~16~~ Divisions.

Section 3
The Reich Minister of War is charged with the duty of submitting immediately to the Reich Ministry, detailed laws on compulsory military duty.

Berlin, March 16, 1935

The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
ADOLF HITLER

The Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs
FREIHERR VON NEURATH

The Reich Minister of the Interior
FRICK

The Reich Minister of Finance
GRAF SCHWERIN VON KROSICK

The Reich Minister of Economics
Acting: HSALMAR SCHACHT
President of the Board of Directors of the Reichsbank.

The Reich Minister of Labor
FRANZ SELLTE

The Reich Minister of Justice
DR. GUERTNER

The Reich Minister of Defense
VON BLOMBERG

The Reich Minister of Post and traffic
FREIHERR VON ELTZ

The Reich Minister of Nutrition and Agriculture
R. WALTHER DARRE

The Reich Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda.
DR. GOEBBELS

The Reich Minister for Air
HERMANN GOERING

The Reich Minister of Science Education and Popular Culture
RUST

The Reich Minister without Portfolio
R. HESS

The Reich Minister without Portfolio
KERRL

The Reich Minister without Portfolio
Dr. HANS FRANK

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 1654-PS

2 Oct. 1945.

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt. Inf. 0-133 55 67, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Enlish and German languages and that the attached above is a true and correct translation of Document 1654-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt. Inf.
0-133 55 67

1654-PS

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2194-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

H1120-0142

REICH DEFENSE LAW

G-300 The Ministry for Economy and Labor Saxony Ref: Nbv:407g
Top Secret Dresden and 6 for September 1939
Tel: 52151/Long Distance 52051

To The Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia,
Transportation Section,
Attention of Construction Chief, Counselor Hirches
or Representative in the Office.

Prag

(STAMP) The Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia received, Prag, 5 Sept. 1939. No. 274.

Enclosed please find a copy of the Reich Defense Law of 4 Sept. 1938 and a copy each of the decrees of the Reichsminister of Transportation dated 7 October 1938--RL/V 10.2212/38, Top Secret-- and of 17 July 1939--RL/IV 1.2173/39, Top Secret, for your information and observance. By order --

3 Encl.: SIGNED: Kretzschmar.

Completed at Dresden 4 September 1939.

3 Enclosures. SIGNED: Schneider.

Receipt for the letter of 4 September 1939, Nbv:407g with 3 enclosures signed 5 September 1939 and returned to Construction Counselor Kretzschmar.

File: Nbv SIGNED: HI.

Top Secret
Enclosure 2.
RL/IV 1.2861/39G

The Reichsminister for Transportation.

RL/V 1.2173/39 Berlin 17 July 1939

44 plus 2 copies.
No. 45.

To the Subordinate Authority of the Reich and the States as well as the General Authority of the States to whom are attached:

(a) Waterways Deputies (Nbv).

(b) Deputies for local Transportation (Nbv).

(c) Deputies for ocean traffic. (Sbv).

To each one individually:

Subject: Protection of the secrecy of the law for the Reich Defense. (RV--Gesetz).

Ref: Decree of 7 October 1938 RL/V 10.2212/38, Top Secret.

2194-PS

The leader has agreed to the tacit omission of the secrecy protection of the Reich defense law of 4 September 1938 transmitted with the corresponding decree. In spite of the greater ease in business correspondence thus created, the following limitations, which are herewith brought to your attention for compliance, have been ordered by the competent office.

1. It remains prohibited to cite the Reich Defense law in public or in connection with laws to be promulgated, as well as publication of the contents of the law in its entirety.

2. It is permitted

   a. the mention of all installations founded on the Reich Defense law and their functions in public without referring to the law;

   b. the cosignature of laws which are prepared and announced in peacetime for war.

Deputy

Signed Baur.

SECRET STATE MATTER!

To GRS Nr. 10/39

Enclosure for RL/LV. I. 2861/39 g.

The Reich Traffic Minister

RL/L. 10. 2212/38 secret state matter

Berlin, W. 8, the 7th October 1938
Wilhelmstrasse 80.

47 and 3 copies

Examination Nr. 49

To the following Reich and State authorities from whom have been ordered

(a) deputies for water ways,

(b) deputies for the local traffic,

(c) deputies for ocean traffic

- but especially -

Subject: Reich Defense Law (Reichsverteidigungsgesetz).

Enclosed is transmitted copy of the Reich Defense Law signed by the leader and Reich chancelor on 4 September 1938. The promulgation remains suspended.

Deputy

Signed Baur.

To Abv.: 407 g.

H1120-0143

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TOP MILITARY SECRET

To OKW Nr. 10/39

1432

Reich Defense Law (Reichsverteidigungsgesetz).

of 4 September 1938.

The Reich cabinet has decided on the following law which is announced herewith.

I. State of Defense,

par. 1

(1) As possessor of the complete power of state, the leader and Reich chancelor can decree for the Reich territory or its parts a "State of Defense".

(2) If the political situation demands it the leader and Reich chancelor decrees the "Mobilization". The mobilization can be limited to a part of the Reich or of the armed forces.

par. 2

(1) Once the territory of operation is determined the chief of the army and the commanders of the armies have upon declaration of the state of defense without further order the authority to exercise executive power in this operational territory.

(2) The commanders exercising executive powers can, effective for the territory of operations, promulgate laws, institute special courts, and issue directives to the officials and offices competent in the territory of operations, with the exception of the supreme Reich officials, the supreme Prussian country officials, and the Reich leaders of the NSDAP. The lawfulness of directives precedes directives from otherwise superior offices.

(3) The boundaries of the territory of operations are determined by the supreme commander of the armed forces.

(4) Special directives for the case of a surprise threat to the Reich territory.

If a part of the Reich territory is surprised by a military threat, and if special decrees for defense against this danger cannot be awaited, then the commanders of the imperiled service commands (Wehrkreise) have the right to issue the directives which cannot be delayed and which are necessary for the protection of the imperiled territory to all non-military offices within their sphere of command. The same rights apply to the commanding admirals of the Navy in case of surprise threats against the coastal territory, and to the commanders of air districts in case of surprise attacks from the air within the framework of their war tasks. The execution of these directives has precedence over the other commitments and the directives of superior offices. The named commanders can transmit their right of issuing directives to subordinate officers down to the village counselor (Standortaelteste).

par. 3

(1) With the declaration of the state of defense the plenipotentiaries for the Reich administration ("Generalbevollmaechtigte fuer die Reichsverwaltung" GBV) named by the leader and Reich chancelor takes over the uniform leadership of the non-military administration with exception of the economic administration.

3194-PS

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To him are subordinate

the Reich minister of the Interior

the Reich minister of Law

the Reich minister for science, education and popular education,

the Reich minister for religious matters,

the Reich office for regional order (Raumordnung).

(2) The GBV must comply with the demands of the supreme command of the armed forces (OKW) which are of considerable importance for the armed forces. If the demands cannot be brought in accord with the affairs of the Reich administration the leader and Reich chancelor makes the decision.

(3) The GBV has the right within his sphere to issue laws with the accord of the OKW and GGBW which differ from the existing laws.

par. 4

(1) With the declaration of the state of defense the chief deputy for economics ("Generalbevollmaechtigte fuer die Wirtschaft" GBW), appointed by the leader and Reich chancelor, takes over the direction of the economy except for the armament industry.

(2) It is the task of the GBW to put all economic forces into the service of the Reich defense, and to safeguard economically the life of the German nation. To him are subordinate

the Reich minister of economics,

the Reich minister of nutrition and agriculture,

the Reich minister of work,

the Reich chief of forestry,

the Reich commissar for price control.

He is furthermore responsible for directing the financing of the Reich defense within the realm of the Reich finance ministry and the Reich bank.

(3) The GBW must carry out the demands of the OKW which are of considerable importance for the armed forces; and he must insure the economic conditions for the production of the armament industry directed immediately by the OKW according to its demands. If the demands of the armed forces cannot be brought into accord with the affairs of economy, then the leader and Reich chancelor decides.

(4) The GBW has the right within his sphere to issue laws with the consent of the OKW and GBV which differ from the existing laws.

par. 5

(1) The Reich postal minister, the Reich transportation minister, and the general inspector for the German road net are, with the declaration of the state of defense, bound to the demands of the OKW for the immediate affairs of the armed forces.

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(2) The following will get orders from the OKW:

(a) the Reich transportation minister for the use of means of transportation,

(b) the Reich postal minister for the use and distribution of the complete communication connections to the armed forces and the other agencies.

(3) The Reich transportation minister must comply, with the declaration of the state of defense, with the demands of the CBV according to the directions given to him by the OKW for the use of the means of transportation.

(4) In the spheres of the Reich postal minister, of the Reich transportation minister, and of the general inspector for the German road net, the chief of the OKW has the right to promulgate laws in accord with the GBV and GBW which differ from the existing laws.

par. 6

The Reich ministers and chief Reich offices carry out the tasks within their spheres on their own responsibility, regardless of the special competence of the chief of the OKW, of the GBV, and of the GBW, according to paragraphs 3, 4 and 5

par. 7

For the shaping of the political will of the people the deputy of the leader of the NSDAP is responsible. He uses for that the NSDAP, its formations and coordinated units.

II. State of War

par. 8

(1) If the fight with an external enemy is forced upon the German people, the leader and Reich chancelor declares the state of war.

(2) With declaration of the state of war the war laws and war decrees come into force without further order. The legal consequences provided in other laws for the state of war become effective.

par. 9

If the state of defense is not already declared beforehand the decrees about the state of defense go into effect with declaration of the state of war.

III. Preparatory Measures

par. 10

The Reich Defense Counsel (Reichsverteidigungsrat (RVR):

(1) The task of the Reich Defense Counsel consists in peace time in the decision on all measures for the preparation of the Reich defense and the gathering together of all forces and means of the nation according to the directions of the leader and Reich chancellor. The tasks of the RVR in war time will be specially determined by the leader and Reich chancellor.

2194-PS

(2) The leader and Reich chancellor is chairman in the RVR. His permanent deputy is general field marshall Goering. He has the right to call conferences of the RVR. Permanent members of the RVR are

the Reich minister of air and supreme commander of the air force,
the supreme commander of the army,
the supreme commander of the navy,
the chief of the OKW.,
the deputy of the leader,
the Reich minister and chief of the Reich chancellory,
the president of the secret cabinet council,
the chief plenipotentiary for the Reich administration,
the chief plenipotentiary for economics,
the Reich minister of foreign affairs,
the Reich minister of the interior,
the Reich finance minister
the Reich minister for popular enlightenment and propaganda,
the president of the Reich bank directory.

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The other Reich ministers and the Reich offices directly subordinate to the leader and Reich chancellor are consulted if necessary. Further personalities can be called as the case demands.

par. 11

The Reich Defense Committee (Reichsverteidigungsausschuss RV.):

(1) The Reich defense committee is the working committee of the RVR. It prepares the decisions of the RVR, sees to their execution, and secures collaboration between armed forces, chief Reich offices, and party.

(2) Presiding is the chief of the OKW. He regulates the activity of the committee and gives the directions to the GBV and GBW. and to the Reich ministries not subordinated to them and to the chief Reich offices according to the decisions of the RVR, which directions are necessary for securing their uniform execution.

(3) The RVA is composed of the OKW., deputy of the commissioner for the four year plan, the leader staffs of the GBV and GBW., and the Reich defense officials.

(4) Chief office officials for the Reich defense (RV-Referenten) and their deputies are commissioned by the deputy of the leader, by the Reich chancellory, by each Reich ministry, by the Reich leader of the SS and chief of the German police, by the Reich work leader, by the Reich forest master, by the chief inspector for the German road net, by the Reich office for regional order, by the Reich bank directory, and in the Prussian state ministry. The RV-Referent and his deputy are immediately subordinate to the minister or the state secretary, and to the chief of the Reich office, resp.

par. 12

The uniformity of the preparations for the start and the course of the mobilization is secured by the OKW.

As regards the actual formulation of the preparations, the GBV and GBW make the arrangements for their sphere.

par. 13

The Chief Plenipotentiary for the Reich Administration (GBV):

The GBV conducts the preparations for the Reich defense in the sphere of the ministries and Reich offices subordinate to him according to paragraph 3. They are bound by his directions already in peace time.

2194-PS

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par. 14

The Chief Plenipotentiary for Economics (GBW):

(1) The GBW conducts the economic preparations for the Reich defense as far as they do not come in the sphere of the OKW as regards the armament industry.

(2) The GBW must secure the economic conditions for the production of the armament industry immediately directed by the OKW according to its demands.

(3) The ministries and Reich offices named in paragraph 4 (2) are, within the framework of these directives, already bound for the preparation of the Reich defense to the directions of the GBW, the Reich transportation minister to his demands according to paragraph 5 (3).

IV. Final Directions.

par. 15

Penal Directions.

Whoever acts against the orders of a decree promulgated on the basis of this law, on purpose or negligently, will be punished with a jail sentence and money fine or with one of these punishments, if the act is not punishable with a heavier sentence according to other decrees.

par. 16

Execution and Completion Directives.

The OKW promulgates in agreement with GBV and GBW the law and administrative directives necessary for the execution and completion of this law.

par. 17

The law takes effect immediately.

Berchtesgaden, the 4th September 1938.

The leader and Reich chancellor
signed Adolf Hitler

signed Goering
General Field Marshall

The deputy of the leader
signed R. Hess

The Reich Minister of the Interior
signed Frick

The Chief Plenipotentiary for Economics
signed Walther Funk

The Reich Foreign Minister
signed Ribbentrop

The Chief of the OKW
signed Keitel

The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory
signed Dr. Lammers

H1120-0149

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2194-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Berchtesgaden, the 4, September 1938

Note to the Reich Defense Law

1. The Publications of the Reich Defense Law of 4 Sept. 1938, remains suspended.

2. The following laws and cabinet decisions are ~~repeated~~ repealed effective immediately.

A. Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935.

B. Decision of the Reich Cabinet of 4 April 1933 to form a Reich Defense Counsel.

C. Rectification and completion of 13 Dec. 1934 of the decision of the Reich Cabinet of 4 Apr. 1933.

D. Decision of the Reich Cabinet of 21 May 1935 on activity of the CB in peace times.

The Leader and Reich Chancellory,
(Signed) Adolph Hitler

The Reich Minister and Chief
of Reich Chancellory
(Signed) Dr. Lammers

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2149-PS

I, A. BREINER, X-046349, Civilian, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2194-PS

A. BREINER
Civilian
X-046349

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2261-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

C O P Y !

The Reichs Minister of War
and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
No. 1820/35 Top Secret L. II a

Berlin, 24 June 1935

TOP SECRET

To

The Supreme Commander of the Army
The Supreme Commander of the Navy
The Supreme Commander of the Air Forces

In the appendix I transmit one copy each if the law for the defense of the Reich of the 21 May 1935 and of a decision of the Reichs Cabinet of 21 May 1935 concerning the Reich's defense council. The publication of the Reich's defense law is temporarily suspended by order of the Führer and Reichchancellor.

The Führer and Reichschancellor has nominated the President of the directorate of the Reichsbank Dr. Schacht to be "plenipotentiary-general for war economy".

I request that the copies of the Reich's defense law needed within the units of the armed forces be ordered before 1 July 1935 at armed forces office (L) where it is to be established with the request that the law should only be distributed down to Corps Headquarters outside of the Reichministry of war.

I point out the necessity of strictest secrecy once more.

(Signed) von Blomberg.

No. 1820/35 L Top Secret II a

Berlin, 3 Sept 1935

To

Defense-Economic Group G-3
copy
transmitted

(signed) Jodl

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COPY!

Reichs' Defens Law
of 21 May 1935

The Reichs Cabinet has enacted the following law that is hereby made public:

Part I State of Defense

ARTICLE 1.

The Führer and Reichschancellor can declare a state of defense for the area of the Reich in case danger of war threatens.

ARTICLE 2.

(1) With the declaration of a state of defense the entire power of execution devolves upon the Führer and Reichschancellor. The Reichsminister of war exercizes it by his orders.

(2) The Reichsminister is empowered in the carrying out of the power of execution to issue legal regulations which may deviate from existing laws. He can, in order to enforce his regulation, threaten punishments and set up special courts.

ARTICLE 3.

(1) The Reichsministers care to observe the instructions of the Reichsminister of war. They remain the highest Reich authorities within their realm of activity.

(2) The Reichsminister will in case of a state of defense effect the necessary measures and are empowered to issue legal regulations which may deviate from existing laws.

Part II Mobilization

ARTICLE 4.

(1) If conflict with an external enemy becomes unavoidable, the Führer and Reichschancellor can order mobilization.

(2) The ordering of mobilization includes in itself the declaration of a state of defense according to Part I, in case the latter is not already proclaimed, without prejudice to the directive of Article Six.

(3) With the ordering of mobilization a state of war in the definition of this law begins.

ARTICLE 5.

The Reichsministers will effect the necessary measures in case of mobilization and are empowered to issue legal regulations which may deviate from existing laws.

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ARTICLE 6.

(1) The Führer and Reichschancellor will appoint a plenipotentiary-general for war economy to direct the entire war economy.

(2) It is the task of the plenipotentiary-general for war-economy to put all economic forces in the service of carrying on the war and to secure the life of the German people economically.

(3) Subordinate to him are:

The Reichsminister for economy
The Reichsminister for food and agriculture
The Reichs labor minister
The Reichs forest master and all Reichs' agencies immediately subordinate to the Führer and Reichschancellor.

Furthermore the financing of the war effort, (in the province of the Reichs finance ministry and of the Reichsbank) will be carried on under his responsibility.

(4) The plenipotentiary-general for war economy is authorized, within his realm of responsibility, to issue legal regulations, which may deviate from the existing laws.

Part III Setting of penalties and Conclusion

ARTICLE 7

Whoever purposely or carelessly acts in violation of a decree issued by authority of this law will be, insofar as a severer punishment is not stipulated according to other directives, punished with jail and with fine or with one of these penalties.

ARTICLE 8.

The Führer and Reichschancellor will issue the necessary legal and administrative directives for carrying out of this law.

Berlin, 21 May 1935

The Führer and Reichschancellor
(signed) ADOLF HITLER
The Reichsminister of war
(signed) VON BLOMBERG
The Reichsminister of the Interior
(signed) FRICK

Note
on the law for the defense of the Reich
of 21 May 1935

The publication of the law for the defense of the Reich of 21 May 1935 will be suspended. The law became effective 21 May 1935.

The Führer and Reichschancellor

(signed) ADOLF HITLER

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Copy.

Copy.

Decision of the Reichskabinettof 21 May 1935
on the Council for the defense of the Reich.

Supplementing the decision of the Reichscabinet of 4 April 1933 and 13 Dec 34 on formation of a council for defense of the Reich, the Reichscabinet has made the following decision:

1.) The plenipotentiary-general for war economy appointed by the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor will begin his work already in peacetime. At the suggestion of the chairman of the Council for the defense of the Reich, he will direct the economic preparations for war, insofar as they do not, in reference to the armament industry fall into the province of the Reichs' Ministry of war. In case of mobilization the following are subordinated to him:

Reichsministry of economic affairs
Reichsministry of for food and agriculture
Reichsministry of Labor
Reich's forest-master and all Reichsoffices immediately subordinate to the Fuehrer.

In case of mobilization he will direct and be responsible for the financing of the war effort (in the province of the finance ministry and the Reichsbank).

These ministries and the Reich's authorities are bound already in time of peace to observe his recommodations for the preparation of a war economy and the fiancing of the war-effort.

2.) The Reichsminister of War and the plenipotentiary for war economy will effect the preparations for mobilization in closest cooperation on both sides.

3.) The plenipotentiary-general for war-economy will be a permanent member of the Reich Defense Council (Reichsverteidigungsrat). Within the working committee he represents through his leadership staff the interests of war economy. The department heads (Referenten) for the defense of the Reich of the Ministries mentioned in Point I are bound by the recommodations of this leqdership staff.

Foundation:

The State of War, an institution of the old law, as it was established in the old Reichsconstitution of 1871, the Prussian law on the state of siege of 4 June 1861 and the Bavarian law on the state of war of 5 Nov 1912, has been only incompletely replaced in Article 48 of the Reichsconstitution of 11 August 1919. Moreover, the provisions of Article 48 no longer correspond to the actual legal conditions.

The new law for the defense of the Reich should create clear legal bases for the transfer of the whole machinery of state from a state of peace to one of war. In this connection it was to be noted that a state of war can begin unexpectedly or from a state of foreign political tension. Since the time of such tension must be utilized as far as foreign political relations will bear, it in order to create a readiness for war in time, the law for the defense of the Reich provides two steps for the transfer from state of peace to state or war:

1. The state of defense
2. The mobilization

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For both steps of war preparation, the law gives the legal basis, upon which the individual measures of the Reichsdepartments can be built up as the council for the defense of the Reich instructs.

It is to be mentioned in regard to the provisions of the law in detail:

To Article 2

The exercize of the power of execution by the Reichsminister of war under the Führer and Reichschancellor should emphasize the pressing necessity of all demands of the immediate conduct of the war and should guarantee their fulfillment.

To Article 4, Section 3

In numerous laws special provisions for war are contained. It is therefore necessary, to establish the beginning of a state of war, in respect to times in order to create clear conditions for the administration of justice etc. Since, however, in a future war official declarations of war are not to be expected, as a result of which Article 42 Section 2 of the Reichsconstitution also is obsolete, the beginning of a state of war is to be considered as being at the same time as the beginning of the mobilization.

To Article 6

The experiences of the great war have demonstrated the necessity of including during a war the entire economy and the financing of the conduct of the war under unified leadership. The plenipotentiary-general for war-economy should according to the will of the Führer and Reichschancellor take over the responsible leadership and stands thereby independently along side the Reichsminister of war, the possessor of the power of execution, and responsible for his realm of activity under the Führer and Reichschancellor.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 2261-PS

24 October 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document 2261-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
O-1335567

2261-PS

H1120-0155

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. [illegible]
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Excerpts from Hitler's Speech before the Reichstag on 22 May, 1935. (Volkischer Beabachter, Southern Germany Special Edition No. 142 a. of 22 May 1935, pages 1, 3, 4.)

Page 1. (Title:) Adolf Hitler's Great Speech before the Reichstag.

Berlin, 21 May 193[illegible]

Deputies! Members of the German Reichstag!

Page 3, column 5 & 6 bottom: Leaving these general conclusions now and arriving at a precise Fixation of the present current problems for me the

Position of the German Reich Government results as follows:

1. The German Reich Government refuses to adhere to the Geneva Resolutions of 17 March.

The treaty of Versailles was not broken by Germany uniliterally, but the well known paragraphs of the dictate of Versailles were violated and consequently invalidated by those Powers who could not make up their mind to follow the disarmement requested of Germany with their own disarmement as agreed upon by treaty.

2. Because the other powers did not live up to their obligations under the disarmement program, the Government of the German Reich no longer considers itself bound to those articles which are nothing but a discrimination of the German Nation for an unlimited period of time, since thru them Germany is being nailed down in a uniliteral manner, contrary to the spirit of the agreement.

But It solemnly declares that this measure is being taken only with regard to those well known paragraphs which are discriminating against the German People in a moral and factual way.

Therefore, the Government of the German Reich shall absolutely respect all other articles pertaining to the cooperation (zusammenleben) of the various nations including territorial agreements; revisions which will be unavoidable as time goes by it will carry out by way of a friendly understanding only.

3. The Government of the German Reich has the intention not to sign any treaty which it believes not to be able to fulfil. However, it will live up to every treaty signed voluntarily even if it was composed before this Government took over. Therefore, it will in particular adhere to all the aligations under the Locarno pact as long as the other partners of the pact also adhere to it.

The Government of the German Reich regards the fact that it has to respect the demilitarized zone, as an extremely difficult contribution by a soverign power, to the pacification, and it believes to be compelled to call attention to the fact that the constant increase in the number of troops on the other side may hot just be regarded to be of great comfort to these efforts.

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19 November, 1945

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2288-PS

I, Goetz Mayer, T/5, 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpt of Document No. 2288PS

Goetz Mayer 2288-PS

H1120-0156

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2289-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Volkischer Beobachter
Berlin edition No. 68
Berlin, Sunday, 8 March 1936

Excerpts, Page 1:

The important speech of the Fuehrer in the Reichstag on 7 March reads as follows:

Men of the German Reichstag! France has replied to the repeated friendly offers and peaceful assurances made by Germany by infringing the Rhine Pact through a military alliance with the Soviet Union exclusively directed against Germany. In this manner, however, the Locarno Rhine Pact has lost its inner meaning and ceased in practice to exist. Consequently, Germany regards herself for her part as no longer bound by this dissolved treaty. The German Government are now constrained to face the new situation created by this alliance, a situation which is rendered more acute by the fact that the Franco-Soviet Treaty has been supplemented by a Treaty of Alliance between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union exactly parallel in form. In accordance with the fundamental right of a nation to secure its frontiers and ensure its possibilities of defense, the German Government have today restored the full and unrestricted sovereignty of Germany in the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland.

Page 5, column 5:

After a hard inner struggle I have, therefore, decided in the name of the German Reich Cabinet (Reichsregierung) to submit the following memorandum to the French Government and the other signatory powers of the Locarno Pact today.

Page 6, column 1:

We have no territorial claims to make in Europe. We know above all that all the tensions resulting either from false territorial settlements or from the disproportion of the numbers of inhabitants to their living spaces cannot, in Europe, be solved by war.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, C. VIRGINIA von SCHON, Civilian, X-046318, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpts of Document 2289-PS.

C. VIRGINIA von SCHON,
Civilian, X-046318.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2292-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

H1120-0157

The German Air Force

(Die Deutsche Luftwaffe)

:	10.3.:
:S i	:
:	35 :

The Reich Minister for Aviation (Luftfahrt), General of the Airmen, Goering, in his talk with the special correspondent of the Daily Mail, Ward Price, expressed himself on the subject of the German Air-Force.

General Goering said:

In the extension of our national defence, (Sicherheit) it was necessary, as we repeatedly told the world, to take care of defence in the air. As far as that is concerned I restricted myself to those measures absolutely necessary. The guiding line of my actions was, not the creation of an aggressive force which would threaten other nations, but merely the completion of a military aviation (Luftfahrt) which would be strong enough to repel, at any time, attacks on Germany.

Until the present moment, this has been accomplished on a general basis, as so far we have been discussing airmen in general only without making any definite distinction from the military point of view. The British government, among other proposals, asked Germany to join an Air-Pact, whose object is to take joint action in the air against an aggressor who disturbs the peace, i.e. to put our own Air Force at the disposal of the threatened country. This is the British demand. Germany, trying to do everthing and trying to collaborate everywhere where peace can be ensured, replied by a Note expressing her agreement with such an effective protection as is represented by the air-convention.

In this Note Germany expressed to Britain the view, that Germany would be prepared to send her Air Force to the help of the threatened country.

After the German government expressed willingness to help, it became necessary to make a clear demarcation within German aviation, namely in this respect: which air force will be able to be made available? This situation brought about the decision as to those of the German aviation who will in future belong to the Air Force and those who will in future remain in civil aviation or in sport aviation. It was necessary to mark this separation also outwardly, so that the members of the German Air Force became soldiers according to the law and their leaders became officers. This involves only a part of the persons who up to the present moment have worked in the common (allgemein) German aviation. Therefore the difference between our Air Force and our civilian aviation shows itself clearly and distinctly in the various badges of rank and in the designation of rank.

I sum up: Our willingness to share in the effective defence of world peace, our assent to hasten with help to the hard pressed country, made the creation of a military aviation imperative, if our assent should not remain merely an empty phrase.

Answering the correspondent's question about the hierarchy in the new Air Force, its uniforms and its ranks the general said: "The Air Force is under the orders of the Reich Minister for Aviation who controls also civil aviation. His military rank in General of the Airmen (General der Flieger). The uniform remains similar to the uniform of the sport aviation organisation but outwardly it will be marked clearly by military badges of rank. Similarly the names of rank correspond with the military designation of rank from Lieutenant upwards to General of the Airmen." To the question concerning the nomination of German Air-attachés in foreign missions General Goering replied that the preparations for it were pending. Also about the numerical strength of the

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Air Force he said that he could not yet give final figures. As far as the percentage ratio to the Air Forces of other powers is concerned, every sensible and decent man ought to realise that Germany being particularly threatened needed such figures as would guarantee the absolute safety of the German people. Asked about the role of the Air Force within the Armed Forces General Goering stated that at the present moment, it was impossible to make a clear appreciation of the situation. But that it was definite that the Air Force must be an integral part of any defence (Sicherheit) and that without an Air Force the Army and the Navy, no matter how strong, were useless.

In conclusion the correspondent asked whether the German Air Force will be capable of repelling attacks on Germany. General Goering replied to that exactly as follows: "The German Air Force is just as passionately permeated with the will to defend the Fatherland to the last as it is convinced, on the other hand, that it will never be employed to threaten the peace of other nations."

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 2292-PS

30 October 1945

I, HIERONIM TROMBALA, Capt., General List, 204771, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 2292-PS.

HIERONIM TROMBALA
Capt., General List
204771

2292-PS

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2322 PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

HITLER'S SPEECH BEFORE THE REICHSTAG
1 SEPTEMBER 1939

Hitler's Reichstagsrede vom 1. September 1939

Members of the German Reichstag:

For months we have been tormented by a problem once imposed upon us by the Dictate of Versailles and which, in its deterioration and corruption, had now become utterly intolerable. Danzig and a German City. The Corridor was and is German. All these territories owe their cultural development exclusively to the German people, without whom absolute barbarism would reign in these Eastern territories. Danzig was separated from us. The Corridor was annexed by Poland. The German minorities living there were mistreated in the most appaling manner. Already during the years 1919/20 more than one million people of German blood were driven from their homes. As usual, I have tried to change this intolerable state of affairs thru proposals for a peaceful revision. It is a lie if it is claimed throughout the world thatwwe ensure all our revisions only by applying pressure. There was ample opportunity for fifteen years before National Socialism assumed power to carry thru revisions by means of a peaceful understanding. This was not done. In every single case did I then take the initiative, not once but many times, to bring forward proposals for the revision of absolutely intolerable conditions.

As you know, all these proposals were rejected. I need not enumerate them in detail: proposals for a limitation of armaments, if necessary even for the abolition of armaments, proposals for restrictions on methods of warfare, proposals for eliminating methods of modern warfare which, in my opinion, are scarcely compatible with international law. You know my proposals for the necessity of the restoration of German sovereign rights over the territories of the German Reich, the countless attempts for a peaceful solution of the Austrian problem which I have made, and later, on the problem of the Sudetenland, Bohemia and Moravia. It was all in vain. One thing, however, is impossible: to demand that a peaceful revision should be made of an intolerable state of affairs, and then obstinately refuse such a peaceful revision. It is equally impossible to assert that in such a situation to act on one's own initiative in making a revision is to violate a law. For us Germans the Dictate of Versailles is not a law. It does not work to force somebody at the point of a pistol and by threatening to starve millions of people into signing a document and afterwards proclaim that this document with its forced signature was a solemn law.

In the case of Danzig and the Corridor I have again tried to solve the problems by proposingpeaceful discussions. It was obvious that they had to be solved! That the deadline for this solution may perhaps be of little interest to the Western Powers is conceivable. But for us this deadline is not a matter of indifference! First and foremost, it was not and could not be a matter of indifference to the suffering victims. In Conferences with Polish diplomats I have discussed the ideas which you have heard me express here in my last speech before the Reichstag. Noon can say that this was an improper procedure or even unreasonable pressure.

I then had the German proposals clearly stated and I feel bound to repeat once more that nothing could be fairer or more modest than those proposals submitted by me. And now I want to tell the world that only I could afford to make such proposals, because I know very well that at that time I placed myself in a position contrary to the conception of millions of Germans by acting the way I did.

Those proposals were rejected. But not only that! They were answered by mobilization, by increased terrorism, by intensified pressure on the people of German blood living in these territories, and by a gradual economic, political and, during the past few weeks even military strangulation and blokade of the Free City of Danzig. Furthermore, Poland virtually began the war against the Free City of Danzig. Furthermore, she was not prepared to settle the problem of the Corridor in a fair manner satisfying the interests of both parties. And lastly, she did not even dream of fulfilling her obligations with regard to the minorities. I have to state here that Germany has fulfilled her obligations in this respect!

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Minorities living in Germany are not subject to persecution. Let any Frenchman get up and declare that French citizens living in the Saar territory are being oppressed, ill-treated or deprived of their rights. Noon can make such an assertion.

For four months I have watched these developments without taking action but not without issuing repeated warnings. Recently I have made these warnings more and more emphatic. Over three weeks ago, the Polish ambassador was, at my request informed that if Poland persisted in sending further notes in the nature of an ultimatum to Danzig and in further oppressing the people of German blood, or if she should attempt to ruin Danzig economically thru customs measures, Germany could no longer look on without taking action. I have left not room for doubt that in this respect the Germany of today is not to be confused with the Germany that existed before.

Attempts have been made to justify the action against the German minorities by declaring that they had provoked them. I am wondering in what the "provocation" thru the women and children who are being mistreated and deported, consisted, or the "provocations" of those who were tortured in the most beastly and most sadistic manner and finally killed! One thing, however, I do know: there is not one single great power with any honor who would tolerate such conditions for any length of time.

In spite of it all I have made one last attempt. Although I am deeply convinced that the Polish Government - perhaps also because of its being dependent on a unrestraint, wild military rabble - is not seriously interested in a real understanding, I have nevertheless accepted a proposal by the British Government for mediation. The latter proposed that it would not carry on any negotiations but assured me that it would establish a direct contact between Poland and Germany in order to get the discussion going once more.

I must here state the following: I accepted that proposal. For these discussions I had drawn up the fundamentals which are known to you. And then I and my Government were sitting for two whole days waiting for the Polish Government to make up its mind whether to finally dispatch a plenipotentiary or not! Until last night it had not sent any plenipotentiary but informed us thru its ambassador that at present it was considering the question whether and to what extent it might be able to accept the British proposals; it would inform England of its decision.

Members of the Reichstag! If such treatment is meted out to the German Reich and its Chief, and the German Reich and its Chief were to submit to such treatment, then the German Nation would deserve no better than to disappear from the political scene. My love of Peace and my endless patience must not be mistaken for weakness, much less for cowardice. Therefore, I have last night informed the British Government that things being as they are, I have found it impossible to detect any inclination on the part of the Polish Government to enter into a really serious discussion with us.

Thus, these proposals for mediation are wrecked, for in the meantime the answer to these offers had been, firstly, the order for Polish general mobilization, and secondly new grave atrocities. Repetitions of the latter incidents occurred last night. After recently twenty-one frontier incidents had occurred, there were fourteen last night. Three of them were very grave.

For that reason, I have now decided to talk to Poland in the same language Poland has been using toward us for months.

If there are statesmen in the West who declare that their interests are involved, I can only regret such a declaration; however, not for one single minute could that persuade men to deviate from the execution of my duties. I have solemnly declared and repeat once more that we have no claims at all on these Western powers, and shall never demand anything from them. I repeatedly offered Britain our friendship, and if necessary closest cooperation. Love, however, is not to be offered by one partner only, it'll have to find response from the other. Germany has no interests in the West, our fortifications in the West shall be the frontiers of the Reich for all times. We have no other aims in the future, and this attitude of the Reich will remain unchanged.

Some of the other European powers understand out attitude. First of all I'd like

to thank Italy for havingsupported us all this time. But you'll also understand that we do not want to make an appeal for any foreign help in this struggle. This task of ours we shall solve ourselves.

The neutral power have assured us of their neutrality just like we have previously guaranteed their neutrality. This assurance we consider a sacred obligation, and as long as nobody breaks their neutrality, we, too, shall observe it painstakingly. What could we desire or want from them?

I am happy to be able to inform you here of an event of special importance. You are aware of it that Russia and Germany are governed by two different doctrines. There was only one single question to be clearddd up: Germany has nointention of exporting her doctrine, and the minute Russia does not intend to export her own doctrine to Germany, I no longer see any reason why we should ever be opponents again. Both of us agreed onthis one point: any struggle between our two people would only result in benefits for others. We have therefore resolved to neter into an agreement which will exclude any application of force between us in the future, which compels us to consult each other in certain European questions, which makes economic cooperation possible and above all makes sure that these two great powers don't exhaust their energies in fighting each other.

Any attempt on the part of the Western Powers to alter these facts will prove futile, and in that connection I should like to state on thing: this political decision signifies an enormous change for the future and is absolutely final.

I believe that the whole German people will wecome this political attitude. In theWorld War, Russia and Germany fought each other and up to the end they both suffered. That shall not happen a second time! The non-aggression and consultation pact was yesterday finally ratified in Moscow and in Berlin.

In Moscow, the pact was acclaimed just as you have acclaimed it here. I approve of every word in the speech made by Mr. Molotow, the Russian Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

Our aims: I am determined to solve:
firstly, the question of Danzig;
secondly, the question of the Corridor
Thirdly, to see to it that a change shall take place in Germany's relations to Poland, which will ensure a peaceful co-existence of the two powers.

H1120-0161

I am determind to fight until either the present Polish Government is willing to effect this change or another Polish Government is preparddd to do so.

I am determined to eliminate from the German frontiers the element of insecurity, the atmosphere which permanently resembles civil war. I shall see to it that peac on the Eastern frontier shall be the same it is on our other frontiers.

I shall carry out all necessary actions in such a manner that they shall not contradict the proposals which I have made known to you here, members of the Reichstag, as my proposals to the rest of the world.

That is, I will not wage war against women and children! I have instructed my air force to limit their attackes to military objectives. However, if the enemy should conclude from this that he might get away with waging war in a differnet manner he will receive an answe thathe'll be knocked out of his wits!

Last night for the first time regular soldiers of the Polish Army fired shots on our territory. Since 5.45 a.m. we have been returning their fire. From now on, every bomb will be answered by another bomb. Whoever fights with poison gas will be fought with poison gas. Whoever disregards the rules of human warfare can but expect us to do the same.

I will carry on this fight, no matter against whom, until such time as the safety of the Reich and its rights are secured!

For more than 6 years now I have been engaged in building up the German armed forces. During this period more than 90 billion Reichsmark were spent building up the Wehrmacht. Today, ours are the best equipped armed forces in the world and they are far superior to those of 1914. My confidence in them can never be shaken.

If I call upon the Wehrmacht and if I ask sacrifices of the German people and, if necessary, unlimited sacrifices, then I am in the right to do so, for I myself am just as ready today as I was in the past to make every personal sacrifice. I don't ask anything of any German which I myself was not prepared to do at any moment for more than four years. There shall not be any deprivations for Germans in which I myself shall not immediately share. From this moment on my whole lif shall belong more than...ver to my people. I now want to be nothing but the first soldier of the German Reich.

This I have put on once again the coat which has always been the most sacred and dearest to me. I shall not put it aside until after the victory - or I shall not live to see the end.

Should anything happen to me in this war, my first successor shall be Party member Goering. Should anything happen to Party member Goering his successor shall be Party member Hess. To these men as your leaders you would then owe the same absolute loyalityand obedience that you owe to me. In the event that something fatal should happen to Party Member Hess, I am about to make legal provisions for the convocation of a senate appointed by me, who shall then elect the worthiest, that is to say the most valiant among themselves.

As a National Socialist and a German soldier I enter upon this fight with a stout heart! My whole life has been but one continous struggle for my people, for its resurrection, for Germany, and this whole struggle has been inspired by one single conviction: faith in this people!

One word I have never known: capitulation. And if there was anybody who'd think that hard timesare ahead of us I'd like him not to forget the fact that at one time a Prussian king with a ridiculously small staff confronted one of the greatest coalitions ever known and came forth victoriously after three campaigns because he possessed that strong and firm faith which are required of us in these times.

As for the rest of the world, I can only assure them that a November 1918 shall never occur again in German history.

I ask of every German what I myself am prepared to do at any moment: to be ready to pay with his life for this people and for his country.

Whoever believes to have a chance to evade this patriotic duty directly or indirectly, shall perish. We will have nothing to do with traitors. We all are acting only in accordance with our old principle: ourown life matters nothing, all that matters is that our people, that Germany shall live.

I expect of you, as deputies of the Reich, that you will do your duty in whatever position you are called upon to fill. You must carry the banner of resistance, cast what it may. Let noon report to me at any time that in his province, in his district or in his group or in his cell the morale is low. Bearers, responsible bearers of the morale are you! I am responsible for the province your district! None has the right to shun this responsibility. The sacrifice that is demanded of us is not greater than the sacrifice which has been made by many generations in the past. All those men who before us have travelled the most bitter and hardest road did nothing different from what we are called upon to do; the sacrifice they made was no less costly, no less painful, and therefore no easier than the sacrifice that may be demanded of us.

I also expect every German woman to take her place with unflinching discipline in this great fighting community.

German youth, needless to say, will do with heart and soul what is expected and demanded of it by the nation and by the National Socialist State.

If we form this community, forged together, ready for everything, determined never to capitulate, then our strong will shall master every emergency.

I conclude with the words with which I once started my fight for power in the Reich. At that time I said: "If our will is so strong that it cannot be broken thru any distress, then our will and our German state will be able to master and subjugate distress".

H1120-0162

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT No. 2322 PS

5 November 1945

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5, 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversar with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2322 PS.

GOETZ MAYER
T/5, 33812169

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TRANSLATION OF EXTRACTS OF DOCUMENT 2353-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

BASIC FACTS

FOR A

HISTORY OF GERMAN

WAR AND ARMAMENTS ECONOMY

2353-PS

H1120-0165

TRANSLATION OF EXTRACTS OF DOCUMENT 2353-PS
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Page 35

IV

The influence of central organization on development and activities of the war economy organization

Centralization of the Supreme Reich authorities, ordered in case of war, has influenced the development and the activities of the war economy organization to such an extent, that it is necessary to discuss this matter in detail.

The foundations had already been laid for the central organization of the Supreme Reich authorities in the event of a war, prior to 1933 in many discussions and decrees, but it was radically altered when the national socialists came into power and especially by the decease of Reichpresident von Hindenburg. The latest orders were decreed in the Reich Defense law of May 21, 1935, supposed to be published only in case of war, but already declared valid for carrying out war preparations. As this law (see Appendix IV, 1) fixed the duties of the Armed Forces and the other Reich authorities in case of war, it was also the fundamental ruling for the development and activity of the war economy organization.

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Page 135

XV

War and Armament Economic Measures from entry into Austria (1938 till mobilization 1939)

The discussion between the Führer and the Austrian Chancellor of State Schuschnigg on February 12, led to the military-political measures against Austria, which concluded with the entry into Austria on March 13. This action against Austria, disguised under the code name "Action Otto" prepared in a short time, has resulted in a wealth of experience of utmost importance, for the preparation of mobilization and especially for the economic preparations, and has in the course of the year led to changes in the regulations regarding mobilization.

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Page 136

The action was prepared and started without the cooperation of the WStb. The result was, that the military measures created great confusion in the economic sphere leading to unpleasant conditions for the army and also for the economy for the time being.

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Page 141

The experience gained during the action in Austria caused the OKW to issue new regulations, preparing the separating of the mobilization of the Armed Forces from the mobilization of the civilian elements. Mobilization of the Armed Forces without public announcement (X-case) was prepared, nevertheless there should be the possibility of proceeding at any time from the mobilization of the Armed Forces only, to a general mobilization of State, Nation and Economy. The basic idea is, that all actions and regulations in case-X are based on Civil law, a state of defense has not been declared and martial law has not been proclaimed. The appropriate measures were ordered on July 5 by the OKW. WStb and GBW expressed justifiable misgivings regarding these new regulations, as mobilization of the Armed Forces before mobilization of economy would create

2353-PS

H1120-0166

Page 141 (cont.)

considerable confusion and endanger the smooth running of the economic mobilization. On the demand for a divided mobilization was necessary from a military-political point of view, it was accepted in spite of the objections of the WStb and GBW.

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Pages 142-143

The first planned action by the war economy organization during an actual operation was at the time of the entry into the Sudeten territory. Liaison officers of the OKW (WStb) were attached to the corpscommandos, they were in charge of technical war economy units and finally, War Economy Offices for special missions were created to take over definite Economic departments. The military-political developments during the occupation of the Sudeten German territory evolved in such a manner, that the liaison officers as well as the technical war economy units and the offices of WWi were rarely in action. The planned preparation for action by these administrative units and their activities in the Sudeten German territory nevertheless provided experience which was also very valuable for the later Mob-preparations. Primarily it was admitted by all departments, that the installation of the liaison officers of the OKW (WStb) at the corpcommandos is of great value not only to the troops but also for OKW, and is a necessity in modern warfare. This proved especially valuable insofar, as the chief of the Civil government, were as a rule not instructed in their duties and authority, and the offices for special missions, first had to give them the necessary directives for their task.

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Page 146

At the beginning of the year 1939 a new level was reached as regards the military-political situation - the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia by the German army and the abrogation of the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia.- These operations also were prepared "war economically" by the creation of war economy units, who had, as in the case Sudetenland, a very small scope for action. Immediately after the occupation, a war economy inspectorate for special missions was set up, which took over all the duties of the Czechoslovak secretaryship general for National Defense and which was transformed into the Inspectorate of War Economy Prague on March 30, 1939 already. The main duties of the Inspectorate are:

Utilization of the total industrial economy of the Protectorate for the purpose of Reichdefense;

control of manufacture of war material for at home and abroad and

Effect synchronization of demands to be made by military and civilian Reich authorities and the industrial economy of the Protectorate.

Furthermore they are assigned:

the instruction of the Reichprotector on the economic demands to be made in the interest of Reichdefense and to advise him concerning legislation resulting therefrom;

air raid precautions in industry and guarding of factories and the Defence Measures (Abwehrmassnahmen) in the factories.

H1120-0167

TRANSLATION OF EXTRACTS OF DOCUMENT 2353-PS
(cont.)

Pages 181 - 184 XVIII

Execution of the economic mobilization

Before discussing the actual process of the economic mobilization I regard it as my duty, to give my opinion on the possibility of successful warfare as regards war economy, from my experience as Chief of the WStb gained during August 1939. During this time many conferences were held with the then Generaloberst Keitel discussing our readiness for war and conditions in regard to armaments as compared with that of the prospective enemy states. During all these discussions I maintained the point of view, that a war with Poland would present no problem for us, but that for a great world war of long duration, our economic structure would be too weak and that, in the case of a world war, decisive measures, conforming to a total war, would have to be carried out immediately. These objections and the resulting demands were nevertheless ignored.

The process of German mobilization in 1939 was most intensively influenced by the progress of the military-political situation and was carried out with the idea of surprising the enemy, at the right moment. The experience gained during the operations against Austria, Sudetenland and Czechoslovakia, which led to separate and camouflaged mobilization, formed the basis for the measures to be taken. The tension, existing between Germany and Poland since July, was used to take all the measures, necessary for a surprise attack on Poland. Some of these preparations as far as war economy was concerned were the acceleration of the delivery of armaments, which in particular was carried out by the branches of the Armed Forces and, for the organization of War-economy, the forming of war economy units to be attached to the attacking armies.

After August 1, the formation and distribution of VO of WStb took place, they were attached to the AOK; on August 24, formation of war economy units for the attacking armies concerned. On August 25, orders for the camouflaged mobilization were released, with Aug. 26, ordered as the first X-day. (see Appendix XVIII, 1 and Appendix XVIII, 2). In this manner the form of mobilization was ordered, which represented the most unfavorable form for the mobilization of war economy. Reiterated objections against divided mobilization, submitted by WStb as late as August 24, were overidden by the Chief of OKW, while the Supreme Command was of the opinion, that a war with Poland did not necessitate a General mobilization, and any other form of mobilization was out of question for political reasons.

On August 25 18.30 a copy of case X was remitted to the inspectorates of War economy (copy, see Appendix XVIII, 3).

The decree of August 25 orders expressly that case X shall not be extended in its entirety to civilian matters. Even though it was ordered that future proposed mob measures must not be endangered by unplanned demands, requisitions and commandeerings, there was still considerable danger in the mobilization being divided and carried out at different times. This was especially applicable as far as economy was concerned insofar as regulations for economy read that with the utmost consideration of economy in general only the most important war factories should be maintained at their former level and that only isolated war factories should be immediately speeded up to produce a large output. These regulations, in consideration of the Economic Policy which was to oppose every unnecessary change, and also of the kind of propaganda adopted were bound to endanger the planned process of economic mobilization.

The preparations, covering many years of work, for the mobilization of Economy were consequently, for the most part, invalid. This regulation was unfortunately to become an inconvenience later on when starting up the Armaments Industry and the economy of war and was even noticeable for the

2353-PS

H1120-0168

TRANSLATION OF EXTRACTS OF DOCUMENT 2353-PS
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Pages 181 - 184 (cont.)

first four years of the war up to the declaration of total war in 1943. A large number of the measures, contained in the preparation for mobilization of the WStb and invalidated by the above regulation, were not executed until 1943 as a result of demands by the Reichminister for Armaments and ammunition.

On August 27, 1939, the regulation on the administration of economy was issued, whereby the Oberpräsidenten were charged with executing and directing all economic measures of the GBW. Included in this was the official founding of the District Economy offices, the Provincial Food offices (Landesernährungsämter), Offices of forestry and economy of timber (Holzwirtschaftsämter) forming finally the organization, that should have been in force long ago as a result of the mobilization order by GBW.

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Pages 273 - 275

B. War Economy

The year 1940 was the first acid test for the value and necessity of the War Economy organization. After it had proved its value at home by the measures taken to strengthen the war economy of Germany especially in reestablishing the German war industry and reconstructing the armament industry and had earned the constant appreciation of Field marshal Goering, and the Reichminister for War, it now remained to prove that the organisation was also able to support the combat troops, to administer the economy of occupied countries and put it into operation again, and that there was an absolute necessity for such an organization in the present war. That this point of view is correct, is proved by the fact, that all allied- as well as enemy states constructed similar organizations, imitating the German pattern.

The operations against Denmark and Norway and the western campaign against Holland, Belgium and France brought full proof; the year 1942 has more than confirmed this point of view.

1. War Economy Measures during the occupation of Denmark and Norway

The occupation of Denmark and Norway brought for the German War Economy organization a gratifying and manifold task. The office Wi Rü was informed of the planned execution of these operations at the end of February, and thereupon ordered the preparation of the measures to be taken as regards war economy. It was decided, that a small staff under the direction of Major Neef (Group leader in the dept. of raw materials Wi Rü) should carry out the appropriate, preliminary preparations, for the organization which were to be carried out in accordance with the directives of OKW-WFA and the Oberquartiermeisters of group XXI charged with the operational preparations. Commander in chief of Group XXI was von Falkenhorst, General in the infantry; Colonel of General staff Baentsch, Oberquartiermeister. The war economy specialists, coordinated under Major Neef, were assimilated into the staff of group XXI on March 20, under the title "Group War Economy" and VO of OKW/Wi Rü office.

The first performance of the group was the compilation of material on the economic structure of Denmark and Norway, Then it worked on the war economy and armament part of the "Demands of OKW to the political plenipotentiaries of the Führer in the Danish and Norwegian Governments", and the economic measures in the "Special instructions on conduct during occupation of Denmark and Norway".

2353-PS

H1120-0169

Furthermore, special tasks were given to the war economy officers concerned and their first duties defined as follows:

a). Support of the military commanders in the utilization of the economy of the country in the interest of the armed forces;

b). Identification and safeguarding of supplies against unauthorized seizure or transport;

c). Starting or restarting of production plants;

any further war economy and armament tasks should be undertaken only by special order of OKW.

The working staff was able, during the four weeks available, to compile detailed material, providing the respective war economy departments with valuable material for their duties. All necessary orders, directives and so forth were issued in a special calendar in order of mobilization (mobmässig).

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Pages 276 - 282

On April 2 it was decided to select April 9 as the day on which the operation should be carried out.

The execution of the operation was on the whole carried out according to plan. Provision was made that the WO should reach their posts together with their respective staffs, namely, Major Neef by air, the WO Esbjerg and Aarhus over-land, the remaining gentlemen in the warships in which the staffs were transported, while all WO, though partly under heavy fighting, reached their objective on April 9, Major Neef was not able to reach Oslo until April 12, because of the opposition near Oslo.

The unified War Economy Organisation which had been prepared for Norway and Denmark depended upon the regulation that the Senior Command for special missions XXXI in Denmark war subordinate to group XXI in Norway. When it soon became evident that this arrangement did not work because of distances and because of the conflicting behavior of the Norwegian and Danish governments, it was decided on April 10 to make the Senior Command for Denmark directly subordinate to the Commander in Chief of the Army, while group XXI together with the forces operating in Norway was to remain Subordinate to the OKW. As a result of this change it also became necessary to divide the War Economy organization. The War Economy Liaison Office Denmark was placed under the supervision of the administrator of Danish economy, on the staff of the political plenipotentiary of the Führer in Copenhagen; the organization Norway under Major Neef remained attached to group XXI.

In Norway as well as in Denmark the assignment of War Economy Offices to the military detachments has proved successful. The War Economy Offices were burdened with so many problems that their small staff barely sufficed; they were very quickly maids of all work.

As soon as the offices were well established in their new districts and the most important military problems had been settled, they quickly attended to the construction of the War Economy Organization.

In Norway for the first few days after the occupation, the German Ambassador Dr. Brüer , remained the political plenipotentiary of the Führer. As Foreign Office commissioner, dealing with economic problems, Min. Direktor Sarnow of the Reich Wi. M. was attached to him. Major Neef immediately tried to secure a definition of the fields of work. However, . . .

2353-PS

H1120-0170

when this did not meet with any success, for the sake of the work, he arranged with Min. Dir. Sarnow that the office of WO Norway as should be incorporated into the Staff of the commissioner dealing with economic problems, as Main Division II. This measure, however, was never carried out, because both Dr. Brüuer and Min. Dir. Sarnow were recalled on April 22 and the Gauleiter of the NSDAP Terboven was named by the Führer as Reichcommissioner of the occupied Norwegian territories. All attempts by Major Neef to clarify the status and spheres of activity with the 2nd in Command of the Reich Commissar Gauwirtschaftsberater Otte, were for the time being unsuccessful. On April 27 the former Liaison Office was changed to the War Economy Staff Norway. The WO as a branch office was subordinate to the latter.

In Denmark, Commander Dr. Forstmann quickly succeeded in coming to an understanding with the German Ambassador von Renthe - Fink and his commercial attaché Dr. Krüger in regard to the spheres of activity. On May 27 the office was renamed "War Economy Staff Denmark."

The details concerning the establishing of the War Economy offices, their growth, and their manifold tasks have been thoroughly described in the accounts of the WStb Denmark and Norway. Hence, within the scope of this report the details will not come under discussion. In short attention should only be drawn to the tasks as a whole, and the most important experiences during this first large-scale operation of the War Economy Organization.

The problems which faced the war economy officers during the occupation of Denmark and Norway were very extensive and embraced both military as well as economic problems in all fields of economy. The military leaders were glad that officers trained in war economy were at their disposal, who were qualified to solve questions of an economic-organizational character and, as authorities, could negotiate with Danish and Norwegian Officials. At this moment the manner in which the War Economy Organization had been formed, proved its worth in that there was personnel trained in military as well as industrial and commercial fields. Thus it happened that problems were entrusted to the WO which really lay beyond the scope of their activities. The following may be named:

Supplying troops with food,
Motor vehicles and fuel,

Procuring billetting possibilities for the troops,

Securing money and regulating the currency problem,

Procuring material (cement, wood, etc.),

Providing coal,

Regulating transportation,

Loading troops onto ships,

Procuring raw materials and finished products,

Putting the fishing industry into operation,

Rationing food for the armed forces and the civilian population,

Rationing of fuel,

Cooperating with the sailings of ships putting in and out,

2353-PS

H1120-0171

Administering the loading of ships,

Checking over claims for compensation for war damage and requisitions,

Utilization of fish garbage and the manufacture of fish flour,

Price regulations for the purchase and renting of of real estate for the armed forces,

The loaning of horses and seed for agriculture,

These and similar problems had to be taken over by the WO, because the competent offices of the Armed Forces Departments were not there or were not in the position to solve these problems.

Only after these problems had been solved, was it possible for the WO to cope with the real problems affecting war economy, which dealt immediately with the seizing and securing of the most important agricultural supplies and the reestablishing of the means of subsistence.

Then the problems in Denmark and Norway shaped themselves in different ways as a result of the war situation (see appendix XX, 6). As early as June 15 the order could be issued regarding Denmark that the country be treated as being in the domestic theatre of operations; and therefore it was possible to quickly begin to make full use of the Danish defense and armament industry. The exploitation of the armament industry in Norway could only follow at a slower pace and at a later period, because it was regarded as being enemy territory. The utilization of the Danish and Norwegian economy followed within the framework of the "Proposals by the armed forces for the regulating of the general questions in regard to war and armament economy." (see appendix XX, 7).

Very soon it was necessary for the Wi Rü department and the War Economy offices in Denmark and Norway to take sharp measures in order to avoid duplication of work and the overlapping of the WT in Danish and Norwegian concerns. Above all, it was important for the sake of currency stabilization to keep a firm hand over the buyers of the WT, because they were causing danger to the currencies of the countries by flooding them with fiduciary monetary tender. It very soon became finally necessary to adopt measures to make the raw material available for those orders placed with Denmark and Norway, because, in part, the raw materials needed for the purpose of filling these orders were not to be had there.

In order to hasten the process of getting Norwegian industry into operation again, the Wi Rü Amt. sent German industrial and economic personnel to Norway, who, as middle-men, were to quickly establish confidential relationships and who on account of their expert knowledge were to accelerate the revival of Norwegian Economy.

The experiences of the first months of the occupation show that it is absolutely necessary to provide units operating independently with War Economy Offices, since in a modern war economic problems are submitted to the commanders which can only be solved by trained personnel. It is self evident that, later on, a major portion of the problems must be transferred to the civilian Economic departments, which will be set up, and that the soldier confines himself to the solution of economic problems that serve the troops, as long as no solution is found, as later proved to be the case, in the Netherlands.

The staffing of the WO for Denmark and Norway was in most cases too small, because the problems were too complex and the fields of operation

2353-PS

H1120-0172

allotted to them were too large.

Yet it is an established fact that the War Economy Offices, in Denmark and Norway especially, rendered invaluable services to the troops during the first months and that an organization for the reopening of industrial operations and to carry out the commissions of the WT was an absolute necessity.

Moreover, the outstanding work of the War Economy offices in Denmark and Norway was the main reason for the fact that, in 1941, it was possible to carry out, according to plan, the enormous work for the defense of the country, which was required of the Economies of Denmark and Norway by the Supreme Command.

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Pages 283 - 284

2. Campaign in the West

The operations against France, Holland and Belgium brought about the first real use of the war economy organization in enemy territory. It was accomplished in close cooperation with General Qu. of the Army.

At the start of the war, the Armed Forces operating in the West were, by reason of the experience gained during the campaign in Poland, supplied with Army Economic Officers (Armeewirtschaftsführer))(A. Wi. Fü)* who simultaneously were the liaison with the armament offices in the border territory.

The primary duties of the A Wi Fü attached to the Western armies were the tasks of economic evacuation and immobilization and only at the end of 1939 did the preparations for the entry into Holland, Belgium and France come to the foreground. The process of economic evacuation in the homeland rested mainly with the competent Rü commandos of the homeland, who had arranged the necessary preparations by way of mobilization, in accordance with the clearance measures already/during peacetime. prepared

Especially in the Saar territory the VO had a complicated task to perform, and was able to demonstrate the value of its existance for defense also.

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Pages 313 - 315

Negotiations with friendly and neutral states on war economy and also delivery of war material.

The year 1940 brought special problems for the office of Wi Rü as far as trade in war material was concerned as a result of the deliveries, necessitated by the military political situation, to Russia, Finland, Roumania and Italy.

As previously reported in 1939, according to the German-Russo treaty of August 19, 1939, the German deliveries on credit were to attain in the next two years the sum of 200 millions RM, 120 millions RM, thereof during the first year. It was indicated that German deliveries of material to the value of 500 millions RM were desired during the first year alone. As such quantities of machines, vehicles, apparati etc.

* Their designation first was VO of OKW/Wi Rü office, later changed to Army-Economy Officers.

2353-PS

H1120-0173

could not be obtained from the production point of view in such a short time, and as the Russians had also included war material in their request, the preponderant desire, from the beginning, at the Foreign office and the Reichministry of economy was, to put at the disposal of the Russians as much finished war material as possible.

As reported previously, the Russians had made ready for their first reciprocal delivery valuable foods and raw material (1 million tons cereals, 500000 tons wheat, 900000 tons of oil by-products, 100000 tons of cotton, 500000 tons phosphates, 80 millions RM of timber, 10000 tons of flax, manganese, platinum and the transit for 1 million tons of Soyabeans), and in consideration of the importance of these quantities to the German war economy and the importance which the Supreme Command attached to the maintaining of pleasant relations with Soviet Russia, the question of immediate reciprocal deliveries became steadily more pressing.

The desire to produce war material became stronger from week to week, so strong that OKW created a special Referat at Wi Rü charged with working on the Russian demands and arranging them in accordance with the German production program. Appendix XX, 21 and XX, 22 gives an idea of the progress of the arrangements.

As the Russians delivered quickly and well, it was imperative to accelerate German deliveries. Consequently the German High Command decided, to offer the Russians even more war material, that was already manufactured or under construction, and whose monetary value was great. The great cruiser Lützow especially came into this category other ordnance installations for ships, patterns for heavy artillery and tanks and important patents (lizenzen) for war material. As these contracts for this material did not satisfy the Russian requests, the Führer ordered, on March 30, that - as far as necessary - the delivery of war material to the Russians should have priority over the delivery to the German Armed Forces.

This order put some of the Army departments in a difficult position, as the High command also wanted production for the German requirements stepped up and demanded punctual delivery.

On August 14, the Chief of Wi Rü, during a conference with Reichmarshal Goering, was informed, that the Führer desired punctual delivery to the Russians only till spring 1941. Later on we would have no further interest in completely satisfying the Russian demands. This allusion moved the Chief of Wi Rü to give priority to matters concerning Russian War Economy.

By the end of October 1940, Reichmarshal Goering insisted once more, on pressure being exerted for accelerated deliveries to the Russians according to plan. (file notice from Oct. 5, see Appendix XX, 23).

Later on the urgency of the Russian deliveries diminished, as preparations for the campaign in the East were already under way.

The Russians carried out their deliveries as planned, right up to the start of the attack; even during the last few days, transports of India-rubber from the Far East were completed by Express transit trains.

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Pages 323 - 324

The production program ordered by decree of the Führer on Aug. 20, and instituted by reason of urgency, on Sept. 20, was stepped up again

2353-PS

H1120-0174

on Sept. 27, and amended insofar as the equipment under the code word "Achse" (African campaign) was to be given priority over all other equipment, including the ones in the special category.

As both the Army and Minister Todt were urging the high priority of the Panzer - and Achse-program, the Navy demanded its "Seelöwe" - measures accelerated and aerial armaments were being even more intensified, the Chief of Wi Rü office, at a conference of Chiefs of departments, presided over by Fieldmarshal Keitel, pointed to the difficulties of accelerating everthing at the same time, with the bad situation as regards manpower. He demanded once more a clarification of the organization, which was really the most important thing. Resulting from this the following decision was made by the WFSt on Dec. 3.40, enclosed as Appendix XX, 35.

This decision affected future measures as follows:

1). there is no longer any mention of an Invasion of England but only of a siege of England,

2). aerial defence of the homeland was placed at the top of the list for the first time,

3). the prospective big action (Russia) mentioned for the first time, and its postponement to some later date admitted as possible.

Shortly before, - on Nov. 6, 1940 - Reichmarshal Goering, for the first time made a statement to the effect, that we should prepare ourselves for a long war, and therefore planning of raw material should be considered in this perspective. (see file on Report at Beauvais on Nov. 6.40, Appendix XX, 36).

At the beginning of December, instructions were received, that for the time being there was no question of an Invasion of England, and that the "Seelöwe"-preparations should merely be concluded.

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Pages 368 - 373

War Economy

The year 1941 was, as far as war economy was concerned, mostly dominated by the preparations, respectively the execution of the action in the Balkans, the war in the East and the war in Africa.

The respective preparations go back to the year 1940. The development of the Italo-Albanian - Greeco war, the establishing of a German military mission in Roumania and the possibility of German participation in the Italian war in Africa had led as early as August 1940 to a War Economy Staff Roumania and in October a War Economy Staff Africa being created by the office of Wi Rü, to deal with the problems connected with these Theatres of war and charged with working out all the questions appertaining thereto. By the middle of November 1940 Colonel Gen. staff Spalcke was delegated to Roumania as member of the German military mission, and charged with the representation for war economy in the Balkan countries and in Africa and the completion of the necessary basis as regards war economy for an operation were intensively processed in the office of the Wi.Rü.

In November 1940, the Chief of Wi Rü together with Secretaries of state Körner, Neumann, Backe and General von Hanneken were informed by the Reichmarshal of the action planned in the East.

2353-PS

H1120-0175

By reason of these directives the preliminary preparations for the action in the East were commenced by the office of Wi Rü at the end of 1940.

The preliminary preparations for the action in the East included first ofall the following tasks:

1). Obtaining of a detailed survey of the Russian Armament industry, its location, its capacity and its associate industries.

2). Investigation of the capacity of the different big armament centers and their dependency one on the other.

3). Determine the power - and transport system for the industry of the Soviet Union.

4). Investigation of sources of raw materials and Petroleum (crude oil).

5). Preparation of a survey of industries other than armament industries in the Soviet Union.

These points were concentrated in one big compilation

"War Economy of the Soviet Union" and illustrated with detailed maps etc.

Furthermore a card index was made, containing all the important factories in Soviet-Russia, and a lexicon of economy in the German-Russian language for the use of the German War Economy Organization.

For the processing of these problems a task staff, Russia, was created, first in charge of Lieutenant Colonel Luther and later on in charge of Brigadier General Schuberth. The work was carried out according to the directives from the Chief of the Office resp. the group of depts. for foreign territories (Ausland) with the cooperation of all departments, economy offices and any other persons, possessing information on Russia. Through these intensive preparative activities an excellent collection of material was made, which proved of the utmost value later on for carrying out the operations and for administering the territory.

Simultaneously detailed investigations were made of the situation as regards fuel and rubber in the case of a major action in the East, on the basis of the demands made by the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces and the Gen. Qu. of the Airforce, which will be discussed later on.

Included in the processing of the Russian problem were matters of war economic nature connected with the Balkans and Africa.

Balkans

While the preparations for the Russian Campaign could be completed as planned, the measures for the action in the Balkans had to be improvisioned on account of the unsuccessful revolutionary outbreak in Yugoslavia. Only Colonel Wendt, as VO was sent to AOK-12 in Roumania at the begin of January as planned, and given charge of T. B. 13. The preparations were arranged for an entry into Greece only. When the revolt in Yugoslavia started, the preparations had to be altered. Department IV of VO AOK-12 was divided, the one half under Colonel Wendt to follow the assault of AOK-12, direction Belgrad, the other half under Captain v. Illberg to accompany the forces attacking towards

2353-PS

H1120-0176

Greece. Half a battalion each of T.B. 13 was put at the disposal of Colonel Wendt and Capt. v. Illberg, respectively.

With the arrival of the second army Col. Fach was installed VO in charge of T. B. 6 and 8. Furthermore he had specialists at his disposal, familiar with the economy of Yugoslavia and Greece. Dr. Pook of the Wi Rü Office was dispatched to manage copper mines at Bor.

Details of operations and results of the war economy units during the action in the Balkans; see report of OKW (Wi Rü Bureau) No. 27438/41 secret, of June 4, 1941, Appendix XXI, 10).

Even during the operations, organization of a War Economy Staff Serbia with a Wi. Commando at Belgrade was ordered, the staff was closely connected with Consul General Neuhausen charged with the Economic Administration of Serbia, by the Reichmarshal.

Also

a). a war economy officer Agram for the territory of Croatia and

b). a Rü-commando Klagenfurt for the Yugoslavian territories turned over to the Reich, were appointed (see Appendix XXI, 11).

The war economy staff Serbia quickly became of great importance for supplying the troops operating in the Balkans, and later on deserved much credit for the utilization and securing of the Yugoslavian raw materials, important for German armaments and by organizing the transport of these raw materials. The seizing of the still usable factories in Serbia and Croatia for assimilation into the German Armament Industry had already been started in April (s. Wi Rü Bureau No. 22-261/62 of April 29, 41. Appendix XXI, 12 and XXi, 13) and represented useful support for the W. T. especially for repair work but also for the manufacture of material of all kinds. The concerns processing raw material could be built up in the course of time to form a valuable support for the German war economy, the deliveries of copper, bauxite, tin, chromium, asbestos and mica were of considerable importance.

As the territory of Greece, by order of the Führer (see appendix, Wi Rü Bureau No. 22 263/41 2 of May 29, Appendix XXI, 14) was ceded to the Italians for economic exploitation, war economy offices were only installed in Greece where needed by the Army or for the security of transportation.

There was one Wi Kdo each established in Salonika and Athens. At the same time the confiscation and utilization was ordered of the factories, in the areas of Salonica and Athens occupied by German troops, necessary for war economy and armament (see Wi Rü Bureau, No. 22-263/41 s. file XXI, 15). The factories in Athen were especially important as repair plants for the airforce. But also by the delivery of oil and tobacco to the army and to the homeland the war economy offices rendered considerable service.

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Pages 380 - 381

The compilation was the result of the deliberations concerning the planned operation in the East, ordered by the Reich Marshall in November 1940. The Office of Economy and Armament ("Wi Rü Amt") had

2353-PS

H1120-0177

taken pains to give a completely objective picture of the situation regarding Defense and armament economy ("wehr - und Rüstungswirtschaftliche Lage") of the USSR and had held it necessary, to refer to the points which might cause difficulties for a military operation.

The result of this work compiled carefully on the basis of safely proved facts is summed up at the end as follows:

"Any operation leading to the occupation of the European part of USSR (without the Uralterritory), will bring the following results:

I. During the first months Germany will be relieved in the field of nutrition and raw materials, if a quick seizure should succeed in

a). preventing the destruction of stocks (stores; "Vorräte")

b). capturing the mineral oilfields of the Caucasas undestroyed and

c). solving the problem of transportation.

II. For longer duration of the war an effective relief is dependent on the following pre-requisites:

a). in all fields:

1). on the solution of the transportation problem,

2). On the staying ("verbleib"; translator's not: may also mean: "whereabouts") of the people (population and winning them over to collaborate.

b). in the field of agriculture:

1). on preventing destruction of the "M.T.S." and the possibility of replacing their pool of tractors and machines by taking up production again in the USSR.

2). on the possibility of fuel supply.

c). in the industrial field:

1). on the capture of powerworks undestroyed or on their fast restoration.

2). on securing the delivery of raw materials not existing in the European part of the USSR to the industry.

III. The supplying of Germany with India-rubber, tungsten, copper, platinum, tin, asbestos and manil hemp remains unsolved until communication with the Far East will be established.

IV. The territory south of the mouth of Volga and Don inclusive of the Caucasus must be included in the operation. The Caucasian fuel supply is indispensable for the exploitation of the occupied territories.

V. In the field of just the armament-industry it will lead to taking possession of about 75% of the total Russian armament industry and almost 100% of the precision tool-manufactoring and optical industory ("Feinmechanische and potische Industry")

2353-PS

H1120-0178

The USSR will keep about 25% of the mere armament and scarcely 1% of the precision tool-manufacturing and optical industry.

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Pages 404 - 406

In addition to the Italian negotiations, until June 1941 the negotiations with Russia were accorded a great deal of attention. The Führer issued the directive that, in order to camouflage German troop movements, the orders Russia has placed in Germany must be filled as promptly as possible, Since the Russians only made grain deliveries, when the Germans delivered orders placed by the Russians, and since in the case of individual firms these deliveries to Russia made it impossible for them to fill orders for the German armed forces, it was necessary for the Wi Rü office to enter into numerous individual negotiations with German firms in order to coordinate Russian orders with those of the German from the stanpoint of priority. In accordance with the wishes of the Foreign Office, German industry was instructed to accept all Russian orders, even if it were impossible to fill them within the limits of the time set for manufacture and delivery. Since, in May especially, large deliveries had to be made to the Navy, the firms were instructed to allow the equipment to go through the Russian Acceptance Commission, then, however, to make such a detour during its transportation as to make it impossible for it to be delivered over the frontier prior to the beginning of the German attack.

As a result of the visit of the Hungarian Minister, Excellence Bartha, the trade in war material with Hungary came once more into the foreground. Above all, the Hungarians demanded German help in equipping their air force, as well as anti-aircraft guns, search lights, and listening devices, tanks, artillery - and communications equipment, and heavy guns. For this they offered free facilities for the manufacture ofgauges and fuzes, artillery equipment, trucks and tank trucks. The Hungarians were promised help in almost all fields, however, not until the summer of 1942, because it was thought that by this time the campaign in the East would have come to an end. Technical help for the saving of raw material with the issuing of licenses was offered them immediately. The shifting of German orders to Hungary was put into effect.

The negotiations with Roumania and Finnland covered more ground, because both states made considerable demands for the improvement of the equipment of their units designed to fight against Russia. First, of all the Roumanians asked for anti-aircraft equipment, prime movers, and trucks for the motorization and artillery equipment of all kind; moreover, they asked that the artillery and munition orders placed in France and with the Boehler works be executed. The Finns demanded long-range guns, anti-aircraft guns, fuzes, airplanes and help in carrying out motorization. In accordance with the directive from the Führer, the Roumanians were promised help as much as possible, while the Finns were to be put off until later.

When the operations opened in the East, the demands became greater and more urgent; the Finns, especially, called for raw materials and fuel, These demands were met in the case of both these countries as much as possible.

Bulgarian wishes lay, particularly, in the field of motorization and communications and in the delivery of armoured reconnaissance cars and tanks. Only small deliveries could be made; in general the Bulgarians were instructed that, those states which were actually in the battle, must receive first delivery.

2353-PS

H1120-0179

Moreover, the negotiations with Turkey were of special importance. The office of Wi Rü was instructed to specially cultivate these negotiations, and to offer as much war material to the Turks as possible, on the one hand for military-political reasons, on the other hand, in order to force the Turks to make deliveries of chronium. Since the Foreign Office wanted in fall to assure the treaty for deliveries of Turkish chronium for the year 1942/43, more deliveries of war material, which partly constituted former Turkish orders, were promised for 1942.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF EXTRACTS OF DOCUMENT
NO 2353-PS

15 November 1945

I, EVELYN GLAZIER, P/O, W.R.N.S., 37371, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Extracts of Document 2353-PS.

EVELYN GLAZIER
P/O, W.R.N.S.
37371

2353-PS

H1120-0180

Testimony of: WERNER Von BLOMBERG
Taken at: Nuremberg, Germany
10 October 1945 - 1500 - 1645
By: Maj. John J. Monigan, Jr., CAC
Interpreter: Siegfried Ramler
Reporter: Tec 4 James P. Buck

MAJOR MONIGAN TO THE INTERPRETER:

Page 1

Q Do you solemnly swear to translate from English into German the questions I am about to ask the witness, and his responses from German into English, to the best of your ability, so help you God?
A I do.

MAJOR MONIGAN TO THE WITNESS THROUGH THE INTERPRETER:

Q You are reminded that you are still under oath.
A Yes.
Q I have just a few matters which were not discussed with you the last time you were here. I show you here a memorandum written in script, dated 2/5/35, which bears your signature and ask you if you recognize it.
A This is my signature, but what this order was aiming for, I don't recollect any more. I think it relates to some defense in the West, but I don't know the reason for this order. I think it has something to do with the general labor conscription which has come about in March. The date of this document is May, and the date of the Compulsory Labor Law was March. After the general Compulsory Labor Law there was in the western countries a big political excitement so that a conflict with arms from the West was possible.
Q Is it possible that this paper had to do with the reoccupation of the Rhineland?
A No. The first remark of Hitler regarding the reoccupation of the Rhineland was in February, 1936. I remember that date exactly because at that time there was the Winter Olympiade in Garmisch. On this occasion Hitler for the very first time mentioned his planning of the occupation of the Rhineland to our great surprise.
Q Previous to this time there was no discussion about that?
A No.
Q Now the actual re-occupation of the Rhineland was on the 6th of March, wasn't it?
A Yes, March, 1936.
Q Before the actual movement of the troops to occupy it, how much notice did you receive that such an occupation was to take place?
A A very short period of time. As I stated before, the first mention of it was at the Winter Olympiade in Garmisch, which according to my opinion was in February, 1936. A short time later Hitler gave the order for the preparation in Berlin. This preparation was very simple because it only concerned a very small amount of troops so that the commanding general and the leaders of the troops only had to know of it when they were actually invited into the train. The same applied to the ministers of the Reich cabinet.
Q Were not any orders issued from a Chief of Staff level to the various troop commanders to execute the movement?
A The orders only concerned the movement of the troops through the railway trains. They only received the orders where they should proceed after loading on the trains. They were in a sealed envelope and weren't supposed to be opened until they were inside the train.

C-139

2

Blomberg

H1120-0181

Q Do you remember how many troops were involved in that movement?

A I cannot exactly state the amount, but I don't think it was more than five infantry regiments. Of these the greater amount remained in Cologne and Coblenz and only a small amount was moved to Aachen and the other side of the Rhine.

Q All of this wasn't done by rail, was it?

A As far as I recollect everything was done by rail.

Q Do you at the staff level assign any code word to this movement?

A Certainly, but I don't recollect what code words there were.

Q But the code word that you assigned to this movement was not "Schulung?"

A I don't believe that, because in the year of 1935 there was no mention of the occupation of the Rhineland. I am quite sure that this code word "Schulung", was concerned with the general compulsory conscription law which led to a great tension in the West.

Q This was the Army Conscription Law?

A Yes.

Q Referring to this paper, why was it necessary to have the conscription law carried out with such lightning speed as referred to in the first paragraph?

A This procedure "Schulung" -- with that was not meant the conscription itself, but this was a consequence of the tension, because the conscription was put into operation in March while this document dates from May. Otherwise it was the rule that Hitler always kept any political plans secret to himself and only disclosed them to us by surprise. I can give two examples of that. When in the year 1935 we declared the general conscription law he placed the declaration of this order for one Saturday evening. Because he was of the opinion the customs connected with the English weekend would disturb the decisions of the British government he announced this on Saturday evening. And the same thing applied to the March into the Rhineland when the same day of the week was chosen.

Q Do you believe that this paper had to do with the possibility of the reaction of France and England to the conscription law?

A Yes. If I may add something to this -- Hitler, when he declared the conscription law counted on a reaction in the West, and he counted on a reaction in the West, and he counted on the same thing when we marched into the Rhineland. When I told him that resistance against England and France in case they would attack us with arms, that any such resistance would not be possible, then Hitler admitted that in that case we would withdraw our troops to the other side of the Rhine, and it meant considerable trouble to bring Hitler to this decision. But I must mention here in this case, in the influencing of Hitler's decision, I had the support of Goering. As I convinced him that the military situation was going to be impossible for Germany if England would answer forcibly against the march into the Rhineland, and France, too.

Q Do you recall now what was your purpose in publishing this order to the army and navy commands?

A This order only went to the Chief of the Wehrmacht department. This is Colonel General Fritsch. There was Admiral Raeder for the Navy and Goering for the Luftwaffe. Any secret command which has been directed to the Chiefs of the Armed Forces had to be kept secret by them, too, and only would be disclosed to the closest corroborators.

Q Now in paragraph two of the paper it refers in subparagraph a to the number of divisions which would be ready for action and what other suitable troops, including mobile fighting troops, could be made available for the invasion.

Blomberg

H1120-0182

A At this time in the army as well as the air forces the activation of the troops was in process, so that we in the central positions could not say with certainty how many troops could be available for a march. This is why we inquired how many battle-fit divisions could be made available. The reason for that is indicated in the next sentence wherein it says, "This is to be limited to defense necessary in resistance in the West."

Q That again was directed at the possibility of a French-British reaction in the West?

A Yes.

Q Now again in the third paragraph for the Luftwaffe, reference is made to a to support for the attack. What is the meaning of that?

A Had it come to a conflict of arms the support of the Luftwaffe in this question was impossible. At that time it was in such a position that any independent action by the Luftwaffe was out of the question. I remember at that time the heaviest type of plane in the Luftwaffe that could have carried bombs was the Junkers-52 which was a very slow type of plane.

Q I still don't think we have considered the relation to the Luftwaffe of the word "attack" in the third paragraph.

A Yes, this is right. However, I must point out in paragraph two, Roman Numeral I, where it says, ". . limitation only to defense." I must say that it is my opinion that this expression here, this "Schulung" attack has come here by mistake.

Q It is your recollection that "Schulung" was designed to mean an attack from abroad and not an attack on the part of the Wehrmacht.

A This last is quite out of the question because the Wehrmacht at that time was only in the initial stage of armament and in such a bad condition that any such thing would be completely out of the question.

Q Do you recall the discussion which took place in 1935 concerning the Franco-Soviet pact?

A You mean the pact between Franco and Russia?

Q No, Frankreich and Russland.

A Naturally we discussed it, and this was a reason for us to be very careful in our political actions. But we soldiers, and also Hitler to some extent, were quite convinced that in case Germany should be confronted with a war against two fronts, it would mean a very special burden, on the basis of experience we had in the first world war.

Q Were you consulted with regard to the memo which was prepared by the Foreign Office on the 25th of May, 1935 on the reaction of the French-Russian pact in which it was declared Germany would no longer consider itself bound by the Lacarno Pact?

A I was certainly not present at the discussion about this matter, but I am quite sure that VonNeurath has informed me about it afterwards.

Q The substance of the general memorandum on that subject indicated that by reason of the Soviet-French pact, Germany would no longer consider itself bound by Lacarno.

A I remember exactly that this opinion has always been held by Hitler, in as far as this pact between Russia and France it could only threaten Germany, and a new policy had started.

Q It then became clear that the occupation of the Rhineland would be possible because the Lacarno was discarded and so Germany could act accordingly.

A I don't remember that. I only know that Hitler for the first time in February, 1936, told us about his planned occupation of the Rhineland. It is quite possible that Hitler discussed this matter with VonNeurath alone.

Blomberg

H1120-0183

Q Had it been considered by the general staff as a matter of planning to consider the action it would take at such time as when the Rhineland was to be reoccupied before the order was given?

A No, because I remember exactly the leaders of the armed forces, such as Fritsch, Raeder, Goering, and maybe myself, were very surprised at the announcement of the occupation of the Rhineland, and I might say frightened. I remember that I called upon Goering at the time we were in Garmisch because he thought along the same lines. He thought it meant a great danger. I think I remember that Hitler spoke to Goering alone, because after such a discussion Goering was won over for the plan and then gave the orders.

Q Were the troops which were sent to occupy the Rhineland prepared to engaged actively in combat if there was any action taken to their occupation?

A The troops neither knew where they were being transported to, nor could they make a survey of the political situation, but I think for sure they took along heavy munitions. Some other preparations in the form of mobilization has not occurred.

Q Actually the troop commanders must have been instructed as to what course they should take if there was a reaction.

A Certainly I cannot give this in detail, but I am quite sure that they had the order they would have to defend themselves in case of an attack. I am quite sure of that.

Q At the time of the occupation of the Rhineland was there any substantial reason to believe that there would be a reaction there and the troop leaders should be prepared to act to such a contingency?

A We soldiers were quite convinced of the fact that the western powers would very severely react to the occupation of the Rhineland. The political excitement which followed that even for weeks all through western Europe then kept up tension for some time. This was also the reason why I suggested to Hitler that an actual fight could not be carried through. Hitler then considered that in case of an enemy attack he would withdraw his troops. This, however, has not been told to the troops.

Q Again referring to the paper in paragraph 1, 2, regarding the time for the mobilization of the troops taking part. To what was that directed?

A We believed that in case the western powers would react forcibly they would do so immediately, so that then there would be not time for any mobilization and then as it is said here, "Their use would have to be determined by peacetime concentration and armament."

Q But what body of troops were meant by "the forces taking part"?

A We could not judge that from our central position. The army leading staff possible should have notified us as is indicated, paragraph 2, section I, how many combat divisions and other powers can be made available for the action.

Q And that action again was the reaction to the conscription question, but not to the Rhineland matter.

A Only to the conscription.

Q I have here another memorandum dated in Berlin 25/10/33 which likewise bears your signature and ask you if you recognize that one?

A This document must relate to the termination of Germany's taking part in the Disarmament Conference, and the going out of Germany from the League of Nations and this is why sanctionary measures of the League of Nations were to be feared by Germany.

Q Was this paper prepared before the determination was made to leave the League?

Blomberg

H1120-0184

A The decision to leave the Disarmament Conference and go out of the League of Nations was decided by the Fuehrer, and this decision was made just as quickly as all his other decisions. I remember exactly that consideration for the consequences of this step were only taken after the event had occurred.

Q There are attached to this basic paper certain directives. Do you recall these also?

A I can see my signature and I certainly remember it, but may I read it through? (The witness thereupon read the paper given to him.) This is only an amplification of the basic order. In the first paragraph it is said that the leaving of the League of Nations and the leaving of the Disarmament Conference might result in a foreign political situation which might bring about sanctioning measures against Germany. And all the following paragraphs outlines what each one of the departments of the armed forces would have to do in such a case; that is the resistance of any armed attack for leaving the League of Nations and leaving the Disarmament Conference.

Q Actually those detailed directives which were included in the inclosures to the basic letters were not to be done until further directives were issued.

A It says here first in paragraph b that the circle of personnel is to be limited. I think something similar is being said in the amplifying note here. At first in paragraph c it says, "I forbid all practical preparations for the time being." Both directives have been issued on the same day so that one directive is related to the other.

Q Now in paragraph 2, a, regarding secrecy, reference is made to the demilitarized zone in the foreign policy.

A This relates to this -- the only chance of putting up resistance of any interference from western countries was on the Rhine. However, the demilitarized zone started 50 Kilometers east of the Rhine, so that a resistance on the Rhine would only be possible after a march into this demilitarized zone.

Q That demilitarized zone is identical to the Rhineland demilitarized zone, is it not?

A The eastern boundary of the demilitarized zone was 50 Kilometers east of the Rhine. Defense of the Rhine necessitated the march into this territory up to the Rhine. In the second amplification, 5 a, for a defense line, in the West the Ruhr, then the Rhine and the Black Forest was mentioned.

Q Actually that is the same zone into which the movement was made in 1936?

A Only in 1936 we moved forward a few battalions onto the west side of the Rhine. I think it was to Aachen and Saarbrucken.

Q From a military standpoint it was well known before the reoccupation of the Rhineland that as a matter of defense in the west it was necessary that the demilitarized zone must be reoccupied.

A At least the Rhine zone, because the only chance of resistance was by the broad Rhine river.

Q So any measures that they contemplated for a holding position on the west, it must be assumed that the militarization of that zone must be completed before a holding could be held on that zone.

A There is no doubt about that. If the French troops had crossed the Rhine and we did not defend ourselves against that, they would be within a short time in the heart of Germany.

Q Actually as it turned out in regard to this paper, in 1933 it was not necessary to take the action that was laid down here.

A No. This is why no more detailed preparations have been made in respect to this.

Blomberg

H1120-0185

Q And a similar condition existed regarding this. (Referring to a paper dated 2 May 1935.)

A Yes.

Q I think that will be all for this afternoon.

Blomberg

H1120-0186

EXTRACT FROM INTERROGATION OF WILHELM KEITEL

31 August 1945, by Mr. Thomas Dodd, OUSCC

Interpreter: Cpl W. Magnus, F211 Co C,
3rd Military Government Regt
Reporter: Nancy M. Shields, B.C.V.
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel

Page 24

Q The rearmament program was begun to the best of your recollection, when, would you say?

A In 1933 Hitler came to power and in 1934 he left the League of Nations. In 1935 he proclaimed military service.

Q Would you date the rearmament to the date of the proclamation of military service - the real beginning of rearmament?

A That was the real start of our armament. What we had done before was just a game.

Q In 1936 the rearmament program was increased, was it not?

A Hitler then proclaimed his intention, as I mentioned before, to establish twelve general commands of 36 divisions. That was the objective aimed at in the first period of rearmament. At the same time he built up the Luftwaffe and, of course, we supplied the officers, and very capable officers he drew at that time from the army.

Keitel

H1120-0187

EXTRACT FROM INTERROGATION OF ERICH RAEDER

8 November 1945, by Major J. J. Monigan

Reporter: Nancy M. Shields, BCV

Interpreter: Leo Katz

Pages 1-10, inclusive

Page 1

The interrogation was opened at 10:40 A.M. and the witness and the interpreter were sworn.

RAEDER: May I ask what part of the court I am confronting?
MAJOR MONIGAN: This is not a part of the court. It is the representatives of the United States Chief of Counsel. We represent the identical position as did the Soviet Delegation who interrogated you the other day, but we are for the United States.
RAEDER: Yes.

MAJOR MONIGAN TO WITNESS THROUGH THE INTERPRETER:

Q Would you state your full name?
A ERICH RAEDER.
Q And your rank?
A Grand Admiral; and Ph.D.
Q I show you document C-17, which is a table of contents of a history of the German Navy from 1919 to 1939, and ask if you can identify it in any way?
A I am to read it through?
Q Yes. If you can identify it without reading it, then it is not necessary.
A Is this a book?
Q Yes. It is the table of contents of a book.

(Hereafter, the questions were translated by the interpreter, but the witness gave his replies in English.)

A Who wrote this? Is it from your side?
Q No. It was prepared by Oberst Schurff. Are you aware of the circumstances under which the book was published?
A Oberst Schurff was a historian for Hitler? He wrote this. I don't know this book at all. I don't know from whom he has got all these things, because he couldn't know all that.
Q You are not, then, familiar with any book prepared by Oberst Schurff concerning the German Navy?
A No, not at all. I don't know that.
Q Was there ever any discussion concerning the possibility of Schurff preparing such a work?
A No. I knew only that Schurff had to write a history of this war, and therefore he was with Hitler, but I never heard that he wrote any such book.
Q And you don't have any recollection of lending your support and files of the Navy to any work which Schurff was engaged in writing?
A I know only that our Navy archives were always in connection with Schurff, but I thought only that he had to write things about this war.

Raeder

H1120-0188

Q Do you know whether Schurff was authorized to obtain information from the Navy archives and to work with the Navy archivists?

A Yes. That was an order of Hitler, that all material that he wanted, had to be given to him.

Q I have here a document, C-156, which is a photostatic copy of a work prepared by the High Command of the Navy and covers the struggle of the Navy against the Versailles Treaty from 1919-1935. I ask you, initially, whether you are familiar with the work?

A I know this book. I read it once when it was edited.

Q Was that an official publication of the German Navy?

A This Captain Schussler (indicating author) was a Commander in the Admiralty. Published by the OKM, it was an idea of this officer to put all these things together.

Q Do you recall the circumstances under which the authorization to prepare such a work was given to him?

A I think he told me that he would write such a book as he tells here, in the "Foreword".

Q And in the preparation of this work, he had access to the official Navy files and based his work on the items contained therein?

A Yes, I think so. He would have spoken with other persons and he would have had the files which were necessary.

Q Do you know whether, before the work was published, a draft of it was circulated among the officers in the Admiralty for comment?

A No, I don't think so. Not before it was published. I saw it only when it was published.

Q Was it circulated freely after its publication?

A It was a secret object and I think all upper commands in the Navy had knowledge of it.

Q It was not circulated outside of Navy circles?

A No.

Q What, then, is your opinion concerning the comments contained in the work regarding the circumventing of the provisions of Versailles?

A I don't remember very exactly what is in here. I can only remember that the Navy had always the object to fulfil the word of the Versailles Treaty, but in order to have some advantages; but the flying men were exercised one year, before they went into the Navy. Quite young men. So that the word of the Treaty of Versailles was filled. They did not belong to the Navy, as long as they were exercised in flying; and the submarines were developed, not in Germany and not in the Navy, but in Holland. There was a civil bureau and in Spain there was an industrialist; in Finland, too, and they were built only much later, when we began to act with the English Government about the treaty of 35 to 100, because we could see that then the Treaty of Versailles would be destroyed by such a treaty with England, and so, in order to keep the word of Versailles, we tried to fulfil the word of Versailles, but we tried to have advantages.

Q Would a fair statement be that the Navy High Command was interested in avoiding the limiting provisions of the Treaty of Versailles regarding personnel and the limits of armaments, but would attempt to fulfil the letter of the Treaty, although actually avoiding it?

A That was our endeavor.

Q Why was such a policy adopted?

A We were much menaced in the first years after the first war, by the danger that the Poles would attack East Prussia, and so we tried to strengthen a little our very, very weak forces in this way, and so all our efforts were directed to the aim to have a little more strength against the Poles, if they would attack us. It was nonsense to think of attacking Poland in this state and for the Navy, a second aim was to have some

Raeder

H1120-0189

defense against the entering of French forces into the Ostsee, because we knew that the French had the intention to sustain the Poles. Their ships came into the Ostsee, Gedingen, and so the Navy was defense against an attack of Poland and against the entrance of French ships into the Eastern Sea. Quite defensive aims.

Q When did the fear of an attack from Poland first show itself in official circles in Germany, would you say?

A In all the first years. They took Wilna. In the same minute, we thought that they would come to East Prussia. I don't know exactly the year, because those judgments were the judgments of the German government Ministers, the Army and Navy ministers, Groner and Noske.

Q Then those views, in your opinion, were generally held and existed perhaps as early as 1919 or 1920, after the end of the first world war?

A Oh, but the whole situation was very, very uncertain, and about those years, in the beginning, I cannot give a very exact thing, because I was then two years in the Navy archives, to write a book about the war and how the cruisers fought in the first war. Two years. So I was not with those things.

Q I show you a photostatic copy of a document dated "Berlin, 31 January 1933," being C-29, and ask you if you can identify it?

A Yes; I acknowledge that.

Q Was this document prepared by you and does it bear your signature?

A (In German) Yes. It was written by my staff and was ordered by me and signed, (In English) and I told that we would make the same as the other States. (Referring to paragraph c.) That is what we should do also.

Q Do you recall what the purpose of this memorandum was?

A In the Navy, all commands have the aim to hold secret all weapons, all technical things. I told them not to hold the things too secret because the development in all states is rather equal and so it had no use to hold these things so secret. It had to be the aim to support the industry, so that it could be in a position to hold competition with the other states.

Q Was this memorandum addressed to your subordinates in the Navy or to whom?

A (Referring to Distribution indication) That was distributed only to the departments in the OKM.

Q And this distribution list contained on the last page of the document, indicates it has been distributed only inside the OKW and not elsewhere?

A (In German) They were directives for the people in the OKM, so that we could accordingly make our actions. That is, the secret technical departments, which were very much concerned with keeping things secret.

Q And the handwriting which occurs at the bottom indicates the receipt in the several departments, of this directive?

A No. This is only the department that worked on it. That worked on the memorandum.

Q Do these notations . . .

A (Referring to handwriting). "A" was the department that had to work it out.

Q Do you know what the purpose of the handwriting is on this document?

A (In German) It was worked on in this department, and people who worked on it in the department had to take notice of it. Circulation through AIII.

H1120-0190

Q That indicates it was circulated to them and they acknowledged receipt of it?

A Yes, yes. This is apparently the copy that circulated in Department A.

Q What was the function of Department A?

A It was a military department. The Headquarters Office (Kommando Amt), and dealt with only military aspects.

Q I show you a photostatic copy of a note of a conversation, which is document C-189, and ask if you recognize it. It is not very clear. Do you recognize the handwriting?

A It is my own handwriting.

Q If you want to read it, perhaps you could read the English easier.

A Oh, no, I can read it! (Reading) Yes, I recognize it.

Q Do you recognize when that conversation with Hitler occurred?

A Yes. (Reading) June, 1934, when I was with the Captain of the "Karlsruhe", with Hitler. The Captain of the "Karlsruhe" told Hitler that his ship was going to leave Germany to go to America, on a voyage for the education of the cadets, or midshipmen.

Q The Fuehrer's instructions, referred to in the first paragraph, were directed to the "Karlsruhe" itself, or to other ships as well?

A This conversation had nothing to do with the commander of the "Karlsruhe" at all, but I had occasion to speak to the Fuehrer on the "Karlsruhe" and the Fuehrer had allowed us to strengthen the defensive weapons of the Navy, and the armor. Not the offensive weapons, but the number of guns, and he said that it was not allowed to speak of 25- or 26,000 ton ships. This displacement was the later aim. The ships had to be so strong when we had the Treaty with England, but until then the displacement had to be much smaller. (In German) The speed had to be kept secret, too, as we had the limitation of 25 sea miles.

Q What, in your opinion, was the purpose of your instruction from Hitler?

A Our aim was to keep everything secret and no Navy tries to tell the other Navies how fast the ships go and later, how large the tonnage is.

Q Actually, at that time, there were ships of the enlarged size in existence, were there not?

A Yes, certainly.

Q In the third paragraph, reference is made to the U-Boat construction. Had that been already begun?

A The development abroad had already begun. In Spain we had a U-Boat that an industrial man had built, and this industrial man was our agent with the Spanish Government, and in the same way, in Holland, preparations were already started, not only to have a model, but already to have the parts to start construction, and the Fuehrer had ordered this, that special secrecy was to be kept because we were negotiating at that time about the 35 to 100 Treaty and he didn't want to disturb the sentiment in any way.

Q I show you a document C-190, which is a photostatic copy of a conversation with Hitler on 2-11-34, and ask if you recognize it?

A I acknowledge that that was when the commander of the "Emden" took leave when he went abroad, and I again talked to the Fuehrer.

Q Does that again constitute a memorandum of the conversation you had with Hitler at that time?

A That was a report that I made afterwards as notes for myself.

Q Did the Navy get the money from Dr. Ley?

Raeder

H1120-0191

A No, we didn't get it. I told him that if I was to do all those things that he wanted me to do, then I could not manage with the money that I had received, but he acknowledged that if I was to execute all the things that he wanted me to, then I should have the money.

Q Did the money finally come from Dr. Ley or did you get it from regular sources?

A I cannot say exactly, but certainly not from Dr. Ley.

Q But you did get sufficient funds to carry out the program which Hitler desired at that time?

A Yes. The funds at that time were no longer granted by the Reichstag but by the Minister of Finance under the order of Hitler.

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